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ABSTRACT 
 
 The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically 
whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we 
define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military 
engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or 
intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile 
strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited 
uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a 
countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold 
War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian 
intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive 
reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine. Therefore, we need to 
understand the logic of unipolarity and how the hegemonic power can be drawn into actions, 
especially in the absence of a great power rival.  
 The theoretical puzzle we seek to solve comprises the competing explanations for why a 
presidential administration will decide to intervene in one situation and not in another. This is the 
normative question on which we focus from the outset in order to solve the theoretical puzzle. 
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Since both the situations and decision makers vary across cases, we need to know precisely what 
is driving the outcome. Therefore, our theoretical perspective and goal-driven research objective 
are focused on standardized, generalized questions: Why intervene? Why use force or not? Under 
what conditions or circumstances are intervention decisions made? 
     Do outcomes depend primarily on presidents making decisions as the all-important 
dynamic versus other variables and different measurements as to what drives the “go” or “no-go” 
decisions? Our examination of the phenomena of interest will lead us to a generalized theory as 
well as a typology of military intervention in the post-Cold War era.  
 
KEY WORDS: International Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Presidential Decision 
Making, Military Intervention. 
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CHAPTER 1 
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically 
whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we 
define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military 
engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or 
intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile 
strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited 
uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a 
countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold 
War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian 
intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive 
reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine. Therefore, we need to 
understand the logic of unipolarity and how the hegemonic power can be drawn into actions, 
especially in the absence of a great power rival. This study has found that interventions are more 
likely when international factors (support or pressure from allies and intergovernmental 
organizations), momentum from previous interventions, continuity from predecessor 
administrations, lessons learned from prior decisions, and an optimistic appraisal of the military 
situation are favorable. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
The question of U.S. military intervention and the direction (or drift) of American foreign 
relations since the end of the Cold War has received considerable attention in recent scholarship. 
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Kessler1 finds that past intervention experiences influenced “cognitive constructs” in the 
decision-making process; “reasoning by historical analogy” was crucial in the determination of 
how and when to intervene; and “past lessons linked perceived interests to policy preferences.” 
Peterson’s study2 of U.S. interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia finds that piecemeal 
application of historical analogies, perceived pressure due to U.S. membership in international 
organizations (i.e., NATO, UN), and the tendency to “demonize” individuals or groups involved 
in a conflict are key to decisions of armed intervention. Norton3 analyzes the Somalia, Haiti, and 
Rwanda decisions during the 1990s, concluding that U.S. involvement was in each case 
“nontraditional,” resulting from “intrastate” conflict, and motivated, at least partly, by 
“altruistic” aims. Hence, we synthesize the foregoing “list” or “menu” of theoretical reasons for 
military intervention suggested by these scholars to construct the larger puzzle that we intend to 
solve by looking hard at the chosen cases.  
THEORETICAL PUZZLE 
 The theoretical puzzle we seek to solve comprises the competing explanations for why a 
presidential administration will decide to intervene in one situation and not in another. This is the 
question on which we focus from the outset in order to solve the theoretical puzzle. On the one 
hand, does the president as an individual drive the decision-making process, or is the institutional 
presidency key, being his circle of key advisers? Thus, are “personality” and “informal factors”4 
                                                          
1
 Kessler, Bart Raymond: Military Intervention: A Cold War Assessment of the “Essence” of Decision. Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, 2003. 
2
 Peterson, Shannon: Stories and Past Lessons: Understanding United States Decisions of Armed Humanitarian 
Intervention and Nonintervention in the Post-Cold War Era (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 2003. 
3
 Norton, Richard James: Post-Cold War United States National Security Decision-Making: The Cases of Somalia, 
Haiti and Rwanda. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, 
MA, 2003. 
4
 Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds.: Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the 
Study of International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962). 
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determinative? On the other hand, are decisions reactive or determined by a variety of external 
factors (for example, “hard” versus “soft” crises)5: systemic, domestic, institutional, and strategic 
variables (for example, the “ornithological” shift of uniformed doves and hawks in three-piece 
suits since Persian Gulf War)?6 Are our best explanations based on power defined as influence 
projected through presence, as Schelling7 posits, or false optimism or pessimism regarding the 
likelihood or easiness of success, as Van Evera8 maintains? By comparison, a “no-go” is likely 
when decision-makers see no “upside” to action (e.g., Bush I regarding Bosnia and Haiti, cited in 
Halberstam9). Are decisions determined by the leadership (or management) style of the 
commander-in-chief, or mostly shaped by the self-motivated players participating in the 
decision-making process (i.e., what Condoleezza Rice called the “rarified staff”10)? If the style 
and personality of the chief executive are the drivers, should we seek answers in personal 
ideology (e.g., “nontraditional” and “altruistic” goals;11 “rhetoric of justice”;12 and “legality” 
versus “morality”13), generational experience (e.g., World War II and Vietnam War analogues in 
the Persian Gulf War, as noted by Woodward14), and reasoning by historical analogies,15 or, as 
Greenstein16 puts it, the president’s “vision of public policy” and “cognitive style”? Conversely, 
                                                          
5
 Nye, Joseph S.: Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999. 
6
 Bacevich, A.J.: American Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
7
 Schelling, Thomas: Arms and Influence (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966). 
8
 Van Evera, Stephen: Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1999). 
9
 Halberstam, David: War in a Time of Peace  (New York: Scribner, 2001). 
10
 Rice, Condoleeza: No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown, 2011). 
11
 Norton, Post-Cold War United States National Security Decision-Making. 
12
 Butler, M. J.: U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Inquiry of Just War Theory. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, April 2003. 
13
 Atack, I.: Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention. Security Dialogue, September 2002.  
14
 Woodward, Bob: The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 277, 307. 
15
 Kessler, Military Intervention. 
16
 Greenstein, Fred I.: The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
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is the president’s final action the outcome of the quality of a collegial process, where the quality 
of the decision (output) is the result of the quality of advice (input)?17 Since both the situations 
and decision makers vary across cases, we need to know precisely what is driving the outcome. 
Therefore, our theoretical perspective and goal-driven research objective are focused on 
standardized, generalized questions: Why intervene? Why use force or not? Under what 
conditions or circumstances are intervention decisions made? 
 The Persian Gulf War of 1991-1992, as a prototype case, was precipitated by an action 
most readily defined as a destabilizing event in the international system, at least regionally, 
threatening the equilibrium of order and power.18 In a different vein, Gaddis19 argues that the 
second Bush administration designed a “new grand strategy” following the 2001 terrorist attacks, 
the Bush Doctrine, based on unilateralism, pre-emptive use of force, and hegemony. 
      After Eckstein,20 the problem with critical-case studies based on a single instance is that 
any political event can be explained by some minimally plausible explanation that is not contrary 
to fact. If all determinants are possible or probable, none are proved. Therefore, we employ 
several instances of intervention and nonintervention (to be presented below) in solving our 
theoretical puzzle.  
       After Waltz,21 we also consider the systemic environment, wherein the United States 
acted as the sole military superpower in the post-Cold War period. According to Waltz, “In 
                                                          
17
 Burke, John P., and Fred I. Greenstein: How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965 (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991).  
18
 Bush, George H. W., and Brent Scowcroft: A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998). 
19
 Gaddis, John Lewis: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 
20
 Eckstein, Harry: Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1991). 
21
 Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 
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anarchy, there is no automatic harmony.”22 Thus, without the counterbalancing force of a 
competitive superpower, use of force would be less hindered if not inevitable. However, there is 
no reason to assume war is inevitable.23 Likewise, in agreement with Stoessinger,24 the system is 
motivated by power, order, and perception, the latter often being at odds with reality. Hence, we 
consider the other levels of analysis and inform our study by considering systemic, national, 
individual, and strategic factors for each case under study. At the national or domestic political 
level, we need to weigh the scope and quality of information available to decision makers,25 the 
role of institutional players (for example, perceived pressure from Congress)26 and bureaucratic 
politics,27 as well as the impact of public opinion, interest groups, and other constituencies.28  
       Given the unilateralism of Bush II’s key neoconservative advisers, or “Vulcans,”29 which 
would suggest “Groupthink,”30 how much did institutions factor into their decisions after 9/11? 
Unilateralism and interventionism may go hand in hand with executive decision making without 
recourse to Congress and the legal mechanism of the War Powers Resolution.31 To illustrate, 
members of Congress may at one point in time be calling for intervention in a particular case, but 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., p. 160. 
23
 Ibid., p. 186. 
24
 Stoessinger, John G.: The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time (New York: Random House, 1963). 
25
 Hersh, Seymour M.: Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. (New York: Harper Collins, 2004). 
26
 See Peterson, Stories and Past Lessons. 
27
 Allison, Graham T.: Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 
1971). 
28
 See Saunders, Elizabeth Nathan: Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca: Cornell 
 University Press, 2011); Anderson, Terry H.: Bush’s Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
 Von Hippel, Karin: Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (New 
 York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
29
 Mann, James: Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004). 
30
 Janus, Irving L.: Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). See also Janus, Irving L.: Groupthink: Psychological 
Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (2nd Ed., New York: Cengage, 1982). 
31
 U.S. Congress, War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong., H. J. Res. 542, November 7, 1973;  
see also Prestowitz, Clyde: Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions 
(New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
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later may join the chorus of opposition. Therefore, while institutions like Congress try to exercise 
influence on the chief executive, they probably act mainly as a loose brake rather than a 
significant or truly determinative player, notwithstanding the War Powers Resolution of 1974.32  
         Do outcomes depend primarily on presidents making decisions as the all-important 
dynamic versus other variables and different measurements (i.e., U. S. policy is fundamentally 
reactive, as Henry Kissinger and others maintain) as to what drives the “go” or “no-go” 
decisions? Our examination of the phenomena of interest will lead us to a generalized theory of 
military intervention in the post-Cold War era.  
METHODOLOGY 
 After George and Bennett,33 this study employs a structured, focused comparison 
method, whereby we ask the same, general questions of each case study and focus on the same, 
specific aspects of each case. 
        First, we identify the class (or subclass) of events we are studying. As we mentioned 
above, the phenomena of interest involve the actual or intended use of force (“boots on the 
ground”). Second, following George and Bennett,34 we define our research goal as requiring the 
comparison of several cases, rather than a single instance. Third, the variables of interest will be 
divided into four categories: (I) international or systemic, (II) national or political, (III) 
individual, and (IV) strategic or military. These categories are addressed by corresponding 
questions regarding the determinants of the decision making. We attempt to answer these 
                                                          
32
 Fisher, L.: Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers. St. Louis U. L. J. 43, 1999; Fisher, L.: 
Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and NATO. Case W. Res. L. Rev. 47, 1996-1997; 
Fisher, L.: The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act? American Journal of International 
Law, 85, 1995. 
33
 George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett: Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
34
 Ibid. 
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questions with respect to each category of variables. Thus, our theoretical focus is maintained by 
asking the same set of questions and presenting a common focus for each case.  
 The set of questions are as follows:  
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), 
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?  
 
 Ideally, in any such case, one would expect success, one would want international 
support, and one would want the result to be a more stable situation. As an example, the Persian 
Gulf War satisfied these expectations, whereas Bosnia held rather less promise.35 Similarly, did 
the perceived failure in Somalia cause the Clinton administration to hesitate in Rwanda, whereas 
perhaps the cumulative success of efforts in Haiti may have led Clinton to intervene in the 
Kosovo crisis three years later?36  
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have 
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?  
 
 For example, why did the Clinton White House demur in the wake of political and ethnic 
violence in Rwanda, but move to action in Haiti, a human tragedy of notably lesser scale in terms 
of the loss of life? If geography counts, perhaps Haiti trumped Rwanda on tangible interests, 
while Haiti became hostage to a domestic constituency, led by the Congressional Black Caucus, 
something Rwanda lacked. Another factor could be timing, corresponding with the domestic 
fallout from Somalia.  
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or management 
style) have a determinative effect?  
 
 Phrased differently, we may ask how much effect individuals have, since they do matter 
and always will. As a product of the World War II generation, arguments involving terms such as 
                                                          
35
 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed. 
36
 Holbrooke, Richard: To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998). 
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“aggression” and “appeasement” resonated with Bush I. However, for Clinton and Bush II, the 
paradigm may have been formed by “lessons” or “mistakes” of the Vietnam War. Also crucial is 
the quality and scope of advice available to, or solicited by, the president.37 Conversely, conflict 
and competition among key players can affect results. By way of illustration, George W. Bush’s 
jealousy of Secretary of State Colin Powell may have had an effect on decisional outcomes in 
addition to leveraging of different players’ preferences, such as those of Vice President Dick 
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice. Therefore, the number of participants, how wide is the circle of advisers, and the quality of 
advice all count as well as the participants’ preferences. Hence, we ask how much the 
subordinate players stack the deck in terms of the options presented to the president.  
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or nonintervention 
scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an administration and from 
one presidency to the next?  
 
 Bureaucratic politics would suggest faithfulness to the Weinberger-Powell doctrine and 
make the military a reluctant intervener. General Wesley Clark might be a key “player” who 
pushed or pulled the chief decision-maker, the president, in Kosovo, but the end result was 
victory in what was, in Clark’s words, “not, strictly speaking, a war.”38 Likewise, conflicting 
goals, unfinished business, and limited resources come into play, such as, for example, the recall 
of General Tommy Franks from Afghanistan in late 2002 to start drafting the order of battle for 
Iraq. The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait may have been a necessary correction to the 
regional strategic status quo, whereas the Iraq war after 2003 is seen as a “war of choice.”39  
                                                          
37
 Greenstein, The Presidential Difference. 
38
 Ignatieff, Michael: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Metropolitan Books, 2000). 
39
 Haass, Richard, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoire of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2009). 
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 Our challenge is to measure the weight of each factor against the others. In the end, a 
president’s decision may be individually determined, based on his own strong perceptions and 
worldview, even if external events, advisers, and the bureaucracy try to push the decision in a 
different direction. We hope to solve the puzzle in the process of examining the cases in this 
focused, structural manner. 
RESEARCH DESIGN: VARIABLES 
      Following George and Bennett,40 we formulate the objectives, research design 
(variables), and structure of our research; we carry out each of our case studies, based on the 
available data, according to the structured, focused comparison method; and then we will draw 
on our findings to construct a theory and anatomy of presidential decision making in cases of 
military intervention since the end of the Cold War. Thus, we identify our puzzle of presidential 
decision making as a building block study41 with respect to the phenomena of U.S. military 
intervention in the post-Cold War era. 
           As noted above, the categories of variables are given as follows: (I) International, 
systemic, or structural factors; (II) National, domestic, or internal political factors; (III) 
Individual, personal, and ideological factors; and (IV) Criteria for the use of force. 
I. International, systemic, or structural factors:  
 We consider the identification of crises that threaten regional instability, local disorder, or 
other undesirable outcomes; crises that present direct or indirect threat to U.S. interests or 
hegemony; and crises that pose a physical threat to American territory, property, or citizenry, 
either domestically or outside the United States.  
                                                          
40
 George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett: Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
41
 Ibid. 
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 The one constant is the unipolar or sole superpower moment. United States supremacy 
holds throughout the post-Cold War era, although the limits of American economic wherewithal 
to project such power has become more obvious. The United States still is “the indispensable 
nation” in the global environment. Therefore, if Bush I saw Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a 
systemic threat in 1990-1991, did Bush II perceive Iraq the same way after 9/11, armed with the 
Bush Doctrine as a guide to action? In other words, how did 9/11 change the way the U.S. 
perceived its post-Cold War goals and capacity to achieve them? 
Additionally, the structural factors include institutional actors, such as NATO, UN, and 
other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that may influence decision makers, even driving 
or pulling the commander-in-chief in a different direction from the course preferred by his 
domestic or political advisers. An example may have been the policy shift toward diplomatic 
(but not military) engagement in Bosnia after the transition from Bush I to Clinton because of 
NATO’s influence.42  
However, intervention in European crises such as Bosnia and Kosovo arguably were 
intended to stop the destabilization of an area of vital interest — in contrast to a reluctance to 
intervene in Africa because of its relative geopolitical unimportance. Additionally, so-called 
humanitarian intervention has involved other goals and factors. Similarly, actions such as the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 could have had underlying motives related to superpower hegemony. 
II. National, domestic, or internal political:  
We consider the influence of the roles of key institutional players, including the chief 
executive, specifically, presidential leadership style as a push or pull factor (as a subset of 
institutional roles). An example was Clinton’s initial reluctance to play a leadership role in 
                                                          
42
 Holbrooke, To End a War. 
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Bosnia, thereby affecting the approach of Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his 
negotiations with the European allies.43 Public opinion and popular support are decisional factors 
as well, including the so-called rally effect, the public’s assumed tolerance for casualties over 
time, and the perceived success or failure of the operation.  
 Bureaucratic politics influences each scenario, where decisions and policy are impacted 
by the standing, stature, and influence of intra-governmental actors, including agencies involved 
in intelligence, national security, defense, and diplomacy. For example, General Wesley Clark’s 
military missions in Kosovo44 may have succeeded despite inter- and intra-agency rivalries. 
Institutional, constitutional, and legal factors, such as executive-legislative relations, unified or 
divided government, the War Powers Resolution,45 and budgetary issues may have exerted 
relative weight in a decisional scenario. Given the long-term budget-busting costs of military 
action after 9/11, one wonders how much, if at all, finances constituted any kind of brake. In the 
case of Iraq, setting the vote for war just before the 2002 Congressional elections may have been 
intended to dampen or mute opposition voices. The examples of Clinton and Bush II illustrate 
persistent Congressional deference to presidential decision-making, in effect, turning a blind eye, 
to the War Powers Resolution.46 While Congress has not repealed the War Powers Resolution, 
that legislation has been ignored since the 1980s, although the GOP actually raised it in a 
partisan response to President Obama’s “lead-from-behind” action against Libya in 2011.  
III. Individual, personal, and ideological factors:  
                                                          
43
 Christopher, Warren: Chances of a Lifetime (New York: Scribner, 2001); Christopher, Warren: In the Stream of 
 History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
44
 Clark, Wesley K., Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 
2001). 
45
 U.S. Congress, War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong., H. J. Res. 542, November 7, 1973. 
46
 Hendrickson, Ryan C.: Clinton, Bush, Congress and War Powers (Eastern Illinois University, 2004). 
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 In addition to psychology, personality, and leadership style, historical reference points, 
including historical analogies and interpretation of historical events, are motivators as well as 
justifications for actions taken. For example, the appeasement-aggression model derived from 
the World War II experience apparently remained compelling for Bush I as a generational 
consensus that contributed to his response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the Persian Gulf 
War.47 A similarly generationally driven analogue on the issue of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weaponry in 2003 with the Cuban Missile Crisis was invoked at one point by George 
W. Bush.48 This last point is problematic in that it illustrates the misapplication or 
misunderstanding of historical analogies.49 The second war against Saddam Hussein went ahead 
without much overt concern about U.S. troops running into WMD casualties. Thus, Bush II’s 
team either misread the “lesson” of the Cuban Missile Crisis (and the caution exercised by JFK 
and his advisers), or perhaps simply expropriated this historical event to justify an already agreed 
upon decision to go into Iraq in 2003.50  
IV. Criteria for the use of force:  
 Whether or not explicitly stated by decision makers, the Powell Doctrine or Weinberg’s 
Rules of Engagement, as applied to each case, are not only a key set of dependent variables, but 
also measurements of the relative necessity (or desirability) for deployment of the military option 
in a given case.51 The assumed criteria for the use of force are as follows: (1) the first criterion is 
that all other options (negotiations, sanctions, etc.) have been ruled out for sufficient reason; (2) 
                                                          
47
 Bush, George H. W.: Heartbeat: George Bush in His Own Words, Jim McGrath, ed. (New York: Scribner, 2001).  
48
 Bush, George W.: Speech, Cincinnati, OH, October 7, 2002. 
49
 May, Ernest R.: “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1975). 
50
 Stern, Sheldon M.: The Wrong Model for the Iraq War. Thinking Peace, Web Site: 
 http://www.thinkingpeace.com/pages/Articles/Archive1/arts063.html, October 20, 2003. 
51
 Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Persico: A Soldier’s Way (London: Hutchings, 1995). 
19 
 
the political, diplomatic, or military objectives are clear; (3) the military battle plan to be 
employed is realistic (“doable”) and the military objectives can be effectively maintained 
(“winnable”); (4) there are sufficient resources to go into the situation with “overwhelming 
force”; and (5) there must be an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of 
personnel once the mission’s goals have been accomplished. We may seek evidence of 
consistency of criteria from clearly specified objectives through to an exit strategy. However, we 
do not presume that our case study scenarios will sustain the usefulness of these ideal criteria. 
Rather, the criteria serve as benchmarks for the selected case studies. 
 The cumulative effect of prior intervention or nonintervention decisions on subsequent 
actions can be considered within the life span of an administration, particularly past adjudged 
successes or failure. Somalia seems to have impacted Clinton’s Haiti and Rwanda decisions or 
non-decisions.52 Somalia is instructive because the mission’s goals and parameters (i.e., limits) 
evolved as events unfolded and was ultimately abandoned as a failure—a classic case of 
“mission creep.”53 By contrast, Haiti (1994) provides an instructive example of the decision-
making process because armed intervention against live resistance was avoided by the 
unexpected, last-minute success in diplomacy.54  
RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDIES 
 We will analyze six decision-making scenarios – Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Kosovo, Iran (Iran’s nuclear development), and Iraq – on the basis of four sets of variables and 
four corresponding questions from our focused, structured analytical framework , whereby we 
                                                          
52
 Lake, Anthony: Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 2001). 
53
 Bowden, Mark: Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). 
 
54
 Shacochis, Bob: The Immaculate Invasion (New York: Viking, 1999). 
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ask the same, general questions of each case study and focus on the same, specific aspects of 
each case. We devote the subsequent chapters to considering the selected case studies of military 
intervention in more depth. The selected cases represent a “go” and “no-go” for each of the 
presidents – Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II. For example, the Bush I administration moved 
diplomatically, militarily, and politically toward intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
in the Persian Gulf War and yet the same group of decision-makers declined to participate in 
NATO’s action in Bosnia one year later. Rwanda is instructive as a case of nonintervention to 
affirm the theoretical assumptions regarding presidential decision making. In contrast to the “no-
go” decision for Rwanda, the Clinton team made a “go” decision for Kosovo. The Bush II 
administration opted to go into Iraq in 2003 before “finishing the job” begun in Afghanistan in 
2001. Among several notable crises during the Bush II administration, 2001-2008 – Georgia, 
Darfur, North Korea, and Iran – Iranian development of a nuclear weapon capability was the one 
most likely to have been perceived as a regional or systemic threat to U.S. interests. Bush II’s 
decision-making team promoted weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the primary casus belli 
for the Iraqi intervention, but did little to counter Iran’s or North Korea’s nuclear weapon 
development. Selection criteria rule out actions and decisions involving different kinds of 
intervention, including retaliatory air raids or economic sanctions.55 A sufficient body of 
literature, academic and popular, exists on U.S. military intervention since the end of the Cold 
War to provide substantial qualitative information on the selected cases. There is a large body of 
congressional, intergovernmental, and organizational reports on all of the cases under study as 
well (see Select Bibliography: I. Documents). We will also consider the cases of Panama, 
Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan (as well as Libya and Syria during the Obama administration) in 
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a broad generalized survey of the question of decisions to intervene or not. Our goal is to build a 
generalized anatomy of presidential decision making and typology of U.S. military intervention 
in the post-Cold War era.   
SUMMARY 
           The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically to 
intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. Why had some 
intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), where decision-
makers came to believe they were compelled to act? For example, why did Bush I choose to stay 
out of the Serb-Bosnian conflict, while another president (Clinton) was convinced by staff and 
the course of events that he had a moral and political responsibility to act? An example of this 
case is to ask why the suspicion of Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction led to 
full-scale invasion, whereas other nations’ clandestine nuclear weaponry (e.g., North Korea and 
Iran) was considered a cause for concern rather than a cause for war. Why did a president decide 
to intervene in one case and not in another, or decide differently from another, where his 
predecessor or successor may have weighed largely identical considerations in the same 
scenarios at a different stage? As an example, why did the Clinton White House demur in the 
wake of political and ethnic violence in Rwanda, but move to action in Haiti, a human tragedy of 
notably lesser scale in terms of the loss of life? Do individual human factors (psychology, 
ideology, worldview, or management style) have a determinative effect? Therefore, we consider 
the commander-in-chief’s leadership or management style as well as the so-called lessons of 
history or historical reference points, which, in turn, reflect an individual’s worldview, values, 
and belief system. Finally, we ask how did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous 
intervention or nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of 
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an administration and from one presidency to the next? The cumulative effect of successive 
intervention actions seems also linked to perceptions of success or failure. Thus, did the 
perceived negative outcome (or consequences) of the Mogadishu, Somalia operation factor in the 
decisions regarding Haiti and Rwanda in 1994? Hence, did the case of Haiti’s peaceful 
intervention present the chance to get a “win,” or was the decision not to intervene to prevent 
genocide in Rwanda the result of gun-shyness? To answer these questions leads to an anatomy 
and typology of presidential decision making.  
The selected case studies are by consensus the most important military interventions 
since the end of the cold war.  Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the question of U.S. military 
intervention in the post-Cold War period and our structured, focused comparison framework. 
Chapters 2 and 3 cover the Bush I administration’s decision making in the Persian Gulf War and 
Bosnia, a “go” and “no-go” decision, respectively. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the Clinton 
administration’s “no-go” in the case of Rwanda and “go” decision for Kosovo. Chapters 6 and 7 
consider the Bush II administration’s decision to “go” in the case of Iraq and “no-go” in the case 
of Iran. Chapter 8 reviews a range of additional cases of US military intervention since the end of 
the Cold War, including Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan (as well as the recent cases of 
Libya and Syria) in order to build an anatomy and typology of presidential decision making.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
BUSH I: PERSIAN GULF WAR—GO 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Persian Gulf War (January 15—February 28, 1991) was a military intervention 
against Iraq by the United States at the head of a 34-nation coalition to expel Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait. The intervention was precipitated by Iraq’s invasion and occupation of neighboring 
Kuwait in August 1990. The primary actions were air and ground attacks in Kuwait, Iraq, and 
Saudi Arabia, resulting in the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and causing Iraq’s leader, 
Saddam Hussein, to sue for a ceasefire. The conflict was largely confined to the Kuwaiti, Iraqi, 
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and Saudi border regions, except for Iraq’s Scud missile attacks on Israeli targets as a 
diversionary or provocative tactic. U.S. and coalition casualties (145 personnel killed in action) 
were minimal and equipment losses were considered insignificant. 
 What causes war? How do actors prevent conflicts? According to Van Evera, five 
conditions lead to the risk of interstate war: (1) false optimism with respect to the outcome; (2) 
first-strike capability advantage; (3) fluctuations of relative power among states; (4) one conflict 
spilling over into another; and (5) circumstances leading to easy conquest. In the post-Cold War 
era, false optimism persists as the salience of the other conditions has diminished.56  
The Bush I administration’s decision to intervene in the Persian Gulf War was 
overdetermined: several factors contributed to the decision and no single factor was 
determinative. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait represented regional destabilization, disrupting the 
status quo, a threat to core economic interests (i.e., 10% of the world’s oil supply), and several 
breaches of international law and security, including aggression. No formal treaty or obligations 
related to international organizations were involved in the Persian Gulf War decision making. 
However, the United Nations Security Council approved “all appropriate means” to expel Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait. Also contributing to the “go” decision was Bush I’s conclusion that 
economic sanctions would not be effective and the proposed military strategy, Operation Left 
Hook, involved minimal casualties. 
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by 
definition), where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act? 
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   The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the most obviously destabilizing action in the Middle 
East since the outbreak of the first Persian Gulf War between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988). The 
strategic and economic importance of the region’s oil fields was a clear threat to U.S. global 
interests. Hans Morganthau has suggested that states do not behave as rational unitary actors in 
the real world.57 Hence, Spanier posits that realism, like utopian idealism, is prescriptive rather 
than descriptive, and thus normative in nature.58 However, the Persian Gulf War fits both a 
rational and realist scenario of destabilization, where a regional balance of power was disrupted 
and said disruption posed a threat to perceived and identified U.S. interests. As Spanier puts it, 
“the United States remains at the center of the unstable world.”59 Therefore, the “high politics” 
of diplomacy, projected and potential military power, and “core” interests as well as the “low 
politics” of economic and business interests, cultural interactions, political culture, 
nontraditional and nongovernmental actors drove U.S. military intervention to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait in the second Persian Gulf War. As evidence, we cite concerns of national security and 
regional stability as well as the economic threat to the region’s most crucial resource, oil, and 
principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and aggression. 
 President of the United States George Bush determined early on that the Iraqi takeover of 
Kuwait was “outright aggression.”60 A factor often overlooked is that 3,000 Americans lived and 
worked in Kuwait at the time, making an issue of their protection. Most Westerners had been 
taken into custody by the Iraqis, but were not considered hostages.61 
 Preliminary to the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein got into a number of disputes 
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with neighbors, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait, over oil prices. Price cuts from the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led Kuwait, UAE, and others to 
overproduce, antagonizing Iraq, which was bound by agreement to the lower OPEC prices. 
Despite the fact that the Kuwaitis and Saudis had supported Iraq in its war with Iran, Saddam 
Hussein complained to the Arab League, accusing Kuwait of “theft” from the jointly held 
Ramaila oil fields, calling it virtually “military aggression.” Also, the Kuwaitis refused to cancel 
Iraqi debts.62 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft was disturbed that key advisors at the 
Bush I White House saw Kuwait as the “crisis du jour” rather than considering the long-term 
implications of a doctrinal shift in U.S. foreign policy signaled by the largest military operation 
since the Vietnam War.63 
 According to Francisco Parra, the Persian Gulf War was “the first oil war … other motives 
were at best secondary.”64 Bush I’s Secretary of State James A. Baker contends “the linkage 
between oil and a robust American economy was largely an abstraction: it had been more than a 
decade since American consumers had experienced gas lines.”65 Nevertheless, the facts of oil are 
compelling, but there is no “smoking gun” (or crumpled memo) that puts oil at the top of the list 
of U.S. interests to intervene. Additionally, as Duelfer and Dyson hypothesize, the never-ending 
cycle of conflict between the United States and Iraq that began in 1990-1991 was not inevitable 
or purposeful.66 As late as July 19, 1990, the United States had little or no interest in the issues 
between Iraq and Kuwait.67 President Bush sent special envoy April Glaspie to sit down with the 
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Iraqi dictator, July 23-24, 1990, but Parra doubted the veracity of Glaspie’s diplomacy.68 The 
bottom line for U.S. national interest was that, by invading and occupying Kuwait, Saddam 
seized 94 billion barrels or 10 percent of the world’s “proved oil reserves.”69 The core point is 
that the intervention was over-determined (i.e., there were many compelling reasons to do it, any 
one of which would have been sufficient on its own). Secretary of State Baker reflected that once 
the Bush I inner circle determined their efforts to moderate and accommodate Saddam Hussein 
had failed, Baker saw armed intervention as the likely outcome.70 
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have 
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage? 
 There is a weak comparison to Reagan’s decision to intervene with air and naval forces 
on behalf of Iraq against Iran in the first Persian Gulf War, where the absence of “boots on the 
ground” looks like a half-way attempt to interfere without intervening. The reasons why the 
United States backed Iraq against Iran during Reagan’s administration after having “tilted” 
toward the Iranians earlier are complex and beyond the scope of the present study.  Later actions 
taken by the Clinton administration against Iraq for violations of the no-fly zone, gassing the 
Kurds, and the Bush I assassination plot were limited uses of force, or non-interventions by our 
definition.71 A fair comparison is the Obama administration’s intervention in Libya in 2011. 
While there was no use of ground troops, the goal of the “lift and strike” strategy (to lift an arms 
embargo to supply rebels and to launch air and naval strikes) was to empower opposition forces 
to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. 
    The Persian Gulf was not one of the Bush I administration’s major areas of concern at 
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first, although American policy makers had worried about the security and stability of the region 
since the British withdrew from the area at the end of the 1960s. The Bush I administration’s 
policy review (NSR-10) raised some concerns about Saddam Hussein’s regime. They possessed 
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), were suspected to be working on developing a 
nuclear weapon capability, and they had used chemical weapons on Iranians and Kurds.72 
Intelligence reports indicated Iraq was acquiring “nuclear triggering devices,” “long-barreled 
‘super gun’ artillery piece,” and “special tungsten furnaces” in connection with its apparent 
nuclear weapon development.73 These unpleasant findings were not themselves sufficient 
triggers for considering U.S. intervention until Saddam Hussein’s incursion into Kuwait, which 
suggested Iraq had gone rogue and turned into an aggressor, threatening the pre-existing regional 
status quo. Hence, President Bush was convinced of the inevitability of force once the 
circumstances became clear. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney soon came to the same 
conclusion, whereas Secretary of State Baker was cautious. General Colin Powell, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, demanded sufficient force and freedom of action.74 Until a viable plan 
was on the table, Powell worried that no one was advising the commander-in-chief to be cautious 
before embarking on the most ambitious U.S. military operation in almost twenty years.75  
 Thus, the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait was perceived as different in kind 
from previous crises in the Persian Gulf region, such as the Iran-Iraq war, because it involved a 
destabilization of the status quo and threatened core economic interests (i.e., oil). As mentioned 
above, the Bush I administration earlier saw the potential for a rapprochement with Iraq as a 
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bulwark against Iran.76 Later scenarios did not rise to the same threatening level of 
destabilization because of Iraq’s subsequently weakened capability. Although the fear of Saddam 
accumulating more power and greater control over oil, not to mention WMDs, caused some 
concern. Nevertheless, Clinton followed Bush I and the new administration had little or no 
enthusiasm for military adventures abroad. 77 
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or 
management style) have a determinative effect? 
 
 The decision-making style of the Bush I administration was characterized by the 
president predetermining his position and then working to bring his key players in line. President 
Bush announced the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia and once they were already in 
place made World War II analogies and referred to the operation as a “principled moral crusade.” 
Bush said, Saddam Hussein’s forces “stormed in blitzkrieg fashion” and “appeasement does not 
work.”78 Bush further analogized the mistakes or lessons of the Vietnam War. Defense Secretary 
Cheney shared Bush’s Vietnam War lesson: to give the military sufficient force and not to tie 
their hands. Cheney said, “the president belongs to what I call the ‘don’t screw around’ school of 
military strategy.”79 Within twenty-four hours of the Kuwait invasion, Bush called a National 
Security Council meeting, talked to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and put United 
Nations Ambassador Thomas Pickering to work to get the United Nations Security Council to 
convene an emergency meeting.80 Nevertheless, a considerable amount of time elapsed before 
the president clarified what the nature of U.S. action would be, leaving key decision makers to 
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cull hints from nuances. General Powell pored over Bush’s public remarks. The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs sifted through the Commander-in-Chief’s words, even as he was preparing a plan of 
action. Powell’s operations chief, Thomas W. Kelly, wondered what they were supposed to be 
planning! Was it retaliation against Iraq? Was it to liberate Kuwait? Was it to defend allied Arab 
states?81  
 Even when Bush publically played the diplomatic card by enlisting the offices of 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Jordanian King Hussein, the president’s real intention or 
expectation seems to have been that the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis was headed toward a “live” 
intervention. Powell surmised as much from the Aspen statement (August 2, 1990) issued by 
Bush, Mubarak, and Hussein, calling for Arab League mediation, describing the president’s 
words as “measured.”82 Although Bush and Scowcroft do not say so in their memoire, the 
president seems to be getting the diplomacy out of the way, expecting failure, so that they could 
move ahead to the next step.83 Meanwhile, in Washington, the Defense Secretary was sending 
staffers to excavate files of all four services for plans that might be useful and pitched to the 
president as military contingencies. This is what Cheney called “pulsing the system.” Cheney 
knew Powell had always sampled the various services for their ideas and used informal ties to 
forge alliances and get to a consensus. The Secretary of Defense did not want to be 
outmaneuvered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Chairman.84 Cheney and Powell in different 
roles would later clash in the Bush II administration during the advent of the next war with Iraq 
(see Chapter 6). Their differences were not so much over speed, objectives, duration, or allies, 
but rather turf. Cheney told Powell his job was to provide a range of military options, not to 
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analyze or recommend policy.85 Therefore, competition among key players and bureaucratic 
rivalry spurred information gathering and may well have enhanced the quality of subsequent 
decision making. Nevertheless, Colin Powell could not pinpoint when Bush decided a major 
deployment of troops was the way to go.86  
 Hence, the core question this section answers is whether another president would have 
done the same thing. From a generational context, the confluence of applying the lessons of 
World War II regarding appeasement of aggression and “kicking the Vietnam Syndrome” makes 
it hard to imagine a Kennedy, Nixon, or Reagan deciding differently. However, Powell and 
Cheney, two products of the Vietnam generational experience, held contrasting views with 
respect to the mistakes of the Vietnam War. Thus, Cheney was one of the first key players to 
align himself with the president’s push toward intervention, whereas Powell, in league with 
Secretary Baker, advocated caution even as he supervised the preparations for war.87 
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or 
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an 
administration and from one presidency to the next? 
 
 It seems the U.S. invasion of Panama, December 20, 1989 to January 3, 1990, was a test 
case for a more active role for the military and less restraint on the use of intervention as a tool of 
foreign policy. However, one might be hard-pressed to identify the national interests at stake in 
the use of combat forces to grab a foreign political leader and bring him to trial on criminal 
charges in the United States. There is no indication a similar apprehension was planned for 
Saddam Hussein. According to Richard C. Clarke, “as troops swept Panama looking for Manuel 
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Noriega … he had eluded our operations for days.”88 Congressman John Murtha observed that 
President Bush referred to the inability to corral Noriega as a likely precursor to hunting down 
Saddam Hussein if coalition forces had continued toward Baghdad in 1991.89 Therefore, the 
lesson learned from “Operation Just Cause,” as the Panama invasion was dubbed, was that U.S. 
armed forces could go in, quickly achieve the objective, and exit.90 Whereas Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraqi military was much stronger than the Panamanian National Guard, there were, in fact, more 
resistance, casualties, and days spent on the Panamanian operation than planned for. However, 
the overall judgement was that the invasion of Panama was quick and easy, and could be viewed 
as a model for future action. 
I. International, systemic, or structural factors: 
 
 “The motive driving international theorizing,” according to Spanier, “was to avoid 
another war.” (Spanier, p. 10) Therefore, we ask why states opt for war. We seek answers in 
actions that disturb the equilibrium or status quo. That Iraq’s action against Kuwait was 
destabilizing in the region was a necessary condition for the United States to react with force, but 
not sufficient to explain the decision. There were no formal, written treaties, agreements, or 
understandings that compelled the United States to aid the Kuwaitis, according to Defense 
Secretary Richard B. Cheney. Nevertheless, Cheney was a key decision maker and he expressed 
a hard line from the outset: the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was itself a threat to U.S. interests and 
the president should be able to consider a wide range of options, including the use of military 
force.91  
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 The most likely restraint on United States military action would have been the counter 
force of the USSR. However, the Soviet Union failed to oppose U.S. intentions, as would have 
been the case during the Cold War. While Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev lent diplomatic 
and political support, effectively spurning their Cold War client, the Soviets did not join, 
participate, or contribute directly to the operation. The USSR supported UN Security Council 
resolutions against Iraq and cut off weapons shipments, and Eastern European “creditors” 
contributed humanitarian assistance and allowed “coalition” overflights.92 Thus, U.S. freedom of 
action is evidently due to the change in relative power in the international system, as illustrated 
by the Persian Gulf War. If looked at a bit differently, the second Gulf War was made possible, 
or U.S. military intervention was made feasible, due to a changed balance of actual or projected 
power between the United States and USSR.  
 Also, the Bush I administration saw the Iraqi move against Kuwait as a threat to Saudi 
Arabia as well. The United States commitment to Saudi security was given as “a word of honor” 
by President Bush to Saudi Ambassador, Sheik Bandar bin Sultan.93 Early in the crisis, in August 
1990, Bush said, “This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.” According to Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, the president’s quote equaled a “declaration of war,” 
but Bush didn’t think so.94 Rather than appearing to be acting unilaterally, the Bush I 
administration put together a “coalition of the willing” and built a bridge between the two 
superpowers. A joint U.S.-Soviet declaration was issued by Secretary of State James Baker and 
Foreign Minister Edouard Shevardnadze “condemning” the Iraqis’ invasion of Kuwait. Britain, 
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France, Germany, Japan, and Turkey were all agreed.95 In October 1990, Schevardnadze offered 
Soviet mediation to Iraq, but Saddam refused. Thus, the Soviet Union gave full support for the 
United States to go to the UN Security Council. Resolution 556 (given a 13-0-2 vote) approved 
“all appropriate measures” to enforce interdiction through a naval blockade.96 United States 
envoys Haass and Kimmitt put together support at the UN for an independent coalition, deriving 
jurisdiction from Article 51 of the UN Charter on “Aggression.”97 On November 29, 1990, the 
Security Council set January 15, 1991 as Iraq’s deadline for compliance and authorized the U.S.-
led coalition to use “all means necessary.”98 “Soviet help in particular was key,” according to 
Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft.99  
 The Bush I administration was meticulous in its efforts to build a coalition of support—
including the USSR, NATO allies, Japan, South Korea, Arab friends, and others plus Japanese 
and German financial support—before acting.100 The president sent the Defense Secretary to 
Saudi Arabia to convince the king to accept U.S. troops on his territory, a controversial and risky 
move.101 Apparently, Cheney convinced King Fahd to let coalition forces on Saudi soil over the 
objections of key royal advisors.102 The leading coalition partners were Britain, France, Spain, 
Italy, Germany, and Turkey. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu wanted to send “non-lethal 
military assistance,” but faced opposition at home.103 Therefore, the foregoing illustrates how 
Bush I’s intervention flowed from an array of international activities with alliance partners as 
well as the United States’ erstwhile primary opponent.  
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II. National, domestic, or internal political: 
 In 1989, President George Bush issued a directive on United States policy toward 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (NSD-26): “Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would 
serve our long-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East … [We 
recommend] economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and increase our 
influence with Iraq.”104 Military intervention in the post-Cold War era has been characterized by 
“nontraditional” and “altruistic” goals,105 involving “rhetoric of justice”106 and arguments of 
“legality versus morality.”107 While the Persian Gulf War could be argued on the basis of 
international security and the threat to core interests, the Bush I administration fell back on the 
language of justice and morality in its efforts to persuade the public and Congress to support its 
preferred course of action. 
 According to the War Powers Resolution (1973),108 only under very special 
circumstances can the President of the United States use force without Congressional approval. 
The president must get Congressional authorization for any deployment of thirty days or more 
and either the House or Senate may terminate an operation by cutting off funds after an 
additional thirty days. The president as commander-in-chief may use force to enforce treaties, 
multilateral security agreements, or support NATO and UN operations. The history of most 
presidential administrations contradicts the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution.109 
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Congressional support for an offensive plan was decisive. A resolution to continue sanctions 
narrowly passed the Senate 52-47, and the House 250-183. Congressional opponents may have 
been convinced by Iraqi intransigence.110 However, Bush and Baker maintained the president 
need not get a declaration of support from Congress because of the UN resolution, but then 
belatedly sought that support.111 
 The invasions of Grenada and Panama ostensibly required “secrecy” and the news media 
were largely “kept in the dark,” but during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Pentagon made 
daily announcements and news crews were invited to photograph military dependents. There was 
also a propaganda blitz, for example, reporting on the “formidable force” amassed against 
Iraq.112 For the Bush I administration, taking the pulse of public opinion was a vital check on 
another coalition partner, the American people. However, the president thought the “magnitude” 
of the Persian Gulf crisis was not being covered sufficiently in the press and media.113 Issues of 
cost were also raised in Congress.114 
 Meanwhile, the Secretary of State worried about opposition in Congress moving toward 
impeachment if Bush I went to war over Kuwait without a formal declaration of war.115 Bush 
decided on a major deployment at the end of October 1990, but waited until after the mid-term 
elections, November 7th, to make an announcement. In Baker’s view, “Even with advance notice, 
many members would have opposed the decision.”116 Baker’s opinion was: “The stronger the 
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coalition, the easier it was to get consensus at home.”117 However, the Secretary of State believed 
legislators preferred the “politically easier, let-sanctions-work approach.”118 Baker recalled key 
leaders, such as Sam Nunn in the Senate and Les Aspin in the House felt “blindsided.” 119  
 Another danger would be unacceptably high casualties. Bush I administration estimates 
ranged from 10,000 to 15,000, General Norman Schwarzkopf estimated 5,000, and Chairman 
Powell estimated 3,000.120 Thankfully, those numbers were wildly inaccurate. By the same 
token, James Baker miscalculated the popularity of the second Persian Gulf War. Nothing 
succeeds like success. However, while Secretary Baker was cautious, President Bush bragged 
about “kicking the Vietnam Syndrome.”121 
III. Individual, personal, and ideological factors: 
 Foreign policy decision makers are susceptible to “reasoning by historical analogies.”122 
Vietnam War and World War II analogies pervaded Persian Gulf War decision making.123 The 
president, a former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, was “optimistic,” but uncertain about the 
prospects for decisiveness from the UN Security Council, where a Cold War “stalemate” 
persisted for years.124 “We should not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of World War 
II,” stated President Bush, which he understood to mean “appeasement of aggression.”125 After 
all, Bush was a very young enlistee in June 1942, citing then Secretary of War Henry L. 
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Stimson’s commencement speech at Phillips Andover Academy as an inspiration.126  Chairman 
Colin Powell, a Vietnam-era veteran, referred to “mistakes” or “lessons” of the Vietnam War, 
which ran the gamut from inadequate resources and mission creep (or “escalation”) to public 
opinion and political opposition.127  
 Other important players also drew on historical analogues and first-hand experience. 
Saudi Ambassador Bandar asked if the United States would help if Saddam attacked Saudi 
Arabia. If so, how and what kind of help would come? Would the United States give the Saudis 
weapons? President Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft said they could not answer, 
but Secretary Cheney and General Powell would. Bandar responded with a sarcastic reference to 
former President Jimmy Carter sending unarmed jet fighter planes to the Saudis.128 In the 
aforementioned discussion with the Saudi ambassador, the President of the United States 
delivered a military security commitment in the form of a personal promise. “I give you my word 
of honor,” Bush told Bandar, as if there were no impediments on his ability to deliver.129
 Bureaucratic infighting was minimized when the Secretary of Defense met the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs in a “come-to-Jesus meeting” for giving military options to the president as 
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis unfolded. Cheney does not seem to have ever questioned the wisdom or 
likely effectiveness of an offensive operation, while Powell was cautious. There was a rivalry for 
the president’s ear as well as a suspicion between the uniformed and civilian bureaucracies 
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Powell and Cheney led. “The tension soon drained away. Both men knew that they needed each 
other.”130  
IV. Criteria for the use of force:  
 United States intervention in the Persian Gulf War might be the sole case study where the 
criteria of the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine were fully engaged: diplomacy; clear-cut political 
objectives; sufficient resources, money, and personnel; doable strategy and tactics; and an 
activated exit plan. Ironically, the last criterion is often criticized for leaving Saddam Hussein in 
power in Iraq as what some critics saw as “unfinished business.”   
 The progression of events leading to the Desert Shield and Desert Storm seems at once 
inexorable and cautious. One day after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait (August 2, 1990), Rear 
Admiral William A. Owens, Defense Secretary Cheney’s aide, was culling “surgical-strike 
plans” for Iraq at Cheney’s request. Even though Colin Powell did not know Owens was acting 
under Cheney’s orders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff admonished Owens: “The last 
thing I want is to execute something someone dreamed up that I just heard of.”131 General Powell 
had a philosophical and semantic objection to the “surgical” concept, considering its efficacy to 
be “illusion” and “fantasy.”132 The first deployment of troops authorized by President Bush on 
August 6, 1990, and the buildup continued for three months. The concentration of forces started 
out as a “trip-wire force” so that Iraq would have to confront U.S. troops in order to attack Saudi 
Arabia. Secretary Cheney and General Powell had their first meeting with Bush I in the “tank” 
(White House war room) regarding troop deployments. Powell was nervous about where the 
deployment was heading. What was the mission? Was it to defend the Saudis or expel the Iraqis 
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from Kuwait? How much more personnel would be needed?  Powell wasn’t looking for a new 
mission, but a clarification of the present mission in the Persian Gulf.133 As late as the end of 
September, Powell favored “containment” or “strangulation.” The economic embargo was 
already underway and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, thought it was 
effective. However, Cheney seemed uninterested and so Powell went to Secretary of State James 
Baker, who also preferred a diplomatic track. The idea of “containment” would give the 
president a wide range of options from which to choose, but Powell thought the idea was never 
given a chance.134 By September 1990, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated 
economic sanctions and blockade would not be sufficient to force Iraq out of Kuwait.135 After 
being given short notice to prepare an offensive war plan, General Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. 
commander in the field, was angry. His superior, Powell, told Schwarzkopf he still did not have a 
go-ahead on an offensive mission from the president, but they had to draw up a plan anyway.136 
By October 1990, Schwarzkopf and Powell knew they would need about twice as many forces as 
they had and they had to make sure they got them.137 Gulf War strategy was called “Operation 
Left Hook”: to outflank Iraqi forces with a quick finish, overwhelming force, and decisive 
action.  Plans for the additional 200,000 troops Powell and Schwarzkopf wanted were approved 
by George Bush, October 30, 1990. Thus, the U.S.-led coalition operation expanded from 
defense (of Saudi Arabia) to offense.138 President Bush finally outlined his objectives, November 
8, 1990: (1) complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces; (2) restoration of Kuwait’s 
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“legitimate” government; (3) guarantee Saudi Arabian security; and (4) safety of U.S. citizens in 
the region.139   
 It is interesting to note the Bush I policy-making circle had no respect whatsoever for 
Iraqi intelligence and communication capabilities.140 A critical period ensued from mid-
December 1990. Colin Powell still believed George Bush would opt for a negotiated settlement 
if he could get one. Powell furthermore believed Saddam Hussein did not think the United States 
would attack and thought Saddam might pull out at the last minute once he realized the U.S. 
threat was for real. However, Secretary Cheney thought that was “wishful thinking.”141  
 President Bush gave orders to go in four days, January 11, 1991. Air Force launched 
attacks, January 16, 1991; the Normandy helicopter task force moved at 2:20 a.m. eliminating 
Iraqi offshore radar facilities and their “early warning” capacity; and the main attack began at 
3:00 a.m.  In the final phase of combat, Iraqis were “bewildered” and “routed, fled, and 
surrendered,” by February 28, 1991.142 The Bush I administration tried diplomacy, through 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and stated Iraq’s disputes (over oil) with Kuwait can only be solved by 
peaceful means.143 Scowcroft argued to use oil as a weapon to cut off Iraqi pipelines from Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey against Powell’s and Schwarzkopf’s “rehearsed plan for defending Saudi oil 
region” to use air strikes, naval strikes, and deploy troops to defend the Saudis, which would take 
twenty days.144 Scowcroft was “frankly appalled” that some key advisors saw Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait as “a fait accompli.”145 According to General Schwarzkopf, Iraqi weaknesses 
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were command and control, dependence on foreign spare parts, and “lack of offensive 
experience.” Schwarzkopf estimated the overall U.S. plan of attack would take four months.146 
The plan was heavily based on air power. Secretary of Defense Cheney was a skeptic: “The 
history of air campaigns suggests that they are not terribly successful.” Scowcroft conveyed the 
Saudis’ worry that without combat troops our commitment could be seen as thin. Schwarzkopf 
said he was “not an advocate of air power alone,” but circumstances favored it. The Iraqi-
Kuwaiti borderlands offered a “target-rich environment,” there was “no cover at night” in the 
desert, the Iraqi forces had no experience under such an attack, and the United States had 
“sophisticated munitions,” i.e., fire power.147 Combat on the ground followed Bush I’s last 
ultimatum (February 22, 1991, 8:00 p.m.) and lasted five days (February 23-28, 1991).  
 Where the Bush I administration fell short was in the area of post-war objectives, as 
outlined by Secretary of State James Baker.148  Downright unrealistic plans comprised: 
rebuilding Kuwait; establishing new Persian Gulf security arrangements to include Iraq and Iran; 
withdrawing U.S. troops to be replaced by some sort of regional peacekeeping force; and 
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.149 Unresolved issues included Iraq being left intact 
under the pre-existing regime and sanctions were imposed, but they were “leaky.” An additional 
consideration is the “unprecedented status” of Iraq following its conditional capitulation, which 
was not a “surrender,” but had external sanctions and internal controls imposed, including 
peacekeepers in Kurdish areas, no-fly zones, and embargoes on arms purchases and oil sales.150 
Could the United States have overthrown the regime and gotten out? Should the United States 
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have encouraged Shiite and Kurdish revolts? Would an even worse regime, most likely Islamist, 
have replaced it? Regime change might have provoked Russian and Saudi objections and the 
situation would not have been preferable to what actually transpired.151  
 Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm seems to have touched all the bases of the 
Powell Doctrine: all other options explored and exhausted (international sanctions and back-
channel diplomacy); clear-cut objectives (Iraqi expulsion from Kuwait), a winnable strategy 
(Operation Left Hook); sufficient commitment of resources, including overwhelming force (half 
a million troops in arms); and an exit strategy to avoid “mission creep.”  
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
The decision to use military force in the case of the Persian Gulf War was over-
determined, whereby a number of factors constituted sufficient justification in and of themselves: 
disruption of the international oil sector, regional stability, the territorial integrity of a sovereign 
state, and to take action against aggression, a crime in violation of the United Nations Charter. 
Moreover, Bush I diligently labored to build a broadly based coalition of allies, including the 
Saudis and Israelis, while courting Congressional and public support at home. Importantly, Bush 
I implemented a battle plan that was sufficient and clearly delineated to avoid a “quagmire,” thus 
avoiding the ghosts of Vietnam. Consequently, George H. W. Bush would consider the Persian 
Gulf War an unqualified success, marking the death of the so-called Vietnam Syndrome for U.S. 
policy makers. However, critics would view the decision to allow Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist 
regime to remain in power to be a mistake in light of the ten troublesome years to come, leaving 
“unfinished business” for George W. Bush in the next war with Iraq. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BUSH I: BOSNIA—NO-GO 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Bush I administration’s “no-go” decision in Bosnia was determined by the consensus 
among the key players—Bush, Baker, Scowcroft, and Eagleburger—that there was no payoff in 
becoming bogged down in a Balkan quagmire. This viewpoint derived from Bush I’s worldview 
and management style (see Category III below). Although the Bosnian civil war would later be 
judged an international crisis and a human rights disaster entailing ethnic cleansing and other 
atrocities, the Bush I White House considered this case a European problem that should be 
handled within the region, without U.S. intervention.   
Following the liberal democratic revolutions sweeping Eastern Europe in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, four of the six states of Yugoslavia, an artificial nation-state cobbled together 
after World War I, sought to break away from the formerly communist confederation. In June 
1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic 
offered minimal opposition to the Slovenian action, but directly supported an uprising of ethnic 
Serbs in Croatia, triggering a brief and bloody civil war. In December 1991, Germany 
45 
 
recognized the new Slovenian and Croatian governments, followed by the European Community 
(EC) and the United States. As for a more active U.S. role, James A. Baker, the Secretary of 
State during the Bush I administration, famously declared: “we don't have a dog in this fight.”152 
Macedonia was allowed to secede from the confederation, but after Bosnian Muslims (known as 
Bosniaks) participated in an independence referendum in multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, warfare erupted against the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks 
carried out by the Serbs, commencing in March-April 1992. The Bosnian Serbs were 
enthusiastically supported by Milosevic and their militia initiated a systematic “ethnic cleansing 
campaign” intended to redesign the republic’s borders, thereby isolating its Bosniak 
population.153 
 “Ethnic cleansing” was a new term, though not a new idea in history, which became part 
of public discourse as the Serb war on Bosnia got underway. However, the term itself was first 
coined by Serbians with respect to their forced removal from Kosovo in the 1980s.154  
 According to Von Hippel, the Western European community was unable to exercise 
effective influence over the rapidly deteriorating chaos in the former Yugoslav confederacy. The 
inability of the NATO allies, including the United States, to come to agreement on policy 
seriously undermined the credibility of the alliance itself. The UN position was that the breakup 
of Yugoslavia was a European regional crisis, but the institution was forced to play a bigger role 
when European diplomacy failed to put the brakes on escalating ethnic violence.155 
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 The United Nations became actively involved in the Yugoslav crisis in September 1991, 
calling for “a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment 
to Yugoslavia.”156 The next month UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar appointed 
Cyrus Vance, former U.S. Secretary of State, to be in “constant contact” with all interested 
parties, including the UN, EC, and NATO.157 Subsequent resolutions provided for conditional 
implementation of a peacekeeping force, approved the Secretary General’s implementation plan, 
and authorized full deployment of the peacekeeping force (United Nations Protection Force, 
UNPROFOR) in five of the former constituent republics.158 The subsequent situation in Bosnia 
by May 1992 in the face of escalating violence led to withdrawal of all except a handful of 
observers, military personnel, and civilian staff. The “run and hide” response to hostilities is in 
the nature of objective peacekeeping, indeed its inbred defect. Hence, the Serbian-Bosnian war 
deteriorated in designated “no-fly zones,” “safe areas,” and border regions by the end of Bush I’s 
tenure in January 1993.159  
1.Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), 
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act? 
 
 Realist arguments are strong explanations for international conflict.160 Thus, we seek an 
explanation based on core national interests. Additionally, United States military interventions in 
the post-Cold War era have been characterized by “multilateralism.”161 However, after the end of 
the Cold War there ensued a broader debate on national interests to incorporate new issues, 
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including environmental threats, cross-border migration, and cyber-terrorism. Hence, U.S. forces 
were dispatched to several “complex humanitarian emergencies,” “military operations other than 
war,” and “non-traditional missions” as opposed to “traditional”’ military operations. These 
deployments did not involve a direct threat to the United States and there was no “large peer 
competitor,” as the Soviets had been during the Cold War days.162 Indeed, these crises were 
“intra-state conflicts” and U.S. motivation was seemingly partly “altruistic.”163  
 On June 21, 1991, Secretary of State Baker told Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic that the 
United States supported “the unity and territorial integrity” of Yugoslavia. The statement gave 
Milosevic a stamp of legitimacy when he sent his troops into Slovenia and Croatia to prevent 
secession. Nevertheless, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence a few days later.164 The 
rationale for the shift in U.S. policy is not readily apparent. However, Baker’s position was that 
only a policy on which the Western allies agreed could succeed. Slovenia and Croatia declared 
independence in December 1991, Germany recognized the new states almost immediately, and 
the other Western European governments (through the aegis of the EC) extended diplomatic 
recognition January 1992. The United States recognized all three secessionist republics in April 
1992, followed by their being granted UN membership in May 1992. Ironically, Serbian-
dominated Yugoslavia was denied member status by the United Nations.  
 Regardless of the change of thinking in Washington, the Bush I administration’s policy 
fell in line with that of its institutional partners—UN, EC, and NATO.165 Indeed, that was the 
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intention. The Secretary of State convinced the president of the necessity of a “unified Western 
position on recognition of individual Yugoslav republics.”166 
 At the outset, the Bush I administration did not consider the intra-state conflict in Bosnia 
to be a destabilizing international event, nor one that threatened U.S. alliance partners; rather, the 
Bush I decision makers saw the Bosnian conflict as a European regional problem. Warren 
Zimmerman, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, admits the United States made “damaging 
mistakes” and in Bush I’s first year there was “surprisingly little concern” about Yugoslavia 
among the U.S. diplomatic corps.167 Zimmerman relates how President Bush asked Yugoslav 
Prime Minister Ante Markovic for his take on the breakup of the Soviet Union during a brief 
visit to Washington rather than discussing the emerging threat of nationalistic secessionism in 
Yugoslavia.168   
 Brent Scowcroft at the National Security Council (NSC) and Lawrence Eagleburger of 
the State Department were the most influential decision makers, after Bush and Baker, and had 
the most first-hand experience in Yugoslavia. The two were pessimistic about preventing war 
through any diplomatic means by May 1991.169 They agreed Yugoslavia was a “hopeless 
quagmire” and Eagleburger, a former ambassador to Yugoslavia, was “reluctant to invest the 
United States too deeply in Balkan affairs.”170  
2.Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have 
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage? 
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 The Bush I administration, while recognizing the independence of a Muslim-led Bosnia, 
maintained that the Balkans constituted a European problem and refused to send U.S. forces 
there as part of a UN “peacekeeping” operation, even though several members of NATO did 
so.171    
 Therefore, the Bush I administration was not moved to act in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 
basis of humanitarian or altruistic objectives. Said issues might have been contributing factors if 
there were necessary and sufficient conditions for intervention, such as a threat to U.S. citizens, 
property, long-term U.S. economic interests, or an actual attack. We may speculate Bush I did 
not perceive the Serbian-Bosniak conflagration as a threat to the international or regional status 
quo or U.S. economic interests.  However, the subsequent campaign of violence and genocide in 
Bosnia was only one of four outbreaks of war in the ethnically fractured confederation in 1991 
and 1992. Serbia, using militias and the Yugoslav army (known by the acronym JVA), waged 
war on the secessionist republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia as well as Bosnia. In fact, 
the Secretary of State saw the Macedonian conflict as most critical because of its potential to 
spill over the border of a NATO partner, Greece. According to Ambassador Zimmerman, 
Secretary Baker’s well intentioned efforts to keep Yugoslavia’s constituent parts together were 
doomed by the “collision course” of events, propelled by “top-down” nationalism.172 Baker’s 
goals were (1) a peaceful, consensual settlement, (2) human rights for the various ethnicities, (3) 
constitutional power sharing, and (4) economic development propped up by U.S. and European 
aid.173  
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 A rational, though misdirected, assumption that an economic solution could work was 
shared by Prime Minister Markovic, whose economic policies were moderately successful, 1989-
1990, but failed to affect the course driven by Milosevic’s Serbia.174 Perhaps undermining the 
U.S. position, Baker told Markovic: “If you force the United States to choose between unity and 
democracy, we will always choose democracy,” but the United States would not use force to do 
so.175     
3.How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or management 
style) have a determinative effect? 
 President Bush and Secretary of State Baker controlled a non-intervention policy with 
regard to Bosnia. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security 
Adviser Brent Scowcroft agreed, despite the horrific turn of events in the former Yugoslavia, 
where Serb paramilitary guerrillas pursued a campaign of “ethnic cleansing,” including forced 
removal and relocation, deliberate rape and impregnation of Bosniak women, and outright 
murder of unarmed civilians.176 The president repeatedly asked, “Tell me what this is about.”177 
In other words, Bush saw no “payoff” in the United States getting sucked into a “Balkan 
quagmire.”178 Nevertheless, the Bush I team backed economic sanctions and an arms embargo 
against Yugoslavia (i.e., the formal union of Serbia and Montenegro).179    
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 For President Bush, “personal alliances were everything.”180 Yet the president was 
“secretive” and prone to “compartment” information such that only he knew the totality of a 
particular puzzle, deliberately withholding pieces from key players.181 Bush’s most important 
foreign policy confidants were National Security Adviser Scowcroft and Secretary of State 
Baker. Both men concurred with the president that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a regional problem 
requiring a European resolution and not one necessitating direct U.S. involvement. There were 
no advocates close to Bush countering that viewpoint. Importantly, the definition of direct 
involvement meant introduction of combat forces and thus did not preclude an array of other 
options, including diplomacy and granting or denial of economic aid.   
 Scholars have given Scowcroft high grades for his leadership as National Security 
Adviser, even while criticizing the outcomes.182 Therefore, the decision-making process in the 
Bush I administration was highly consensual and cooperative with Scowcroft often presenting 
other people’s views as succinctly as his own. Of crucial import, however, was the National 
Security Adviser’s “unbreakable relationship” with Bush I and the two men’s “shared 
perspective” of key lessons of history, such as the Vietnam War experience.183 By contrast, 
Bacevich takes the Bush I team to task for being “morally obtuse” and trying to do “business as 
usual,” thereby neglecting the Bosnian Muslims.184 In a similar vein, former Defense Secretary 
James Schlesinger said the Bush I administration was “lost without its Cold War map.”185 
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 However, there was an ideological undercurrent among mid-level players in the Bush I 
administration that articulated a divergent viewpoint. William Krystol, who was the Vice-
President’s chief of staff and as such had little direct input in foreign policy, points to Paul 
Wolfowitz’s authorship of the Defense Planning Guidance. In Krystol’s mind, “Wolfowitz saw 
very early that the fundamental choice was American leadership, or increasing chaos and 
danger.” The document, which was leaked to the New York Times and subsequently published in 
a much watered down form, did not fit the cautious mooring of Bush I’s foreign policy.186 
Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defense, envisioned several scenarios in which the United 
States might have to fight two large regional wars at one time. 187 Wolfowitz was attempting to 
articulate a post-Cold War strategic vision, but there was some indication he was partly 
motivated by humanitarian concern. Albert Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz’s academic mentor, criticized 
the Western allies for prohibiting the victims of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia from arming 
themselves. In a Wall Street Journal article, Wohlstetter took Bush I to task, linking the Persian 
Gulf War’s outcome to the Yugoslav civil war: “The successful coalition in the Gulf War 
stopped too soon and ... told Slobodan Milosevic, who is not a slow learner, that the West would 
be even less likely, four months later, to stop his own overt use of the Yugoslav Federal Army to 
create a Greater Serbia purged of non-Serbs.”188 Richard Perle, another Wohlstetter protégé, was 
even more assertive from a human rights perspective: “We have become a party, in a very real 
sense, to attacks on civilians that approach genocidal proportions because we are enforcing an 
embargo that prevents Bosnians from defending themselves … then if we can be said to have 
contributed to that genocide.”189 Perle did not hold an official title in the Bush I administration, 
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but he was an important insider-outsider, an influential fellow traveler of neo-conservatives such 
as Douglas Feith, Wolfowitz, and Krystol. Significantly, Perle held both the EC and UN in 
disdain.190 The paradigm shift the neo-conservatives preferred was clearly based on unilateralism 
and U.S. hegemony. Gibbs argues that a “closely related” strategic policy goal was to define a 
new role for NATO as “a key instrument of U.S. hegemony.”191  Hence, Yugoslavia became the 
theatre where the United States and EU could put their capabilities and power into action.192  
4.How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or 
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an 
administration and from one presidency to the next? 
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in his memoirs, “When ancient ethnic 
rivalries reignited in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and well-meaning Americans thought we 
should ‘do something’ in Bosnia, the shattered bodies of the Marines at Beirut airport [in 1983] 
were never far from my mind in arguing for caution.”193 General Colin Powell’s cautious 
position was pilloried as a “no-can-do” attitude by a New York Times editorial.194 In an op-ed 
piece published in the Times, Powell wrote that successful policy outcomes derived from a clear-
cut set of objectives, as in the Persian Gulf War and Panama, but when the goals were “murky or 
nonexistent,” the result was “disaster.”195 The Vietnam Syndrome is clearly operating in 
Powell’s thought. The Powell Doctrine offers only one answer: “We do deserts; we don’t do 
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mountains.”196 However, another viewpoint is that the Powell Doctrine has more to do with how 
to use force rather than whether to use force.197   
 Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney was another key player in the Bush I 
administration who may have feared entrapment in a Balkan quagmire. Cheney came out firmly 
against participation of U.S. combat personnel in UNPROFOR in April 1992.198  
 An intriguing question is how differently Bush I or any other administration would have 
perceived the crisis in Bosnia in an environment of bipolarity. The competition between 
superpowers might have attracted U.S. attention as an opportunity to undermine the rival Soviet 
Union’s influence in southeastern Europe. After the Cold War, the Balkan crisis did not seem to 
hold a compelling interest for the United States.   
I.  International, systemic, or structural factors:   
 United States military intervention decisions appear linked to “perceived pressure” due to 
U.S. “membership in international organizations,” such as UN and NATO.199 We will try to 
avoid conflating what came later under Clinton’s watch with Bush I’s “no-go” decision. 
However, considering the splintering of Yugoslavia occurred in the moment of the emergent 
unipolar hegemony of the United States, one might assume the sole superpower would have had 
complete freedom of action. However, the United States could not act in a vacuum. UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, reporting in 1999 on the Srebrenica massacre, warned that “the 
tragedy will haunt our history forever. A deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel, or 
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murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means and with the political 
will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion.” Given that his commentary benefitted 
from hindsight following the Bosnian bloodbath and other unintended consequences, Annan 
implied the major responsibility for providing “political will” rested with the United States.200 
Nevertheless, the UN’s institutional impotence comes into play. In the words of one analyst, the 
United Nations Security Council “experimented with almost every available form of coercion 
short of war.”201 The unsuccessful UNPROFOR military operation “only pushed the 
international community deeper into the quagmire.”202 UNPROFR’s mission was intended to be 
neutral, but even the Secretary General recognized the combination of peacekeeping and 
enforcement of UN resolutions contradicted such objectivity.203 Also, coordinated international 
reaction time is slow; four years passed between the introduction of UN peacekeepers in 1991 
and commencement of NATO’s bombing campaign in 1995.204  
 In November 1991, NATO heads of state and government addressed the Yugoslav crisis 
and issued a statement calling for “peaceful resolution,” “self-determination,” and the “prospect 
of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it.”205 A year later, speaking 
collectively, the NATO alliance partners were “profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating 
situation … [which is a] serious threat to international peace, security, and stability … [and] the 
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present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs … [is responsible for] terrible gains by 
force and engaging gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”206  
 According to Ambassador Zimmerman, Secretary Baker’s failure to stop Slovenia’s and 
Croatia’s declarations of independence “cooled Western European ardor … for propelling the 
United States into the deepening crisis.”207 In the spring of 1991, Baker was more frustrated by 
Macedonia, where Greece, a NATO partner, placed major roadblocks for cultural and historical 
reasons.208 Throughout 1992, the government of Slobodan Milosevic contended that Serbia had 
nothing to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina, meaning Bosnian Serbs were operating on their own 
initiative, outside of Yugoslavian control. As reports of horrific violence reached Washington, 
the Secretary of State worked toward expelling “Yugoslavia” (in effect, Serbia and Montenegro) 
from the United Nations.209 Baker saw fatal shortcomings in Western coordination, the EC was 
incapable of reaching consensus or unanimity, and ancient relationships (for example, Croatia 
with Germany and Italy, Serbia with France and Britain) allowed the Balkan factions to play off 
the Western allies against each other.210 Another reservation was expressed by the most reliable 
U.S. ally. British Prime Minister John Major asked, “Once in, where does it end.”211 Bush, 
Baker, and Scowcroft shared similar skepticism regarding an exit strategy.  
 However, the Balkan crisis of the early 1990s was characterized by a lack of consistency 
and coherence among the United States and the Western European allies. As late as May 1991, 
the United States tried to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia by withholding trade and aid, 
whereas the European Community offered additional aid and trade as a reward for unity. Of 
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course, neither approach prevented Slovenia and Croatia from breaking away. The EC withdrew 
economic and financial assistance in June 1991 when Serb (Yugoslav) troops used force against 
Slovenia. From July to December 1991, the United States joined the EC to impose aid and trade 
sanctions, followed by the UN at the end of the year. The U.S., UN, NATO, and EC tightened 
sanctions as the Serb-Bosniak war worsened and only after November 1992 did the sanctions 
reach the level of “classic embargo” as a diplomatic weapon.212 
 Why did the United States and the Western allies opt for sanctions? Simply, according to 
a commonsense rationale, they were loathe to use force. At the same time, the logic of the 
alliance’s policy led to identifying Serbs and Bosnian Serbs as aggressors if Serbia used military 
force to prevent Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian secession. As the breakup of Yugoslavia 
devolved into civil war and genocide, the UN, EC, and NATO as institutions ran the risk of 
appearing ineffectual if their collective efforts failed.213 Moreover, the United States had to prove 
its leadership was not only still needed, but even credible.214 
 To say diplomacy failed in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a gross 
understatement. The European Community held a peace conference in February 1992 and 
charged Lord Peter Carrington, former British Foreign Secretary and NATO Secretary General, 
and Portuguese Ambassador José Cutileiro with drafting a peace plan for Bosnia. The result was 
a proposal for a decentralized confederation, whereby local communities would be designated as 
Muslim, Serb, or Croat. All three warring factions signed the agreement in March 1992, but the 
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Bosnian Muslims reneged just ten days later.215 Carrington was replaced as EC representative by 
David Owen, a fellow former Foreign Secretary, and he collaborated with UN Special Envoy 
Cyrus Vance on a new plan. The Vance-Owen plan divided Bosnia into ten ethno-regional 
“cantons” and was announced in January 1993.216 This time it was the Bosnian Serbs who 
rejected the proposed settlement in May 1993, following a referendum in which Bosnian Serbs 
lopsidedly voted down the plan.217 Vance had already resigned in April and Owen declared the 
Vance-Owen peace plan “dead” in June, by which time the Serb and Croat “ethnic cleansing” 
had proceeded apace, rendering the previous ethno-geographic map irrelevant.218  
II. National, domestic, or internal political: 
 A powerful stimulus to intervention is “perceived domestic pressure.”219 There seems not 
to have been much interest in Bosnia or Yugoslavia on the part of the American public, from 
1990 to 1992. To the extent the American public followed events in the disintegrating former 
Yugoslavia, the predominant theme in Western news media was the victimization of the Bosniak 
population and the portrayal of the crisis as a genocidal anti-Muslim campaign that invited 
eventual U.S. or multilateral intervention to save the lives of Bosnian Muslims.220 A further 
proposition is that the elite media, particularly the New York Times and Washington Post may 
have influenced public opinion and hence policy makers by framing the Bosnian crisis in terms 
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of both humanitarianism and security interests.221 The so-called “CNN effect” played a crucial 
role in the way the Bosnian drama played out. International dialogue was stimulated by televised 
coverage of Serb atrocities as U.S. and European public opinion pushed the Western allies in the 
direction of support for the NATO air strikes and establishing an International War Crimes 
Tribunal.222  
 The Bush I administration’s non-intervention decision for Bosnia was in line with the 
current mood of public opinion. Some observers saw a re-emerging isolationism, while others 
asserted the American public would support interventions if the United States went in to win, 
with clearly defined goals, and avoided getting bogged down in other countries’ politics.223 
Although the initial “no-go” decision preceded Panama, the Persian Gulf War, and Somalia, 
where the Bush I administration sent peacekeepers in December 1992, a certain level of 
intervention fatigue might have set in.224 
 Since August 1992, when George H. W. Bush was in office, most polls showed a 
majority, plurality, or relatively even split in approval of the president’s handling of the Bosnia 
situation. Specifically, an NBC poll conducted in Bush I’s last month in power showed only 34% 
of respondents supported “the United States sending troops to Yugoslavia to try to help stop the 
civil war there,” while 54% opposed and 12% didn’t know.225 
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 Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina may have foundered on the banks of a hostile 
Democratic Congress if proposed by Republican Bush in the politicized election season of 1992. 
While expressing support for humanitarian interventions, Congress failed to appropriate money 
for UN peacekeeping in the Defense Department (DOD) budget and attached a series of concerns 
and stipulations to funds for peacekeeping operations supported by the State Department budget 
for FY 1993.226 The reservations expressed by mostly unfriendly Democratic members of 
Congress suggested a combination of intervention fatigue and skepticism about the value of 
peacekeeping in general.227  Initially, there was expressed and implied resistance to U.S. 
involvement in the failing state. One prominent Democratic leader on foreign policy in the U.S. 
Senate, Joe Biden, supported the “lift and strike” idea. Candidate Bill Clinton adopted the idea 
after previously opposing it, as a policy alternative to Bush I in the presidential campaign.228 
Democratic leader George Mitchell and Republican leader Bob Dole endorsed the Bush I 
administration’s support for NATO airstrikes, but could not persuade a majority of the Senate. 
Resistance was led by Democrats such as Patrick Leahy and Republicans such as John McCain, 
who insisted the NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina had “no clear-cut military objectives.”229   
 In the Bush I White House, Baker, Scowcroft, and Eagleburger concluded intrastate war 
in Yugoslavia was unavoidable. Nevertheless, they were unconvinced as to what part the United 
States should take to influence events there. “Once in, where does it end?” was the way British 
Prime Minister John Major put it.230 Baker worried the American public would balk at sending 
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combat troops, “particularly having just fought another major war—this one in the Gulf.”231 As a 
result, the President was sanguine about the European allies shouldering the responsibility. 
Simply put by Baker, “our vital interests were not at stake.”232 Moreover, the level of threat 
posed by Milosevic’s Serbian irredentism and military capability were adjudged lesser than those 
of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Additionally, Secretary Baker alluded to the U.S. need to be 
“engaged” in a redefined relationship with Europe. While Baker and Bush were of one mind in 
that it was time for the Europeans to show they were capable of leadership, a “diminished U.S. 
role” was not in America’s interests.233   
 
III. Individual, personal, and ideological factors: 
 Top decision makers in the Bush I administration used a “story model” mode of problem 
 representation in “armed humanitarian intervention” in Bosnia, according to Peterson.234 In 
addition, international crises invite the tendency on behalf of elite decision makers to demonize 
one actor or groups in those conflict situations.”235 In the Bosnian crisis, the villain of choice was 
Milosevic.236 The problem with such demonization as a policy motivator or propaganda tool for 
rallying public opinion is the obvious extension to a logical resolution: if this leader is the 
problem, then get rid of him. Instead, the villain Milosevic was his state’s negotiator and 
signatory of the subsequent Dayton peace accords.  
The conventional wisdom is that the former Yugoslavia splintered after 1989 because of 
age-old ethnic rivalries, cosmetically plastered over during the long reign of Josef Broz Tito. 
Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State, disagreed. Holbrooke stated, 
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“Yugoslavia’s tragedy was not foreordained. It was the product of bad, even criminal political 
leaders …”237 Secretary of State James Baker said, “It seems to me that the U.S. can lead without 
having to fight its fourth war in history, in this century, on the ground in Europe.”238 Baker was a 
key player and Bush trusted his judgment; therefore, it is important to understand why he was so 
cautious on Bosnia. Consensus or unity among the NATO allies, promotion of democracy, a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict, and a firm belief that American public opinion would not 
stand for the use of combat troops in the Balkans were Baker’s priorities or decisional guidelines. 
 The first priority of Western unity or consensus “came for naught,” as Baker himself 
phrased it, when Germany recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia in December 
1991 and the European Community did likewise in January 1992. Thus, U.S. policy of non-
recognition of the secessionist republics and support for an intact state was marginalized and 
irrelevant.239 The key point became moot by the time of the independence referendum in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in March 1992, when Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles sketched out five 
policy options for the Bush I decision makers and each one assumed recognition of Bosnian 
independence.240 Ambassador Zimmerman hoped U.S. recognition of Bosnia would deter 
Serbian aggression.241 In Washington, Eagleburger warned against a “halfway policy” of 
granting recognition to Slovenia and Croatia, but not recognizing Bosnia or Macedonia, 
especially since the latter two states were considered more democratically inclined. Eagleburger 
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convinced Baker; UN envoy Cyrus Vance and EC envoy Lord Carrington also agreed Bosnian 
recognition was necessary.242    
 We can assert with some confidence that another administration would have decided  
differently from the Bush I team, since the successor Clinton administration eventually did so.  
The presence on the Clinton team of key players, such as Secretary of State Warren Christopher,  
National Security Adviser Lake, UN Ambassador Albright, Chairman Shalikashvili, and  
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, constituted an assembled cast infused with an ideology of  
messianic democracy, American exceptionalism, and the United States being the “indispensable  
nation.” By contrast, the top Bush I aides—Baker, Eagleburger, and Scowcroft—shared the  
President’s more cautious and traditionally realist worldview. Lieutenant General Brent 
Scowcroft was the President’s alter ego in foreign policy. Scowcroft’s diplomacy has been 
labeled “conservative realism,” but his conservatism was less ideological than simply 
cautious.243 In his words, quoting John Quincy Adams, “We are the well-wishers of all who seek 
freedom. We are the guarantors only of our own.”244 Thus, the Bush I administration’s guiding 
viewpoint was quite distinct from the liberal idealism of its successor.  
IV. Criteria for the use of force: 
 
 Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 satisfied none of the criteria of the Powell  
 
Doctrine. Von Hippel identifies three critical issues pertinent to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 
1990s. First, military intervention and use of force; second, peace support operations; and third, 
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nation-building.245 If any one of these factors were to fail, the mission would fail. Additionally, 
Von Hippel informs us that inconsistent policy precedes intervention.246 The sources indicate 
repeated U.S. warnings were delivered personally, publically, or through diplomats to Milosevic, 
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and other principals.247 Despite sincere and honest 
intentions, these warnings had little effect on events or actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
therefore it is hard to give praise to Bush I’s efforts in this case. 
 According to Secretary of State Baker, critical U.S. interests in the Balkans were 
“peaceful settlement,” human rights, political power sharing among the ethnic communities, and 
the provision of economic assistance directed toward nurturing a free-market regional 
economy.248 The more experienced Balkan hands in the Bush I White House were Eagleburger 
and Scowcroft and their view was pessimistic about any prospect of the United States, United 
Nations, or NATO influencing or redirecting events in Bosnia-Herzegovina.249 
 First, there were no vital interests or direct threats in play in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
contrast to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis.250 Second, nonmilitary options were being explored and the 
Bush I team was perfectly happy to let the European Union take the leading role in the 
Balkans.251 Moreover, the European governments participating in the peacekeeping operations in 
the former Yugoslavia preferred a diplomatic settlement to an all-out ground war.252 Third, the 
calls for the United States to “do something” in Bosnia were not necessarily backed up by an 
expectation of a sufficient commitment of money and manpower. As understood by Powell, any 
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action in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be “limited.” Here Powell reflected the military’s 
institutional memory of Vietnam; a limited war spelled disaster.253 Powell further recalled the ill 
defined objectives in the Lebanon peacekeeping mission that climaxed in more than two hundred 
“shattered bodies” of U.S. Marines in 1983 whenever he heard the “well meaning” urgings to 
intervene in such bloody scenarios.254 Fourth, the strategic options were (1) air strikes around 
Sarajevo, (2) more widespread bombing of Serbian targets throughout the area, and (3) troops in 
ground combat.255 Powell’s opinion was that only the latter option could force the Serbians to 
quit in the absence of any other clear-cut objectives. The only preferable outcome seems to have 
been simply to stop the fighting. The Pentagon had little faith in the “lift and strike” strategy, 
proposed in early 1993, whereby the arms embargo against supplying the Bosniaks would be 
lifted to allow them to defend themselves in concert with “surgical” air strikes against Serb 
defensive and infrastructure targets. This is exactly the approach adopted by the UN and NATO 
in 1994 and 1995. What transpired were effective military countermeasures by the Serbians.256 In 
the end, Milosevic’s regime survived to broker a win at the negotiating table.  
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
 In subsequent years, the Clinton administration, led by National Security Adviser 
Anthony Lake and United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright, argued that the United 
States should lift the UN arms embargo and initiate air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. 
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dismissed the “lift and strike” option, 
whereas Britain and France argued that their peacekeeping troops on the ground would be targets 
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of Serb retaliation.257 Initially, despite the worst fighting in Europe in half a century, the Clinton 
administration continued the Bush I administration’s non-intervention policy until August 1995, 
when reports of the heinous slaughter of Muslim civilians in Srebrenica and five days of NATO 
bombing of Serbian targets brought the warring factions to the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. 
 Ultimately, U.S. troops participated in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia, starting in 1995.  
In response to pressure from members of Congress, President Bill Clinton announced U.S. forces 
would be there for only a year, but those troops were still in place during the 2000 presidential 
campaign when George W. Bush and his advisers suggested the Balkans should be policed by 
Europeans.258  
 Ambassador Zimmerman speaks of the EC’s “irresponsibility” and U.S. “passivity” in 
the Yugoslav crises.259 Ultimately, he asked rhetorically, who killed Yugoslavia? Zimmerman 
identifies Slobodan Milosevic’s repression of Bosnia as the decisive factor, ironically aimed at 
unity.260 Thus, U.S. policy was just plain ineffective due to the disinclination of key players in 
the Bush I administration to see any gain from deeper involvement (Category 3, individual 
factors). The President, Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Adviser, and 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs held diverse but equally pessimistic views on the Bosnian case. 
Hence, Bush I left Bosnia as a mess for Clinton’s administration to clean up.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CLINTON: RWANDA—NO-GO 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 Rwanda, called Mille Collines (“Land of a Thousand Hills”), is renowned for its beauty, 
its temperate climate, and its most lucrative exports, coffee and tea. However, Rwanda is 
landlocked, densely populated with few natural resources and minimal industry, and most of its 
people rely on subsistence agriculture to live. In 1990 the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) began a civil war against the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda. The 1994 
genocide took an estimated 800,000 lives, and destroyed the country’s economy, governance, 
and social fabric.261  
 A variety of factors contributed to Clinton’s “no-go” decision in Rwanda. Internationally, 
the civil warfare seemed all too commonplace in Africa and was not considered even as 
troublesome as the situation in neighboring Burundi (see Category I). Unlike European or 
Middle Eastern crises, African affairs lack a domestic interest-group constituency and fail to stir 
the public’s attention (see Category II). The decision-making hierarchy did not respond to the 
questions raise by middle-level personnel and the policy makers tended to follow a pattern of 
“cognitive closure,” blindly adhering to a preferred policy line until reality undermined its logic 
(see Category III). Lastly, there was no consensus on a military strategy that could accomplish 
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the goals of preventing or stopping the genocide and ending the civil war. The operational plan 
proposed by the United States only sheltered refugees in camps, whereas the United Nations 
commander in the field sought sufficient force to bring the violence to an end (see Category IV).   
1.Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by 
definition), where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act? 
 The 1994 genocide was not a spontaneous uprising, but rather a calculated and systematic 
program of violence carried out by Hutu government and military officials against Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus.262 Evident in most accounts is a tendency to paint events in simplistic good-
guy/bad-guy terms. To the contrary, the final stages of bloodshed witnessed a number of 
innocent Hutus killed by Tutsi rebels in retaliation. Moreover, the ethnic civil war was neither 
inevitable nor unavoidable, as pointed out by the commander of the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire of Canada.263 On April 28, 1994, the 
nongovernmental charity organization, Oxfam, publically confirmed that a genocide of an 
estimated half million Tutsis was occurring in Rwanda.264 The tripwire had been set off three 
weeks earlier, on April 6, 1994, as Rwanda’s President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundi’s 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira were assassinated when their plane was shot down. Habyarimana 
and Ntaryamira were both Hutu. To illustrate the confusing ethnic politics of the two former 
Belgian colonies, Burundi had recently replaced a Tutsi military dictatorship with a 
democratically elected Hutu regime, whereas insurgent Tutsi forces aimed at overthrowing a 
Hutu government in Rwanda. A matter of hours following the dual assassination, armed 
Rwandan soldiers and Hutu militia targeted supporters of a brokered peace settlement (the 
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Arusha accord), most prominently Rwanda’s female prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana,265 
and within twenty-four hours “carefully planned” killings of targeted lists of victims began.266 
According to Samantha Power, the “fastest, most efficient killing spree of the 20th century” took 
800,000 lives in 100 days (from April 4 to July 14, 1994) and the “United States did almost 
nothing.” 267   
 Traditional U.S. security interests were not involved in Rwanda.268 The Pentagon saw 
Rwanda as another “Somalia waiting to happen”269 (see further discussion below). The U.S. 
State Department speculated the Rwandan “succession question will be difficult … the military 
intended to take over power temporarily.”270 Even after it became evident that the situation was 
more serious than a military coup, the “muted response” of the Clinton administration avoided 
the word “genocide” to sidestep the perception that the United States was refusing to send troops 
on a humanitarian mission.271 Arguably, the United States had a legal obligation if genocide were 
occurring. As policy analyst Milton Leitenberg contends, “the world’s indifference allowed mass 
murder.” There were 1,200 UN peacekeepers in the country before the slaughter began, but the 
United Nations’ response was to withdraw, as participating governments shied away from a 
combat operation.272 Brookings fellow Bruce Jones holds that the United States, United Nations, 
and world community erroneously and wishfully believed the situation in Rwanda could be 
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easily solved because the two sides would quickly agree to a ceasefire in advance of a brokered 
settlement.273 
 At the State Department, the Rwanda desk officer, Kevin Aiston, was the first to learn of 
the presidents’ plane being shot down. The UN peacekeeping mission’s command confirmed the 
reports within an hour. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence 
Bushnell drafted an urgent memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Bushnell was 
concerned about violence breaking out in both Burundi and Rwanda. She wrote, “Our strategy is 
to appeal for calm in both countries, both through public statements and in other ways.” Bushnell 
later acknowledged she never received a response from Christopher.274  
 How was the Rwandan crisis viewed from Washington in 1994? According to George 
Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “It’s ironic, in a way, that the 
preoccupation at the time in that part of the continent was not Rwanda; it was Burundi … I think 
it’s important to understand there were a lot of other things going on at the time …” 275 Moose 
adds, however, the United States was committed to a diplomatic settlement as demonstrated by 
his personal meeting with RPF rebel leader Paul Kagame just one day before the presidents’ 
deaths.276 Power reports Romeo Dallaire began to employ the term “ethnic cleansing,” which had 
become part of the popular lexicon due to events in the former Yugoslavia, at this point hesitant 
to say “genocide” until he literally looked up the appropriate conventions and definitions in 
international law. By April 30, the UN commander labeled the calculated killings “genocide” 
and in so doing ought to have elevated the Rwandan conflict to the highest level of U.S. and 
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international concern.277 Washington’s view had been that Rwanda was just one of several 
African trouble spots, not meriting special attention other than continuing diplomatic efforts.  
2.Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have 
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage? 
 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake notes: “I wish I could say [Rwanda] had even 
become an abstraction. I think the problem here for me, for the president, for most of us at senior 
levels, was that it never became a serious issue. We were focusing on the edges of the problem. 
We were focusing on what we could do, for example, in putting on the radio the names of some 
of those who were responsible for the killings in an effort to diminish it. We were concentrating 
on getting a peace process going, which became, in my view, a diversion from dealing with the 
underlying problems. We were focusing on and made a proposal on how to deal with some of the 
refugees and those most at risk.”278 
 Rwanda and Burundi were barely blips on the Bush I administration’s radar, apart from 
perfunctory support for diplomacy and paying the U.S. portion (33%) of the UN’s peacekeeping 
tab. Once the reality of genocide in Rwanda was confirmed, however, President Clinton and his 
chief advisers seem to have been at a loss as to what to do. Power’s straightforward analysis for 
the Clinton administration’s lack of attention and concern is that acknowledging genocide by 
name would compel action by the United States as a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council and signatory of the 1948 Genocide Convention.279 Washington’s paralysis was due to 
an apparent desire to avoid being obliged to take action. Halberstam’s journalistic explanation 
proceeds thusly: “In the United States, in the months right after Somalia, a deliberate attempt 
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was made to suppress the issue [of genocide in Rwanda] at the higher level so that the president 
would not be seen rejecting any option that included sending troops on an errand of mercy. Even 
the word genocide was to be muted in all public discussions …”280  
 In hindsight, a major military mission by the United Nations or United States might have 
saved only a few of those killed, depending on how quickly the forces moved.281 According to 
Lake, “But we never came to grips with what in retrospect should have been a central issue—do 
we do much more to insist that the international community intervene and go out and find the 
troops that are necessary, or even contemplate an American intervention itself? That issue just 
never arose.”282 Following the genocide, the United States supported creation of an international 
tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the Rwandan genocide.283 Power writes, “American 
officials did not conspire to allow genocide, yet they ignored the warnings and the massacre 
itself. Competing and conflicting U.S. interests led to inaction despite U.S. ideals.”284 However, 
what those “conflicting” interests were is unclear, besides an inability to recognize the severity 
of the Rwandan crisis, a resistance to direct involvement in Rwanda in particular, and a 
reluctance to participate in peacekeeping missions in general as a result of the recent Mogadishu, 
Somalia fiasco. The record indicates the Clinton administration ignored warnings, refused to 
commit combat forces, and referred to defunct peace negotiations as if they were viable.285  The 
Clinton administration “rarely condemned the slaughter” and failed to take other simple actions, 
such as jamming Hutu agitation and propaganda via Radio Mille Collines or expelling Rwanda’s 
UN ambassador. Instead of a policy directed at ending the conflict, the Clinton White House 
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called for UN peacekeepers to pull out without reinforcements, even though there were U.S. and 
French troops available in the region.286 The United States dispatched Prudence Bushnell and 
Arlene Render, Director of the Central African Office at the State Department, to Rwanda in late 
March 1994, prior to the outbreak of the genocide.287 Bushnell met with President Habyarimana 
and RPF General Kagame, but no apparent progress resulted.288 Regardless, any understandings 
reached were moot, since the Hutu president would be dead and the Tutsi rebel leader would face 
a horrific new reality in a matter of days. 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell later talked of “theatre” at her meetings with 
Rwandan military and government personnel, who claimed fidelity to the Arusha peace process 
while, in all likelihood, drawing up lists of enemies to be killed.289 Bushnell recollected, “We 
had put hope in the Arusha peace process. That was our winning horse … but I think there were 
fifteen peacekeeping endeavors going on around the world, five of which were in Africa … After 
the Somalia debacle, we didn't want to put money in something that was not going to be a 
success, both politically for President Clinton, and for the United States and the UN as a 
whole.”290 What Clinton and Christopher were thinking and hearing is not altogether clear from 
their memoirs. A reasonable assumption would be that the Secretary of State drove the policy. 
As Christopher put it himself, Clinton’s management style was: “To lay guidelines, then give 
broad authority to implement them. He wants to know what’s going on but not micromanage.”291  
 Bushnell explained U.S. policy was influenced by the Rwandans’ apparently sincere 
interest in the Arusha accord and the expressed desire of the UN Security Council, led by France, 
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for the diplomatic process to be successful.292 Bushnell explained, “Tony Lake had a keen 
interest in Africa, and so there was not significant push back from the White House, as long as it 
met the criteria for a successful peacekeeping operation …”293 Lake later spoke about this: “I’m 
hardly an African expert, and I did not know a whole lot about what was going on in Rwanda. I 
should have insisted that I knew …”294 Bushnell concedes U.S. policy makers overestimated the 
efficacy of peacekeeping, negotiation, and a transitional government followed by democratic 
elections. United States policy priorities were divided on African issues, according to Bushnell, 
whereby Rwanda was only one issue of conflict competing for policy makers’ attention.295 The 
Deputy Assistant Secretary’s trip to Rwanda was intended to cajole the opposing factions to iron 
out their differences and set up a transitional government. Bushnell noted only minor issues and 
the Tutsi RPF seemed to think they could be easily negotiated. She told Rwandan President 
Habyarimana, “this chapter of Rwandan history has your name in it. It can be a chapter of great 
glory, or it can be a chapter of great tragedy.”296 Ironically, Bushnell received a posthumous 
letter from Habyarimana: “I’m really sorry I didn’t implement the peace accords, but I’m going 
to do it.” Habyarimana could not deliver on his promise because he was dead.297 Bushnell also 
met with Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the UN special representative, other diplomats in the 
country, RPF representatives, and Rwandan officials. However, the Hutu government was 
French-speaking, the Tutsi RPF was English-speaking, and neither the American Bushnell nor 
the Cameroonian Booh-Booh spoke the indigenous language, Kinyarwanda.298 The meeting 
became a futile diplomatic minuet, an unfortunate distraction on the eve of the genocide. The 
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U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, expressed concern that there were lists of people 
targeted on both sides. The killing started within days of Prudence Bushnell’s departure from 
Rwanda. The hope was an interim government would be capable of stopping these killings. 
Bushnell admits such hope was “naïve,” but American diplomatic personnel in Rwanda were 
heavily invested in the Arusha accords, and added, “once you become energized with one 
solution, it’s very, very hard to let go and even consider something else.”299 Lebow informs us 
about the phenomenon of “cognitive closure,” a kind of gross simplification of problem 
representation where individuals remained committed to an action plan, even after it ceased to 
make sense.300 Moreover, Bushnell acknowledges, “the greater concern at that time was in 
Burundi, right next door, where I was also heading, and where there [was] killing on a larger 
scale going on …”301 Bushnell’s take on the situation before the violence commenced only 
seemed naïve in hindsight. 
 Hence, when Rwanda’s bloody apocalypse unfolded, the priority in Washington was the 
evacuation of American diplomats and civilians from the country. According to Bushnell, the 
order to evacuate Kigali came from the Secretary of State, not President Clinton, despite 
protestations from the UN commander not to abandon innocents in the face of slaughter. Unless 
the United States and other countries left a few people behind, Dallaire believed they had no risk 
at stake in the Rwandan situation.302 This is an intriguing proposition, since there is a tradition in 
American diplomacy for the ambassador to stay behind, such as James Madison in Paris during 
the Reign of Terror in 1792 and William Bullitt in Paris after the fall of France in 1940.  
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 A task force in Washington directed the successful evacuation and the Secretary, 
President, and First Lady personally visited the State Department to thank the staff for their 
efforts, according to Bushnell.303 Thus, President Bill Clinton’s sole concern was getting U.S. 
citizens out of harm’s way. There was no additional deployment of troops, even though there 
were 300 U.S. Marines in Burundi.304 As 4,000 Americans and other foreigners were flown out 
of Rwanda, some 200,000 Rwandans died in a three-day period.305 Marines carried out a one-day 
rescue operation in Kigali and observed large-scale killings,306 and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency reported: “organized parallel effort of genocide.”307 Therefore, the U.S. failure to 
respond to the palaver, rather than just rescuing one’s own people, was not owing to a lack of 
information. However, the slaughter of 200,000 Rwandans occurred in three days (April 1994), 
which did not allow time to organize any sort of larger operation. Thus, saving U.S. personnel 
became almost axiomatic (i.e., self-evident) in such a situation.     
3.How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or 
management style) have a determinative effect? 
 In January 1994, an intelligence analyst predicted 500,000 Rwandans would be killed in 
“the worst-case scenario.”308 Earlier, in October 1993, the United States refused to deploy troops 
in the UN peacekeeping mission and approved paying for 2,500 peacekeepers, half the number 
Dallaire wanted.309  Prudence Bushnell wrote a memorandum to Secretary Warren Christopher 
regarding the violence in both Rwanda and Burundi.310 Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, 
director of strategic policy and planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confessed to being 
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unschooled in the “ethnic dimensions” of Rwanda, which he described as “marginal” at the 
time.311 Presidential Decision Directive 25, (PDD-25), authored by Richard C. Clarke of the 
National Security Council, May 3, 1994, set conditions amounting to low-risk peacekeeping. 
Member of Congress David Obey said PDD-25 laid out “zero degree of involvement, zero 
degree of risk, and zero degree of pain and confusion.”312 According to Clarke, however, 
“peacekeeping was almost dead.” Thus, the minimalist approach saved the peacekeeping concept 
in Clarke’s view. Regardless of the lack of U.S. participation in the UN mission, when Romeo 
Dallaire was in New York at United Nations headquarters for three weeks in March 1994, the 
State Department’s attitude was that the United States ought to withdraw its support if no 
progress were made toward a transitional government.313 This was before the killing began and 
hence should not be confused with a misdirection of policy in the midst of the one hundred days 
of slaughter. 
 Susan Rice was director for international organization and peacekeeping and worked for 
Clarke, as coordinator of the NSC’s counterterrorism group, when the Rwandan genocide broke 
out in April 1994. UN Ambassador Madeline K. Albright “was instructed,” presumably by 
Christopher or Clinton, to support withdrawal of UN peacekeepers. Albright wanted an 
alternative proposal and asked NSC to come up with something. However, Rice and Clarke did 
not argue against withdrawal. “Observers recall blowout fights.” Rice asked, what if the U.S. 
used the “g-word” and did nothing?314 Rice visited Rwanda after the killing season and regretted 
that U.S. policy steered clear of taking action. “What we did most wrong in the U.S. government 
was that we never even actively considered or debated whether we should do anything to stop the 
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genocide … [i.e.,] intervention … But we never debated it … and it wasn’t debated in 
Congress.”315 By intervention she meant combat troops on the ground, but that option was not on 
the table.  
 Prudence Bushnell’s Rwanda task force at State was “implementing a policy of non-
intervention.” The task force discussed ideas such as encouraging journalists to shoot video in 
Kigali in the hope that the militia commandos were not so shameless as to carry out the genocide 
on camera. Yet any commitment of U.S. government resources required senior-level approval. 
According to Bushnell’s account, she never considered appealing to Warren Christopher, much 
less pressuring him to change the U.S. policy commitment.316 In his memoir, Christopher states 
(somewhat clinically) that “depleted resources and swollen population exacerbated the political 
and economic pressures.”317 Unfortunately, the solution was not to restate the problem. Bushnell 
confessed to being captive to the bureaucratic culture. She and Assistant Secretary George 
Moose briefed the Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, “but we are a 
very hierarchical organization … Somebody of a deputy assistant secretary level doesn’t get on 
the telephone to [give] her opinion to the Secretary of State or the Director of the NSC, 
especially since we knew they were getting information.”318 Certainly in retrospect, Bushnell 
expressed regret at her inability to take a risk and tell her superiors their course of action was 
wrong.”319  
 Joyce Leader, the second-in-command at the U.S. embassy in Kigali, said, “the general 
tenor in Washington was not favorable to large peacekeeping operations.” Clinton’s crisis 
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managers were not only hostile to U.S. participation in peacekeeping, but also to any large-scale 
operation in Rwanda. This viewpoint hardened after eighteen Army Rangers were killed in 
Mogadishu, just six months earlier, despite insistence by Leader and David Rawson that a 
strongly supported peacekeeping mission was vital to the success of the Arusha accord, the 
diplomatic track the U.S. had committed to support.320 Moose, Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, recalled the discussion was about how large a force was needed, financial cost, and how 
to sell a Rwandan mission to a skeptical Congress. The error of U.S. policy was not 
understanding the motivations and objectives of the Hutu extremists. Initially, there was little 
enthusiasm for getting between the Hutu and Tutsi rival forces. Subsequently, Moose concluded, 
“I think frankly that our major mistakes were the mistakes we made before it started … I think 
we were severely limited in what we could have done to actually prevent this from going the way 
it went.”321 If we consider bureaucratic politics, the culture didn’t allow for dissonant 
information to alter policy and an array of available options, such as a rapid deployment force in 
Africa, simply did not exist.  
4.How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or 
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an 
administration and from one presidency to the next? 
 Rwanda suffered from bad karma due to Haiti and Somalia, since the Clinton 
administration adjudged those cases as policy failures they were loath to repeat.322 In the case of 
Somalia, beginning in August 1993, U.S. Army Rangers attempted to capture Mohammed Farah 
Aideed for attacking UN peacekeepers; Aideed eluded capture for months, set a trap for the U.S. 
peacekeepers, and ultimately killed eighteen troops in the well-known incident at Mogadishu 
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(October 3-4, 1993).323 In addition to the obvious negative lesson learned by the loss of lives, the 
“Black Hawk Down” scenario tempered the Clinton administration’s enthusiasm for 
peacekeeping missions. Clinton ordered increased U.S. presence in Somalia, while informing 
UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali of a six-month time limit. Bush I had sent U.S. troops, 
which, according to National Security Adviser Lake, Clinton had expected to be replaced by UN 
peacekeepers before the end of January 1993, but Boutros-Ghali did not want to commit to that 
timetable. According to Richard Clarke, the change of mission from humanitarian aid to a 
manhunt was not a presidential-driven decision, but was driven by President Clinton’s macho 
dictum: “we will respond massively” to such an attack.324 George Stephanopoulos recalls the 
President cursing and vowing, “When people kill us, they should be killed in greater 
numbers.”325 Whereas Stephanopoulos was uncertain as to whether Clinton’s outburst was due to 
frustration or conviction, the chief of staff indicated the commander-in-chief agreed with New 
York Times columnist William Safire’s determination that the “new impotence” of the United 
States “is the unwillingness of too many Americans to expend blood and treasure.”326 Projecting 
this precept to Rwanda, Clinton might have concluded that what he could do and what he ought 
to do were two different things. Ironically, Clinton seemed to have been afflicted by the Vietnam 
Syndrome in reverse. 
 The dramatic events in Rwanda followed a parallel timeline as the political crises in 
Somalia and Haiti.327 United States troops were prepared to enter Haiti in September 1993, but 
the plan was suspended when the Haitian military regime reneged on a previously negotiated 
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agreement to give up power. Only eight days after the October 3rd incident in Mogadishu, 
organized protestors taunted the USS Harlan County in Port-au-Prince harbor, prompting the 
U.S. Navy ship’s withdrawal.328 Hence, the Clinton administration demonstrated its hesitance 
after Somalia and the emptiness of its resolve to intervene. Not without irony is the fact of the 
U.S. intervention in Haiti by way of a diplomatic initiative and bloodless invasion in September 
1994, following the seeming “mistake” of non-intervention in Rwanda. 
 In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, in William Jefferson Clinton’s own words, “I 
ordered evacuation of Americans and sent troops to guarantee their safety.”329 Policy analyst 
Alan Kuperman maintains that ground troops should not be deployed for humanitarian 
interventions during civil wars, but cases of genocide should be an exception.330 Former 
diplomat C. A. Crocker contends Clinton’s performance in Rwanda was “worthy of 
criticisms.”331 Specifically, UN Ambassador Albright said the mistakes in Somalia offered the 
wrong lessons for Rwanda: “Somalia counseled caution; Rwanda demanded action …”332 
According to Prudence Bushnell, continuing civil strife in nearby Liberia was seen as being 
much more in U.S. interest and received a good deal of attention.333 George Moose perceived 
apprehension from the NSC, State Department, and Defense Department about adding Rwanda 
to a growing list of ongoing peacekeeping operations, five of which were in Africa.334 Madeline 
Albright conceded that only a broad-based coalition led by the United States could have 
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intervened effectively in Rwanda, but the Pentagon was dead-set against any such idea.335 The 
commander-in-chief said, “We were so preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia 
just six months old and with opponents in Congress to military deployments in faraway places 
not vital to our national interests that neither I nor any on my foreign policy team adequately 
focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.”336 Even as Clinton approved dispatching 4,200 
U.S. troops to Rwanda and Zaire (where many Rwandan refugees fled) in July 1994, he insisted 
“Mission creep is not a problem here.”337 The President clarified “the immediate and sole 
purpose” of the mission was humanitarian aid and relief rather than peacekeeping.338 Therefore, 
Somalia was not the model for U.S. policy toward Rwanda, but it was the lesson applied to 
Rwanda. 
I.International, systemic, or structural factors: 
 One body of opinion holds the world community’s “willful indifference” responsible for 
Rwanda’s genocide.339 Michael Barnett, who worked for the U.S. Mission at the UN (1993-
1994), contends the United States “muzzled the call to intervene” in a “cowardly act of 
abandonment” at the United Nations Security Council.340 The UN Secretary General has since 
claimed he “begged” the Security Council to act to intervene. Yet Barnett implies Boutros-Ghali 
lied, insofar as he apparently disregarded General Dallaire’s reports of “ethnic cleansing” and 
“genocide” as well as the mission commander’s plea for reinforcements.341 Madeline Albright 
further contends Boutros-Ghali was “disengaged,” but never acknowledged his failure to act 
effectively at the onset of the Rwandan holocaust. Additionally, secret documents reportedly 
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implicate French President Francois Mitterand for publically supporting the Hutu government 
prior to the genocide, despite his knowledge of attacks ordered against Tutsis.342 Thus, there was 
plenty of blame to share. 
 Anthony Lake holds the sole superpower’s “perception of military omnipotence” did not 
mean the United States had to use it wherever and whenever it could.343 At the same time, “the 
pernicious corollary” had been the alliance partners’ unwillingness and inability to the share a 
leadership role.344 According to the Arusha peace agreement, signed August 8, 1993,345 Phase 1 
of the Arusha plan: the United Nations Aid Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) would monitor a 
demilitarized zone and put unarmed military observation teams in place. UNAMIR Commander 
Romeo Dallaire was confident of accomplishing his mission with 1,200 troops. Phase 2 called 
for an added 2,500 troops over three months, and was “the most dangerous part of the mission.” 
A combat battalion and an engineering company would get between the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and Hutu-dominated Rwandan Government Forces (RGF). The warring units would 
surrender their positions and the enhanced UNAMIR force would collect their weapons. Dallaire 
believed the mission required “robust rules of engagement,” supported by reserve forces 
overseeing the demilitarized zone. Phase 3, planned to take ten months, would be “actual 
demobilization and reintegration process,” creating a National Guard from RPF, RGF, and 
gendarmarie (Hutu militia) with most given pensions, retraining, and civilian jobs. Phase 4, 
planned to take twelve months, would organize multiparty, democratic elections, during which 
time there could be renewed violence. Dallaire’s “hope” was that his UN peacekeepers would be 
relieved of their duties and replaced in phase 4. “In UN terms, the mission was to be small, 
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cheap, short and sweet.”346 While future UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, who was the official 
in charge of peacekeeping at the time, was sincere and honorable, he could only give limited 
resources to the Rwandan mission and its order-of-battle was not to engage either side in 
combat.347 However, both the United States and United Nations dismissed or ignored Dallaire’s 
calls for help in the midst of the bloodbath commencing on April 6, 1994.348 According to 
Power, U.S. policy weaknesses included: (1) bias toward states and negotiations; (2) “naïve 
policy optimists” such as Ambassador David Rawson; (3) “blindness bred by familiarity” of 
experts accustomed to violence (for example, 50,000 killed in Burundi, 1993); (4) Rawson 
assessed the Rwandan civil war would be “quick”; and (5) Assistant Secretary of State George 
Moose was “psychologically and imaginatively too limited.” Thus, Moose and others transmitted 
the stereotyped assumption that “these people do this from time to time.”349 
 When the United Nations decided to send the small UNAMIR mission in late 1993, 
consisting of about 1,500 troops, as in Bosnia, the exact mandate of UN peacekeepers was 
unclear.350 The UN peacekeeping office, under the direction of Kofi Anan, was preoccupied with 
the Balkans circa 1992-1993.  In January 1994, when Dallaire faxed UN headquarters with 
information from an informant that planning for mass murder was underway, the peacekeeping 
office told Dallaire to bring the allegations to the Rwandan president for him to investigate.351 
Madeline Albright explains those allegations competed for attention with horror stories and dire 
predictions all over the planet.352  
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 President Clinton’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 was widely 
interpreted to have said, “The UN should learn to say no,” foreshadowing Presidential Decision 
Directive 25. The person closest to Clinton in worldview was Lake, who explained, “In that 
speech, the president began by calling for stronger peacekeeping operations by the UN—not say 
no, but learning how more effectively to say yes … If you think about it, if the UN were to 
intervene in every country which has internal armed conflicts, either large scale or small scale, 
and takes them over, the UN is going to become the greatest colonial power in history, which is 
hardly its mandate. So you have to make choices. The choices have to be based on the degree of 
need, on the one hand, and our ability, or the UN’s ability, to act practically on the other. That 
became the purpose of PDD-25—not to provide answers to those questions, but to ask the 
questions. That leads to, in my view, good policy. While some argue that PDD-25 said stay out 
of Rwanda, the problem in Rwanda, I think largely was that we never had a coherent discussion 
based on PDD-25 of whether we needed to go in or not.”353 
 The Clinton administration’s after-the-fact spin was contained in a telegram where the 
White House recounts how the United States closed its embassy in Kigali, ordered American 
personnel to go home, demanded the Rwandan government vacate office, consulted with the UN 
Security Council to boot Rwanda’s ambassador, and froze Rwandan assets in the United 
States.354 Romeo Dallaire said he was “dumbfounded” by Clinton’s claim that the United States 
had sent $9 million in relief aid to the people of Rwanda, whereas Washington was $8 million in 
arrears for UNAMIR operations.355 The lack of U.S. policy coherence is partly due to the 
unfulfilled promise of the peace accord. In the view of U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David 
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Rawson (who was in that post 1993-1996), the Arusha accord was “fundamentally flawed” 
because it was brokered by “self-appointed” factional leaders disconnected from a consensus of 
popular support, and thus fell apart, just as a similar multi-party agreement failed in neighboring 
Burundi.356 Hence, in hindsight, we can only wonder why Rawson, Leader, Moose, Bushnell, 
and Christopher at the top put all their chips on the accord in the first place. Clearly, wishful 
thinking leads to a best-case analysis when the potential costs and risks of the alternative are too 
high. In the words of Albright, weeks passed before outsiders realized the scope of the genocide. 
The same day the prime minister and ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered, UN headquarters 
rejected Dallaire’s request for permission to use force because UNAMIR might seem to be 
choosing sides. Albright further states there was not only a lack of information, but also 
confusion as to who was doing what to whom.357 To quote Albright directly, “I am struck by the 
lack of information about the killing that had begun against unarmed Rwandan civilians, as 
opposed to the fighting between Hutu and Tutsi militias.”358 By May 17, 1994, the Security 
Council approved a resolution calling for an expanded peacekeeping operation, but the United 
States was admittedly “unenthusiastic about the prospects for the mission as designed by the 
UN.”359 With the United States doing little to bring coalition partners aboard, the mission was an 
institutional failure for the United Nations, by its own official admission.360  
 One issue on which General Dallaire and Ambassador Albright concurred was the 
obstructionist role played by France in the UN and NATO. French President Mitterand gave 
strong support to the Hutu regime before the genocide came to light and might have been 
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reluctant to reverse policy so abruptly and fully. The French approach was to impede decision 
making in the UN Security Council by undermining the plan proposed by Dallaire in January, 
prior to the carnage, and then again in April and May, forcing acceptance of weakly worded 
resolutions, even as Albright was trying in vain to get U.S. policy off the dime. Moreover, 
France was the only NATO ally with a significant, deployable military presence in Africa.   
II.National, domestic, or internal political:  
 Factions embroiled in insurgencies are able to take advantage of opportunities created by 
public debate within democracies.361 Leadership is challenged by the media and intelligentsia 
opposed to brutal methods and significant casualties. Democratic actors cannot employ brutal 
methods of suppression and annihilating oppositional elements.362 Therefore, interventions with 
combat troops are limited by nature to exclude brutal suppression of warring factions. 
 Warren Christopher’s point of view on “whether to intervene for purposes that are quite 
different from the traditional missions of our armed forces … While there is no magic formula to 
guide such decisions, I do believe that the discrete and careful use of force in certain 
circumstances … will be essential to our success in diplomacy and foreign policy.”363 Yet the 
general proposition did not resonate in the specific case at hand. In terms of military 
intervention, Lake offers: “it was almost literally inconceivable … I would think, especially in 
the wake of Somalia, that there was no chance that the Congress would ever have authorized 
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funds to send American troops into Rwanda. Indeed, we were struggling to get the funds for our 
relief operations.”364  
 Notwithstanding Lake’s assessment, a bipartisan group from Congress went to President 
Clinton in April 1994 and asked him to send troops into Rwanda to halt the slaughter. “We are 
writing to express our strong support for an active United States role in helping to resolve the 
crisis in Rwanda,” wrote member of Congress Robert Torricelli of New Jersey.365 Clinton 
declined, saying it was the UN’s responsibility or that of the Rwandans themselves.366 The spin 
the Clinton administration put on the unfolding genocide was that if they could not put a stop to 
it, they would still use military transport planes for food drops.367 Clinton faced intervention 
fatigue and peacekeeping skepticism, plus the fact that U.S. dues pledged to the UN were half a 
billion dollars in arrears.368 The Pentagon saw no U.S. interests on the line in Rwanda. Thus, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Woods was told by the Pentagon brass: “Just make 
it go away.”369 The Senate Republican leader, Bob Dole, weighed in that Rwanda held “no vital 
interests.”370 Clinton’s decision-making team definitely voiced more reasons to stay out than to 
go into Rwanda. There then ensued an Orwellian exercise in “bureaucratese” as Christine Shelly, 
State Department spokesperson, obfuscated, “the use of the term genocide has a very precise 
legal meaning, although it’s not strictly a legal determination.”371 Thus, Shelly and others were 
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given specific guidance not to speak the word genocide. “I have a phraseology which has been 
carefully examined and arrived at.”372  
 The Rwandan storyline on BBC, CNN, and NPR stressed “ancient tribal hatreds [and] 
violence.”373 Would better intelligence have persuaded Clinton, Christopher, and Lake to act 
more assertively to intervene? One scholar blames poor interagency communication and 
bureaucratic inertia for information not reaching the top-level officials.374 Indeed, there has 
emerged a decided “if-we-had-only-known” nuance in the recollections through hindsight. 
Bushnell said, “I have no recollection” of Romeo Dallaire’s informant’s prediction of an 
impending genocidal catastrophe in January 1994.375 Madeline Albright explains, “Even though 
my instructions came from the State Department, I thought I might be able to get faster action 
from the NSC … where Tony Lake’s knowledge of Africa was crucial … I first asked for more 
flexible instructions, then yelled into the phone, demanded them. I was told to calm down. The 
NSC would look again at what to do.”376 The result was inaction and Albright’s “deepest 
regret.”377 Despite the “alarms” sounded by Dallaire and others, “Rwanda was not cited either 
prominently or frequently.”378  
 The Clinton administration eventually sent U.S. troops, after the Tutsi RPF had stopped 
the genocidal killing spree, even as another 2,000 Rwandan refugees died daily, mainly Hutus 
fleeing the RPF advance. Clinton asked Congress to authorize $320 million for assistance and 
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dispatched 4,000 troops to refugee camps in Zaire and 200 Marines to guard the airport in 
Kigali.379 However, Congress appropriated $170 million, barely half the amount requested, and 
set an October 1st cutoff date. Oblivious to 800,000 souls having perished, Ambassador David 
Rawson, as quoted by Power, was still voicing commitment to the dysfunctional Arusha 
accord.380  
III.Individual, personal, and ideological factors: 
 “Is what he’s saying true? … How did this happen? … I want to get to the bottom of 
this.” Despite these presidential lamentations, Samantha Power’s thesis was that Bill Clinton 
showed no real inclination to stop the genocide.381 In fairness, however, as Prudence Bushnell 
said, “it was so counter to the thinking of an American mind certainly, that one would [be] 
behind the scenes, planning the slaughter of the people. Never mind that there was still violence, 
it never crossed anybody’s mind that something on the scale of what happened would be actually 
deliberately planned.”382 Some observers viewed the Rwandan cataclysm through a prism of 
racism, wherein Westerners were indifferent to faceless African victims of violence.383 As we 
have stated, the historical analogy for Rwanda was Somalia, not the Holocaust.384 Albright 
concurs with Power on this position: “History is written backwards, not forwards.” The United 
Nations Ambassador candidly states, “When the violence exploded, we tried to fit the situation in 
Rwanda into the framework we had created … Tragically, the lessons we thought we had learned 
in Somalia simply did not apply to Rwanda. Somalia was something close to anarchy. Rwanda 
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was planned mass murder.”385 As we mentioned above, the Clinton administration was loathe to 
speak the word genocide.386 Christine Shelly at State split hairs regarding “intentions,” even 
while asserting an “absolute requirement … to intervene directly” did not exist.387 As actual 
genocide witnessed its third week, the UN Security Council argued about the g-word, April 27, 
1994. Secretary Christopher cabled U.S. diplomatic personnel to warn that if the Security 
Council acknowledged the existence of genocide, the United States would be compelled to act by 
virtue of the UN Charter. Given British and American pressure, the Security Council statement 
published April 30th condemned “breaches of international humanitarian law,” sidestepping the 
g-word.388 Christopher implicitly allowed Geraldine Ferraro, the U.S. Representative to the UN 
Human Rights Commission, to use the term and Tony Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research, quoted Shakespeare (“a rose by any other name”) in his report dated 
May 18th.  Yet the Secretary of State warned against characterization of any specific incident as 
an act of genocide, or the Rwandan slaughter in total as genocide.389 Perhaps the most damning 
indicator of Clinton’s lack of urgency or indifference is that there was never a high-level policy 
meeting about Rwanda between April and July.390 After American diplomats and civilians were 
rescued from Rwanda, there was no political cost in avoiding taking further action, since no 
American lives were at stake there.391 Personally, early on in the crisis, Clinton was concerned 
for the safety of a Rwandan activist whom he had met. Power quoted an anonymous official, 
who observed, “Sometimes it felt as though she was the only Rwandan in danger.” When the 
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woman was ushered safely into exile, the President’s personal interest was over.392 Clinton’s 
inaction fit Janis and Mann’s concept of unconflicted inertia leading to defensive avoidance.393  
 In late July, after the genocide had effectively ceased, Clinton authorized a massive 
Rwandan relief effort, including food, medicine, fresh water, and sundries. In his memoir, the 
President says the effort cost $500 million and put 4,000 troops into the region (based in Uganda, 
not Rwanda or Burundi). Clinton writes, “…even after all the slaughter, it would still save many 
lives.”394 Regardless of U.S. intentions, the mission was humanitarian aid and rescue, not 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement, and thus had no impact on the state of civil warfare that had 
swept away hundreds of thousands of souls in a genocidal undertow. As the Secretary of State 
recalled, “we now felt compelled to act,” but nonetheless stressed avoidance of “mission creep” 
and “the shadow of Somalia loomed large over our internal planning.”395 
 Romeo Dallaire wrote, “Canada and other peacekeeping nations have become 
accustomed to acting if, and only if, international public opinion will support them.” 
Unquestionably, what the Canadian general called “moral relativism” pervaded the Clinton 
administration’s thinking. “Some governments regard the use of force itself as the greatest evil. 
Others define ‘good’ as the pursuit of human rights and will opt to employ force when human 
rights are violated … The concept of human rights assumes that all human life is of equal value. 
Risk-free warfare [emphasis added] presumes that our lives matter more than those we are 
intervening to save.”396  
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IV.Criteria for the use of force: 
Do civil wars end without some form of foreign intervention? If not, this means the 
United States will be involved sooner or later. Recent scholarship by Fotini Christia suggests the 
United States ought to recognize it will eventually intervene if its strategic interests or principles 
are at stake. Christia prescribes funding factions and shaping alliances, not simply sending in the 
U.S. Marines.397 However, while foreign intervention might influence the outcome, civil wars 
historically end with a decisive military outcome. In the case of Rwanda, the superior RPF force 
prevailed. 
 Had the Clinton administration decided to intervene in Rwanda, how could it have done 
so? An effective strategy would emphasize nation-building and economic development, not only 
“fire-power intensive strategies.”398 A task force investigating the Rwandan debacle found that 
the genocide could have been prevented, or, at least, significantly curtailed.399 The UNAMIR 
mission came to Rwanda in January 1994 with 1,200 to 1,500 soldiers, most of them from 
Bangladesh, commanded by two Canadian officers. For example, the mission had eight armored 
personnel carriers at its disposal, but needed at least fifty for transit and transport. 400 The 
incompetence and futility of UN and U.S. efforts is shown by the failure to deliver a handful of 
American-made armored personnel carriers due to Department of Defense paperwork issues.401  
In contrast to the United Nations’ offensive operation in Somalia, UNAMIR was a “traditional” 
peacekeeping mission, based on the idea that Hutus (RGF) and Tutsis (RPF) would negotiate in 
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good faith.402 General Romeo Dallaire charged the UN with undermining its own mission in 
Rwanda. Dallaire understated that he faced life-and-death moral choices on a daily basis.403  
 Secretary General Boutros-Ghali submitted three options to the UN Security Council, 
April 20, 1994. Note this was early enough in the progression of the genocide to have saved most 
of the dead. Option 1 was immediately reinforcing UNAMIR, beefing up its manpower to 5,000 
troops. Option 2 was downsizing UNAMIR’s force from 1,500 to 170 and trying to broker a 
ceasefire. (Note most of the innocents were butchered with machetes that do not “fire” per se.) 
Option 3 was total withdrawal. At the Security Council, Madeline Albright recalls, “The 
instructions that angered me were to support option 3—complete withdrawal …”404 Albright 
records in her memoir that the bloody events in Rwanda in late April 1994 corresponded to the 
issuance of PDD-25 on May 3 and a report from the Stimson Center, which concluded: “the UN 
should refrain from intervening in circumstances precisely like those in Rwanda.”405 Lake 
counters that the report, developed under heavy pressure after the Mogadishu, Somalia debacle 
of August to October 1993, contributed to U.S. reluctance to intervene actively in Rwanda, but 
was not the decisive factor.406 
 According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council had to choose between a 
“Chapter VI mission” (peacekeeping) and a “Chapter VII mission” (peace enforcement). Two 
alternatives were considered. The first was Romeo Dallaire’s plan, which called for an added 
5,000 combat troops to secure Kigali, “fan out” to protect tens of thousands of Rwandans fleeing 
their homes, and “create safe havens” for refugees and displaced persons. Only the United States 
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had the capability to bring the air power and logistics called for by this plan. Author Samantha 
Power contends Vice-President Albert A. Gore, Jr. met Boutros Boutros-Ghali and promised 
U.S. support through airlift.407 At the White House, Richard Clarke and Anthony Lake opposed 
Dallaire’s “inside-out” plan. The alternative “outside-in” plan was to create “protected routes” 
for refugees on Rwanda’s borders without use of air cover. However, the problem with the U.S.-
backed plan was that most refugees were not fleeing to the borders; rather, most Tutsi refugees 
were trapped or hidden inside Rwanda. Clarke insisted the U.S. plan was “feasible, doable … in 
the short term” and Dallaire’s plan was unworkable. However, the mission commander 
disagreed, stating: “My mission was to save Rwandans. Theirs was to put on a show at no 
risk.”408 The new peacekeeping doctrine, PDD-25 (as mentioned above), circumscribed U.S. 
participation, aid, and support to other states joining peacekeeping operations.409 After 
“haggling” at the Security Council and with the UN peacekeeping directorate, the Clinton 
administration approved “a version of” Romeo Dallaire’s plan—albeit after most Tutsi victims 
were dead.410 Moreover, U.S. logistical support, including heavy artillery, guns, ammunition, and 
vehicles, was delayed by “squabbles” between the Pentagon and UN peacekeeping office until 
President Clinton personally interceded, but shipments were delayed till June and July.411 The 
revised compromise plan was not a complete pullout, yet the operation was scaled down and too 
slowly implemented. By the time the enhanced UNAMIR mission was up and running, Tutsi 
rebels led by Kagame secured Kigali and most of Rwanda, except for a “safe zone” established 
by 2,500 French troops sent by President Mitterand, June 23, 1994. Afterward, Clinton ordered 
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the Rwandan embassy in Washington closed and froze Rwandan assets in U.S. banks.412 The 
Clinton administration’s response was too little, too late, and out of sync. 
 The U.S. military’s attitude toward UN peacekeepers, as recounted by James Woods, was 
not complimentary. When ten Belgian peacekeepers were among the first victims of the Hutu 
gendarmerie, Woods heard the comment: “…our rangers died fighting in Somalia. These guys 
[Belgians], with their blue berets, were slaughtered without getting a shot off.”413 This comment 
was not only disrespectful, it missed the point: the Hutu militia believed the UN would pull out if 
some of its peacekeepers were immediately killed (in a kind of low-tech “shock and awe”). As 
UNAMIR Commander Dallaire requested an additional 2,500 troops, peacekeeping director Kofi 
Anan warned him not to compromise “impartiality.” Then, a thousand NATO troops from three 
alliance member states came to Rwanda to evacuate only!414 The disagreements in NATO 
centered on French antagonism toward Dallaire’s plans. French opposition and American 
reluctance combined to undermine any sentiment for decisive action from NATO beyond getting 
foreign nationals out, and the later French mission to create a “safe zone” for Rwandan refugees 
and displaced persons had limited effect on the death toll. United Nations headquarters 
downplayed the carnage as an internal matter, just a flare-up within an ongoing conflict. The UN 
officers on the ground were vexed by the fact that unarmed civilians were not being murdered by 
an organized army, but rather by armed thugs. President William Jefferson Clinton’s only 
statement at the height of the genocide in Rwanda “reassured” the public about the safety of 255 
Americans.415 Journalists and scholars familiar with Rwandan events suggest a tactical force 
along the lines of the expanded UNAMIR force proposed by Romeo Dallaire could have halted 
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the genocide and rounded up the armed militia commandos. There was simply no international 
effort attempting to stop the genocide. 
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili (Colin Powell’s successor) said 
the Pentagon worked on a system of air drops to provide food, medicine, and supplies to refugees 
rather than Dallaire’s “way-station plan.”416 The United States had promised to pay $30 million 
for UNAMIR and another $30 million for a second operation.417 UNAMIR 2 was designed to 
secure the country to facilitate the safe return of two million refugees, but when Dallaire 
proposed this plan to the UN Security Council in September 1994, France and the United States 
opposed the idea.418 Dallaire’s operational plan, called Homeward Bound, sought to return two 
million refugees outside Rwanda’s borders and 1.7 million internally displaced or homeless 
Rwandans in coordination with nongovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and the Tutsi RPF 
and RPA. Dallaire insisted refugees and displaced persons should not be kept in camps, where 
they would be vulnerable to attack from the Hutu militia, whom the Canadian General called 
genocidaires.419 At the Security Council, France’s UN Ambassador labeled UNAMIR 2 as 
“unworkable,” which “infected” others, led to “cold feet” for a “risky” mission, but it was U.S. 
“apathy” that “stifled any urge to act,” in Dallaire’s opinion. Hence, thousands of defenseless 
people were attacked by gendarmerie in camps on both sides of the Rwandan border until 
Congo/Zaire invaded to force the Rwandans to go home. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands 
more, mostly Hutus, were killed or died fleeing the RPF. Prudence Bushnell observed that there 
was great reluctance among the U.S. military to support a multinational African peacekeeping 
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force. To airlift supplies as a humanitarian aid and relief operation was more acceptable.420 
Dallaire suggested U.S. conscience was soothed by the aid airlifted over the Goma refugee 
camps.421 Ironically, the U.S. decision to put its resources into the Goma operation cost $170 to 
$320 million, compared to the $30 million price tags for UNAMIR and UNAMIR 2!422 
 The first criterion for the use of force is that all other options, such as negotiations and 
sanctions, have been tried or ruled out. In Rwanda, the Arusha accords indeed failed. The second 
criterion was not satisfied, as the political, diplomatic, or military objectives were unclear. This 
was a two-sided conflict, wherein the genocide erupted as a variation of “ethnic cleansing” or 
“final solution” that jettisoned objectivity between parties as a viable position. There was no 
confidence on the part of Clinton’s decision makers for Romeo Dallaire’s military battle plan. By 
design, the Clinton administration’s plan lacked sufficient resources to go into Rwanda with 
“overwhelming force.” There was no exit strategy apart from a timetable imposed by Congress 
and the President’s determination to avoid the slightest possibility of American casualties. 
Rwanda was a case of non-intervention to the utmost. 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION  
 Although lamentable, Clinton’s “no-go” decision in Rwanda resulted from a variety of 
international, domestic, individual, and military factors. First, the civil warfare was considered 
the unfortunate norm for sub-Saharan Africa. Second, African affairs lack a domestic 
constituency and held the potential for a negative blowback in public opinion on the order of the 
recent Somalia fiasco. Third, the decision-making hierarchy did not respond to the concerns of 
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middle-level personnel, such as Prudence Bushnell, who saw the erupting violence as more 
acute, while policy makers tended to blindly follow to a preferred policy until reality rendered it 
moot. Finally, there was no consensus between U.S. policy makers and the UN peacekeeping 
commander on a military strategy that could accomplish the goals of preventing or stopping the 
genocide and ending the civil war.423  
 The Rwandan civil war ended in July 1994; Tutsi forces won the war and lost the 
genocide. The killing fields of the Land of a Thousand Hills were not yet clean. Tutsi RPF 
soldiers would massacre unarmed Hutu civilians at the Kibeho refugee camp in June 1995. 
Arlene Render of the State Department protested the atrocity on behalf of the United States, a 
government that had no operational capacity in place to prevent such a thing from happening.424 
General Romeo Dallaire had asked rhetorically: “Who is grieving for Rwanda and really living it 
and living with the consequences?” Bill Clinton flew to Kigali, Rwanda in 1999 “to offer a 
partial apologia” and said “genocide” eleven times, but, as the late David Halberstam noted 
sarcastically, the President stayed in the country only three and a half hours.425 Once again, the 
Clinton administration’s response was too little, too late, and out of sync. However, Clinton 
claims in his memoirs that the Secret Service was dead-set against a trip to Rwanda, which is 
why he limited his visit to the airport in Kigali only.426 
 The Kigali Memorial Centre opened in April 2004, the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan 
genocide, on a site where over 250,000 people had been buried. These graves and the Centre 
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became permanent memorials to the victims of the genocide and a reminder of the cost of 
inaction and apathy.427 It is important to note the failure to intervene in this case has fueled so-
called humanitarian interventions ever since, subsequently playing on false analogies presented 
by the Rwandan genocide. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CLINTON: KOSOVO—GO 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 As the Yugoslav federation began to break apart in March 1989, Slobodan Milosevic 
declared a state of emergency, effectively ending the autonomy of the predominantly ethnic 
Albanian region of Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians protested elimination of their autonomy, which 
dated back to the days of Tito’s dictatorship, and they suffered repression, police raids, mass 
arrests, jobs lost, and Albanian-language schools shuttered. Yugoslavia’s Serbian President 
Milosevic was at the height of his power and Kosovo, as a region rather than a state or republic, 
was not qualified for independence.428 The legal distinction distinguished Kosovo from Bosnia, 
at least in the view of some outside observers, although the Serb-Kosovar antagonism had 
festered just as long. 
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 Pressure from allies, particularly the British, as well as NATO and the UN would drive 
U.S. intervention in Kosovo (see Category I). Successful interventions in Haiti and Bosnia made 
the Kosovo adventure more feasible to Bill Clinton, a reluctant interventionist. Domestic 
opposition was present, but largely impotent (see Category II). Of considerable importance is the 
personal ideology and worldview of the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, and her moral 
suasion of the President (see Category III). The case of Kosovo also highlights military strategy 
(see Category IV) where the effective use of air power and the credible threat of force proved 
decisive.    
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), 
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act? 
 In 1995, Kosovar Albanians hoped the United States and United Nations would press 
Serbia to restore autonomy in conjunction with the peace settlement in Bosnia, but they were 
disappointed. In March 1998, the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) killed a Serbian official, 
leading to widespread reprisals.429 Whether the repressive response was intentional or not is 
arguable, insofar as some observers commented the KLA had made a strategy of provocation 
since its creation.430 By early 1999, Milosevic indicated his intention to purge Kosovo of its 
ethnic Albanian and largely Muslim majority. After rejecting a demand that NATO forces be 
allowed to enter Kosovo to prevent “ethnic cleansing,” Serbia-Yugoslavia was subjected to a 
seventy-seven day bombing campaign, Operation Allied Force, leading to Milosevic’s troops 
forcing hundreds of thousands of Kosovars to flee for the Albanian and Macedonian borders, 
thus creating the kind of humanitarian crisis the air-strike campaign had been initiated to prevent 
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and thereby threatening the unity of NATO itself.431 From the onset, President William Jefferson 
Clinton ruled out the use of combat troops and limited direct U.S. involvement to minimize 
casualties and to avoid a prolonged commitment in an intractable regional conflict.432 
 In October 1998, Clinton’s envoy, Richard Holbrooke negotiated with Milosevic to 
accept the presence of 2,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo. Milosevic used the introduction of the 
peacekeeping force as an excuse to retaliate against the Kosovar Albanians.433 Under the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an unarmed 700-member mission 
was responsible for overseeing the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. The ceasefire was broken by 
both sides in short order. In January 1999, U.S. Ambassador William G. Walker, head of the 
Kosovo Verification Mission, accused Serb-Yugoslav forces of massacring forty-five Kosovar 
Albanians in the village of Racak.434 It was almost as if Milosevic allowed the peacekeepers in 
so that he could challenge or humiliate NATO. For the Serb leader this proved to be a fatal 
mistake in judgment as international attention honed in on Kosovo. In the words of U.S. General 
Wesley Clark, “The UN was engaged early and continuously. NATO, rather than the U.S., 
bilaterally seized the problem.”435 Clark emphasized that post-operations planning and 
commitments were first put in place and force was only “a last resort.”436 The NATO 
commander and his political overlords hoped for a quick end. Yet when the air strikes led to the 
killing and expulsion of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs, Clark moved to switch from a casualty-
                                                          
431
 Melanson, Richard A., Post-Cold War Policy—Undertaking humanitarian interventions, Encyclopedia of the New 
American Nation, Advameg, 2012. 
432
 Ibid. 
433
 Power, Samantha, “A Problem from Hell,” p. 446. 
434
 United Nations Security Council Resolution  1199, September 23, 1998; Statement by the Secretary General 
following the ACTWARN decision (press release), NATO, September 24, 1998; Statement to the press by the 
Secretary General following decision on the ACTORD (press release), NATO, October 13, 1998; Serbian 
Mayor Slain in Kosovo, New York Times, December 19, 1998. 
435
 Clark, Wesley K., Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 
2001), p. 99. 
436
 Ibid., p. 100. 
103 
 
avoidance strategy to a more offensive strategy, using ground forces supported by Apache 
helicopters, to put a stop to the Serbs’ ethnic cleansing.437 As might be expected, the NATO 
leaders were reluctant to change the mission.438 Milosevic had 40,000 soldiers, militia, and 
police on the ground in the province.439 The UN and NATO commitments to Kosovo had not 
anticipated that Milosevic’s answer to the air strikes would be to heighten violence against the 
Kosovar population.440   
 In the opinion of some observers, international sanctions failed and led only to inflation, 
unemployment, social disorder, and economic disintegration. To the extent that economic 
sanctions were effective, they made control over land and resources even more important and 
worsened Serb repression of the Kosovar Albanians.441 Albanian nationalists established a 
shadow government, headed by Ibrahim Rugova, but only Albania granted it formal recognition. 
Rugova’s organization set up schools and health care facilities, but was helpless in the face of 
Milosevic’s troops and police. Until 1998-1999, U.S. policy remained ambivalent, denouncing 
Serbians’ repression of the Kosovars, but insisting that Kosovo must remain part of Serbia. 
Robert Gelbard, U.S. envoy to the Balkans, condemned the KLA rebels fighting the Serbs as 
“terrorists.”442 
 Kosovo became important as a regional conflict with international implications for all the 
same reasons why Bosnia was important five years prior. The Serbian repression and Kosovar 
insurgency threatened not only the Balkans, but potentially undermined liberalization of 
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southeastern Europe. The conflict also challenged the NATO alliance, which had, to some 
extent, proved its mettle in Bosnia by 1995, insofar as it now had to show its resolve to end 
conflicts could be sustained and repeated. The international implications of taking action against 
ethnic cleansing and genocide compelled the United States to become directly involved, as was 
the case of Bosnia, and were significant beyond Europe. Potential disagreement over interpreting 
events in Kosovo set up a potential conflict with Russia, the first such crisis since the collapse of 
the former U.S.S.R. 
 The context of the Kosovo crisis as a post-Cold War test with Russia was the expansion 
of NATO to include former Soviet satellites. NATO’s addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland was opposed for obvious reasons, considering the alliance’s original purposes.443         
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have 
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage? 
 Kosovo could be viewed as Yugoslavia II or even Serbia II for the post-Cold War United 
States. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, President Bill Clinton started on a diplomatic track and 
ended up on one of direct military intervention.444 Saunders posited that an “internally focused” 
chief executive would act in a transformational intervention in response to an internal threat to 
the “target state.” Saunders explains that the perception of the cause of the conflict, internal or 
external, will determine the decision maker’s actions, being more likely to intervene in response 
to an externally provoked scenario.445 Clinton definitely saw the threat to the rump Yugoslav 
state as internal, not due to external forces. According to Saunders’s paradigm, the goal of 
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intervention thus would tend toward removal of the regime. However, the case of Kosovo 
contradicts Saunders’s expectation with respect to Clinton’s non-transformative intervention, 
whereby “decapitating” Slobodan Milosevic’s Serb regime was never a core objective.446  
  According to former Acting Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in the Bush I 
administration, the successor Clinton administration aimed to support the Muslims in Bosnia and 
Kosovo in order to repair the perception of anti-Muslim bias that they believed tarnished U.S. 
image in the Islamic world. This concern seems not to have been a consideration for Bush I, 
perhaps because of the concurrent and successful grand alliance with the Saudis and other Arab 
partners to liberate Kuwait. Nonetheless, it is not clear to what extent preoccupation with the 
Persian Gulf War may have dampened the Bush I administration’s interest in involving itself in 
the former Yugoslavia.447 Perhaps, for the elder President Bush, it was as Abraham Lincoln once 
said, “only one war at a time.” 
 The U.S., NATO, and UN response in Kosovo was “humanitarian,” but not exclusively 
so. There were tangible U.S. interests, including credibility, stability, and a problem that 
threatened the Bosnian peace settlement.448 In March 1999, Serb military, police, and militia 
initiated “Operation Horseshoe,” using an artillery assault to frighten the Kosovar population, 
coercing them to flee, laying siege to towns, and executing young men over age sixteen.449 Even 
as the United States and its NATO allies intervened, Serbs drove more than a million Kosovar 
Albanians from their homes, three-quarters of a million fleeing to Macedonia and Albania. 
NATO air power seemed not to have inhibited Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing orders.450 As 
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Samantha Power asserts: “The decision to bomb Serbia marked a radically assertive break from 
past American responses to atrocity.” However, NATO repeated the mistake of fighting the “last 
war,” anticipating Serbian capitulation in the wake of the bombing campaign and not expecting 
the bloodthirsty march against the Kosovars.451  
 According to Madeline Albright, as early as December 1992, “U.S. diplomats informed 
Milosevic that the United States would be prepared to respond militarily if the Serbs initiated an 
armed conflict in Kosovo.” (One might be curious to learn what “dog” the Bush I team had in 
that “fight” as opposed to Bosnia.) Clinton’s first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
“reaffirmed this position in February 1993.”452 However, Albright’s comment was casual and 
informal. Albright’s “early warnings” are pretty cryptic and referred to after the fact. There is no 
evidence that her ultimatum was taken seriously by Milosevic or communicated to him at all. 
Hence, five years later, as Clinton’s second Secretary of State, Albright, said publically, “We are 
not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get 
away with in Bosnia.”453 Still unclear is whether this language was intended for quiet diplomacy 
or public alarm and in either case if the Serb-Yugoslav regime believed any such U.S. threat was 
credible. Therefore, by 1998-1999, United States policy was determined by linkage with Bosnia, 
lessons learned from the Bosnian experience, and the driving force of America’s chief diplomat. 
Other factors may have predisposed Clinton to favor intervention, but Albright drove the policy 
in Kosovo, not the President. 
 From his memoirs, Bill Clinton shows no hint of doubt about the correctness of the 
Kosovo policy for which Madame Secretary pushed. In hindsight, Clinton seemed to have 
                                                          
451
 Ibid., p. 451. 
452
 Albright, Madeline, Madame Secretary (New York: Hyperion, 2003), pp. 379-380. 
453
 Ibid., p. 381 
107 
 
absorbed Albright’s policy line, illustrating that a decision maker could be persuaded to a 
particular course of action if it was compatible with his ideology and worldview; in this case, 
their commonly held idealist viewpoint that the United States was, as Albright famously said, the 
“indispensable nation.”     
3.   How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or 
management style) have a determinative effect? 
 Anthony Lake, outgoing National Security Adviser, set the tone for the idealism of 
Clinton’s foreign policy. “It is dangerous hubris to believe we can build other nations. But … we 
can help other nations build themselves …”454 Policy making with respect to Kosovo 
demonstrated Clinton’s “ad-hocracy in action.”455 Key players such as Lake, his successor Sandy 
Berger, Albright, and her predecessor, Warren Christopher, all saw Kosovo as fundamentally 
different from Bosnia under Bush I and Clinton during the 1992-1993 period.456 When the Serb-
Yugoslav regime launched its ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, U.S. officials were 
reportedly “revolted” and “outraged.” At this point, there were no longer any illusions regarding 
Milosevic. In particular, Secretary of State Albright was “anxious to make amends” for Bosnia 
and Rwanda, as Samantha Power ascertained.457 Slobodan Milosevic was a “repeat offender” in 
the Clinton administration’s “institutional memory.”458 The President identified the Kosovar 
Albanians as “defenseless people,” but recognized war in the former Yugoslavia “could drag 
U.S. allies into a wider conflict.” Clinton’s rationale for involvement in Kosovo was a 
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combination of (1) the historical analogy of the Holocaust, (2) U.S. self-interest in preserving the 
gains of the Bosnian peace settlement, and (3) European stability.459  
 Secretary Albright clearly found the Serb assault on the Kosovar Albanians as 
unacceptable and a crisis to which the United States and NATO had no choice but to respond and 
worked to rally support.460 “We had to approve concrete measures that would expand our 
leverage over Belgrade … that was the only language [Slobodan Milosevic] would respond to 
now.”461 Thus spoken like a true child of the Cold War. Albeit such tough talk sounds like a 
simplistic truism from a politician on a campaign stump rather than the policy pronouncement of 
the distinguished “Madam Secretary.” In her own words, Albright was convinced that a 
diplomatic settlement was impossible unless there was a credible threat to Milosevic. The U.S. 
position statement to the effect that “nothing has been ruled out” was weak in her opinion. She 
said, “It was a clear step back from our earlier position and a reprise of our early timidity on 
Bosnia …”462 The Secretary of State and National Security Adviser clashed, Berger calling 
Albright’s advocacy of air strikes “irresponsible” and “you sound like lunatics.”463 Albright 
believed from the beginning that economic sanctions would not work unless backed by force. 
Thus, she argued for removing Milosevic’s regime from power.464 Albright sympathized with the 
KLA’s opposition to Milosevic’s dictatorship, the rebels’ dream of independence and self-
determination, and conceded their need to use force. Yet, the Secretary lamented, “there did not 
appear to be much Jeffersonian thinking within the KLA.”465 In sum, Madeline Albright 
                                                          
459
 Ibid. 
460
 Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 381. 
461
 Ibid. 
462
 Ibid., p. 383. 
463
 Ibid. 
464
 Ibid., p. 387. 
465
 Ibid., p. 386. 
109 
 
articulated an ideology of Wilsonian idealism, American exceptionalism, and messianic 
democracy. 
 President Clinton’s Secretary of State was determined to persuade the NATO allies to 
renew the threat of air strikes.466 She emphasized that Milosevic was central to the problem and 
had to be removed if any resolution was to succeed. As stated earlier, Madeline Albright became 
the driving force in the administration on Kosovo. In April 1998, Clinton said, “I was determined 
not to allow Kosovo to become another Bosnia.”467 He had earlier stated, in a radio address in 
February, “Bosnia taught us a lesson: in this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to 
even greater violence we will have to oppose later at greater cost.”468 Nonetheless, the cautious 
president sent Richard Holbrooke to “reason” with Milosevic, still avoiding the option of the use 
of force. Holbrooke’s stature and rapport with the Serb-Yugoslav president signaled 
Washington’s seriousness. Clinton again tapped Holbrooke to sit down with Milosevic after the 
European meeting at Rambouillet (February 1999), “but even Dick couldn’t budge him.”469 The 
events unfolding drew Clinton into line with Albright’s position in support of air strikes. NATO 
launched its bombing campaign March 24, 1999 and continued for almost four months, as 
killings and displacement of refugees persisted. It is important to note Clinton and Albright put 
their faith in the persuasive power of air strikes rather than ground troops. In his memoirs, 
Clinton addressed the argument that U.S. policy would have been more effective with boots on 
the ground. The commander-in-chief countered that the Serbs would have inflicted large civilian 
casualties before combat troops could be put in place and “that would cost more American lives 
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without enhancing the prospects of victory.”470 The Clinton policy makers were dealing with a 
more hard-line and insular Milosevic regime than they had dealt with in the case of Bosnia, circa 
1995.471 When Clinton announced the U.S.-NATO intervention in Kosovo to the American 
public, he made it clear he had no intention of using combat troops.472 
 The Clinton administration’s freewheeling management style pitted his hawkish 
Secretary State against his dovish National Security Adviser. The need for consensus in the 
situation room imposed limits on the president’s range of options, even as events propelled the 
United States toward direct involvement. Thus, the use of air power without ground combat or its 
credible threat emerged as the limited consensus and became Clinton’s officially stated policy. 
Whether it changed depended on the way events unfolded, in particular the belligerence and 
recalcitrance of the Milosevic regime. 
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or 
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an 
administration and from one presidency to the next?  
 General John W. Shalikashvili’s appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
1993 was key to changing Clinton’s policy toward Bosnia, due to his compassion and work with 
Kurds in Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War.473 Shalikashvili’s advocacy of 
humanitarian intervention represented a change in culture at the upper echelon of the Pentagon. 
Shali’s successor, General H. Hugh Shelton, appointed in 1997, added the Dover Test as a 
criterion for deployment of combat forces, whereby popular support was judged anecdotally by 
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the reaction of people to wartime casualties that returned to Dover (Delaware) Air Force Base.474 
Shelton’s sensitivity was compatible with the president’s “zero tolerance” attitude toward 
casualties. An early advocate of direct action, Madeline Albright wielded much more power as 
Secretary of State than she had as UN Ambassador. “Five years ago, when I proposed using 
force in Bosnia, Tony Lake never let me finish my argument. Well, now I’m Secretary of State 
and I’m going to insist we at least have this discussion.”475 Albright predicted: “Bosnia’s past 
would become Kosovo’s future.”476 Her resolve not to repeat the mistakes of Bosnia and Rwanda 
influenced the chief executive.  
 The Pentagon’s lesson learned by historical analogy placed greater emphasis on “force 
protection” in military planning.477 The policy choice of using force by air without boots on the 
ground suited the military’s general reluctance to commit to putting troops in harm’s way, 
although the U.S.-NATO theatre commander disagreed. The Pentagon argued against fulfilling 
Wesley Clark’s request for Apache helicopters because the Joint Chiefs suspected it was a 
potential backdoor entry with combat troops.478 Additionally, presidential aide Sidney 
Blumenthal holds Clark was handicapped because he was “not one of the boys” immersed in the 
military’s subculture and thus his views were disregarded by the brass.479 Power analyzes that 
allied commanders suffered from “fighting the last war” (in this instance, Bosnia) and “wishful 
thinking.”480 Bill Clinton and his decision-making team expected NATO bombing to bring a 
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quick end to fighting in Kosovo as was the result in Bosnia. Contrary to this hope, no two wars 
are the same. The air strikes continued much longer—eleven weeks instead of two.   
 Halberstam described the Kosovo campaign as an “incomplete and in many ways 
unsatisfactory war” that led to “an incomplete and difficult peace.” The ethnic hatred in Kosovo 
went far deeper than the antagonisms in Bosnia, thus making concessions and compromise more 
problematic.481 The foregoing assumption is subjective and may be true or not. Nonetheless, this 
logic led to a widespread conviction that Kosovo called for actual force, not just a believable 
threat. Yet the Clinton White House’s decision making was underpinned by institutional or 
personal memory of the failure of Rwanda, the success of Bosnia, which seemed to follow from 
proxy warriors and bombing without ground troops, an idealistic worldview amenable to military 
intervention for humanitarian reasons, and the unflinching determination of the Secretary of 
State. General Wesley Clark, as NATO force commander, might have been a key player who 
pushed or pulled Clinton to act in Kosovo, but the end result was victory in what was, in Clark’s 
words, “not, strictly speaking, a war.”482 As a result, the President of the United States “owned” 
the Kosovo policy’s outcome, although his earlier inclination had been much more cautious. 
Even though pundits and critics were calling Kosovo “Madeline’s War,” Clinton said, “Well, it’s 
my war and we’re going to see it through to the end.”483 The President was not very introspective 
or self-critical in his coverage of Kosovo in his memoirs, but, as Blumenthal summarizes, “He 
had learned the harsh lesson of Bosnia: diplomacy without the threat of force would not work in 
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the Balkans.”484  This lesson was learned very late in the game, as Tony Blair had to push the 
alliance to its limits to get Clinton to commit. 
 Furthermore, the so-called “Vietmalia Syndrome” might have been at work. The term 
was coined by diplomatic envoy Richard Holbrooke to describe habits of thinking resulting from 
the Vietnam War trauma that had been reinforced by the Somalia fiasco.485 Colin Powell, on 
hiatus from government service at the time, noted the change in political thinking since the days 
of the Vietnam conflict, when as few as eighteen casualties in a single day resulting from one 
skirmish would not have merited media attention or public outrage, as was the conspicuous case 
in Somalia.486 As a result, there was a reluctance to deploy force in situations where hostilities 
were threatened or underway. Given that these are the very circumstances under which soldiers 
normally operate, it is ironic that such concern for potential casualties became a priority for 
military leaders as well as civilian politicians.487 In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the 
values of both the military culture and the civic culture had evolved.  
I. International, systemic, or structural factors: 
 Richard Holbrooke, Clinton's chief negotiator, revealed that French President Jacques 
Chirac delivered an ultimatum to the president on June 13-14, 1995, demanding greater U.S. 
involvement in a Kosovo resolution; otherwise, France would withdraw.488 According to 
Holbrooke, the Bosnia scenario (1992-1995) had brought U.S. relations with its European allies 
to their lowest ebb since the Suez Crisis of 1956. The problem was not owing to a lack of 
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direction from Clinton’s White House, but rather “too much leadership.”489 Another factor would 
be the four-year Serbian siege of Sarajevo, which began in 1992. Holbrooke wrote, “NATO 
finally did what it should have done years earlier: it launched massive air strikes against Bosnian 
Serb positions.”490 Hence, due to these factors, U.S. policy changed from non-intervention under 
Bush I to intervention under Clinton. Yet we should also conclude U.S. decision making was 
reactive rather than pro-active in the case of Bosnia. Ultimately, NATO and UN pressure spurred 
a change during the successor administration. The international system had changed profoundly 
and ironically NATO was fighting its first war in 1999, the year of its fiftieth anniversary. As the 
United States and the Atlantic alliance were struggling to come to grips with the post-Cold War 
environment and exploring expansion into Eastern Europe. If NATO enlargement was perceived 
as a threat by Yeltsin’s Russia, the official admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland on March 12, 1999 could not have been more poorly timed.491 NATO’s very existence 
was called into question and a perceived failure of will in Kosovo could spell the organization’s 
demise. Clinton understood those to be the stakes. Speaking of the British Prime Minister, 
German Chancellor, and himself, he said to Blumenthal, “[Tony] Blair and [Gerhardt] Schroeder 
and I could ride into the sunset, but we’ve got to do this with NATO intact, having done this as 
an alliance.”492  
 In the case of Kosovo, there were two competing narratives concerning how the war 
against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia was won: the supremacy of NATO air power, or the indirect 
intervention of Russia on the side of the NATO allies (similar to the case of Syria in 2012). Did 
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the de facto Russian alliance with NATO and threat of conventional follow-up (combat forces) 
and negotiations force an end to the war, or (as military historian John Keegan argued) was it 
“air power alone”?493 Secretary of State Madeline Albright undertook a “double magnet” policy: 
pulling Russia toward the U.S. and NATO and pulling Serbia toward Russia.494 Wesley Clark 
noted “international authority was invoked in a diplomatic effort to resolve the prospect of 
additional ethnic cleansing … The application of force was measured at the outset.”495 Clark 
correctly pointed out that no Americans were killed in action, but two military personnel died in 
a non-combat accident and three soldiers were taken prisoner.496 To some degree, the Clinton 
administration might have been “boxed in” by its no-combat-troops commitment, but the Kosovo 
intervention was judged a success in ending “ethnic cleansing” and thus could be seen as a test 
case for deterring such atrocities elsewhere. In that sense, the case of Kosovo served the systemic 
objective of order and stability, especially in the testing ground of the post-Cold War order and 
may have made it easier to think the United States could do more under the next administration.  
 The Russian government, headed by Boris Yeltsin, supported the Kosovo autonomy 
agreement, but long opposed any international military intervention. Boris Majorski, the Russian 
delegate to the Paris peace talks in March 1999, stated, “Problems which have accumulated over 
decades cannot be resolved with bombing.”497 The Russians warned that separation of Kosovo 
from Serbia-Yugoslavia would establish a dangerous precedent with ominous implications for 
not only Chechnya and Crimea, but also places like Scotland and Quebec. Russia’s Foreign 
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Minister Igor Ivanov was more blunt, telling Albright: “we have many Kosovos in Russia,”498 
including Chechnya. In addition to the Russian Federation, the European Union was opposed to 
Kosovo’s independence and the United States could not accomplish its goals in Kosovo without 
European support.499 The U.S. plan in the period from July to September 1998 was to coerce 
Milosevic to stop the violence and reduce the numbers of Serb-Yugoslav troops and militia in 
Kosovo to the level prior to their offensive.500 On September 23, 1998, United Nations Security 
Council declared conditions in Kosovo to be a threat to peace and security. On September 24, 
1998, NATO formally threatened bombing if the offensive continued. In response, Milosevic’s 
forces murdered hundreds of Kosovar Albanians.501 Hence, the United States formulated its 
policy in response to pressure from allies. 
 Among the alliance partners, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook were described as “far more aggressive” against Slobodan Milosevic than previous 
U.K. leadership.502  On October 8, 1998, Albright and Cook lobbied for the UN Security 
Council’s authorization to threaten the use of force. Russia promised to veto any such resolution. 
Rather than thwarting the Clinton White House’s preferences, this set the stage for NATO to take 
action, despite the European allies preferring that the UN take responsibility. NATO authorized 
the use of force October 13, 1998 and Milosevic agreed to terms (later reneged) with Holbrooke 
the same day.503 At this point, U.S. intelligence from Serbs indicated Milosevic was ready to 
make a deal, but the Kosovar Albanians were not. As Albright recalled, the Kosovars were 
divided among themselves, growing bolder and regaining strength, and unwilling to compromise. 
                                                          
498
 Talbot, The Russia Hand, p. 301. 
499
 Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 385n. 
500
 Ibid., p. 388. 
501
 Ibid. 
502
 Power, “A Problem From Hell,” p. 447 
503
 Albright, Madam Secretary, pp. 389-390.   
117 
 
Additionally, the NATO allies were reluctant to condemn Serb actions while the KLA remained 
on the offensive.504 When Albright admonished the NATO ministers that the threat of the use of 
force had to be credible, she recorded their reaction as “There goes Madeline again.”505  
 France and several other European governments voiced considerable misgivings about 
the efficacy of air strikes. They feared setting a too easy precedent for military intervention 
because a state would not accept foreign troops on its soil or an externally imposed solution to its 
internal conflict. Yet, even as European military brass warned against issuing an ultimatum, 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who opposed the use of force in the former 
Yugoslavia a few years earlier, became one of NATO’s strongest voices calling for sending an 
ultimatum to the Serbs.506 As Albright lined up support for the U.S. position, the NATO allies 
were particularly keen on maintaining strict compliance with international humanitarian law and 
minimizing collateral civilian casualties, especially since the operation was characterized as a 
“humanitarian intervention.”507  
 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, reporting in 1999 on the Srebrenica 
massacre, warned that “the tragedy will haunt our history forever. A deliberate and systematic 
attempt to terrorize, expel, or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary 
means and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion.” Annan 
implied the major responsibility for providing “political will” rested with the United States.508 
Madeline Albright remembers the European allies were less solidly committed at first. France 
and Italy were reluctant to push sanctions against Milosevic’s regime and were concerned about 
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provocations by KLA rebels and arming them. For their part, the Russians did not want to meet 
at all.509 Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov defended Milosevic and told Albright and 
Cook that he considered the Kosovar Albanians to be the troublemakers.510 Subsequently, in the 
spring of 1999, as the NATO intervention transpired, U.S. diplomat Strobe Talbot called it “the 
most severe, dangerous, and consequential crisis” in Russian-American relations since the end of 
the Cold War.511 In other words, in a post-Cold War world, Russia remained a crucial, and hence 
structural or systemic, source of pressure.   
 Throughout the year 1998, according to Talbot, Clinton had been eager to engage Yeltsin 
on the Kosovo issue, but met with no success. After Yevgeny Primakov became Prime Minister, 
there seemed to be more interest in Kosovo, but it came in the form of stern disapproval of 
NATO’s threatened air strikes. For the Russians, the innuendo was that the United States could 
intervene whenever and wherever it chose, even in regions where Russia had interests, such as 
the Balkans. More ominously, nationalists in the Russian Duma called for intervening on the side 
of Serbia and President Yeltsin warned President Clinton: “Don’t push Russia into this!”512 Yet, 
as Talbot saw the situation, increasing Russian frustration with Milosevic’s regime moved 
Yeltsin, Primakov, and Ivanov from opposition to NATO’s incursion to acquiescence.513   
 Therefore, despite illusions about a unipolar system after the evaporation of the USSR, 
the United States faced two major sources of structural constraints: (1) the pressure from alliance 
partners, and (2) the need to accommodate a still influential and engaged Russia.     
II. National, domestic, or internal political: 
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 The NATO victory in Kosovo benefited the Clinton presidency, but the potential risks of 
intervention outweighed the payoff. Success in these “teacup wars” would give the President 
some domestic capital, but the potential downside was catastrophic.514 Clinton’s aide Blumenthal 
wrote: “[Clinton’s] entire foreign policy rested on his ability to carry out a campaign that faced 
intense opposition from both right and left …”515 In the spring of 1999, Clinton was looking at  
impeachment and the “vast right-wing conspiracy” that First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton saw 
coming after the liberal Democratic President. According to an article in the New York Times, the 
dangerous situation in Kosovo was made worse because of the impeachment drama by 
distracting the White House and narrowing the administration’s options. The Times piece by 
Scolino and Bronner speculated that an earlier decision could have prevented the Serb assault on 
Kosovo and might have given Clinton a freer hand to risk some political capital on the use of 
combat troops.516 However, except for advocates such as Albright and Clark, there is no hard 
evidence the United States would have been any less reluctant to put soldiers in the field absent 
the impeachment distraction. Moreover, no ally apart from Britain seemed to have any interest in 
a real hot war in the Balkans.517 Senator Larry Craig of Idaho, head of the Senate Republican 
Policy Committee, charged Clinton was: “… a president embroiled in a sex scandal that 
threatens to bring down his administration. He sees the only way out in distracting the nation and 
the world with a foreign military adventure. So, he orders his spin-doctors and media wizards to 
get to work. They survey the options, push a few buttons, and decide upon a suitable locale: 
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Albania.”518 
 As for the tolerance for casualties, U.S. forces lost eighteen in a single day in Mogadishu 
compared to zero in Kosovo. This worked to Clinton’s advantage, although there was an 
undercurrent of opinion that charged the Balkan intervention was a self-serving distraction for an 
administration beleaguered by scandal.519 The omnipresent Lewinsky scandal held the public’s 
attention throughout 1998 and 1999. More than a few pundits and critics made allusions to the 
1997 film Wag the Dog, in which a president orchestrates a fake war to deflect attention from a 
domestic scandal. While some Republicans questioned the timing of the air strikes, an Economist 
editorial even suggested provocation, implying that the bombing “created 10,000 new fanatics 
where there would have been none.”520 Simultaneously, both liberals and conservatives urged an 
“all in” strategy. An influential opposition party spokesperson, John McCain, and National 
Security Council chief Sandy Berger were using the term “win” to characterize the U.S. goal in 
Kosovo.521 Ironically, the drive toward intervention was led by Madeline Albright and the State 
Department, whereas the Defense Department and others in the administration were reluctant to 
become embroiled in a second operation in the Balkans while there were still troops in Bosnia. 
Although the Clinton administration’s standing was enhanced by the success of its policy in 
Kosovo, there is little to indicate U.S. actions were motivated by political considerations, or 
anything other than a desire to resolve a very messy scene in Kosovo. 
 Public opinion seemed to rally in support of Clinton’s Kosovo policy rather than driving 
it or pushing back. In April 1999, a Pew poll found 47% of Americans in favor of U.S. and 
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NATO military action in Kosovo and 48% opposed. However, when military action was 
specifically designated “to end [the] conflict,” 51% approved and 42% disapproved. 
Nevertheless, while 62% supported the Clinton administration’s policy, 72% said it was “very 
important” for the Clinton administration to get Congressional approval. In June 1999, 62% 
approved NATO air strikes, 32% disapproved, and 6% did not know. When asked if air strikes 
were right or wrong, 68% said they were right, 22% said they were wrong, and 10% did not 
know. Interestingly, polling on June 9, 1999 found that 46% favored and 49% opposed the 
possibility of 7,000 U.S. troops deployed in Kosovo (5% did not know). When an agreement was 
reached that in fact called for those 7,000 troops, 56% favored and 37% opposed in polling June 
10-13, 1999 (7% did not know). Clearly, public support lined up behind the President once the 
commitment was a “done deal.” In July 1999, 54% of Americans polled were in favor of U.S. 
troops being deployed as peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo and 43% were opposed (3% did 
not know). The strongest opinions were at the fringes, where 15% were “strongly in favor” and 
18% were “strongly opposed.” Thus, President Clinton could rely on moderates in the center, 
who favored his policy of active engagement in the former Yugoslavia, 39% to 25%.522 
 The Republican-controlled House of Representatives resisted the Clinton administration’s 
move toward intervening in Kosovo, but failed to assert its constitutional authority, voting 427-2 
against declaring war (which Clinton never requested) and tied 213-213 on a resolution to 
continue the air war. The House voted 249-180 to require the President to obtain Congressional 
approval before sending ground troops, apparently doubting his sincerity to keep his word or his 
capacity to control events.523 Tellingly, none of these votes had a binding effect on the Clinton 
administration’s actions. A few Republicans in Congress criticized the Kosovo mission, 
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including Representative John Kasich of Ohio, who called Clinton’s policy “a terrible decision.” 
McCain criticized the Kosovo intervention as a replay of the Bosnian scenario, a “supposedly 
one-year mission” that continued for five years. An early hawk from the sidelines, McCain now 
said the Clintonians lacked clear-cut goals and a coherent policy in the Balkans. Another 
Republican Senator, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, suggested U.S. peacekeepers might be 
targeted by the KLA rebels as well as Milosevic’s forces.524 Former Republican presidential 
nominee Bob Dole asserted an effective Kosovo policy was a casualty of the “all consuming” 
Clinton-Lewinski scandal.525 From the opposite viewpoint, Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi 
suggested the use of force in Kosovo would look like “blatant manipulation” of public opinion to 
distract attention from scandal and impeachment.526 According to Representative Peter King of 
New York, Minority Leader Tom DeLay decidedly prematurely saw Kosovo as “act 2 of 
impeachment.”527 While the storyline highlights Congressional opposition, political distraction, 
and not much potential gain in resolving a faraway foreign crisis, President Bill Clinton put a 
positive spin on his Kosovo policy. “We haven’t allowed the White House to become paralyzed. 
Under the most adverse circumstances, we have got a lot done.”528   
III. Individual, personal, and ideological factors: 
 Early in the Kosovo scenario, U.S.-NATO commander General Wesley Clark 
underestimated Milosevic’s potential for resistance. General Clark also had a contentious and 
antagonistic relationship with Clinton’s third Defense Secretary, William Cohen.529 Clark 
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conceded that Clinton’s proscription against ground troops limited the NATO operation’s 
effectiveness. The theatre commander felt he had no support from the Secretary of Defense and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clark was left out of high-level meetings where the policy he would be 
expected to carry out was decided. 530 Recently departed National Security Adviser Anthony 
Lake wrote, “It is not enough to say we have no choice but to act, that the alternatives to 
intervention are horrible.”531 In Lake’s view, what happened in Kosovo was “a response – not a 
strategy” and lacked a clearly defined political goal. (Lake compared the undefined political 
solution in Kosovo to Vietnam.)532 The political solution allowed Kosovo to remain a part of 
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, but there was serious doubt the Kosovar Albanians would live 
happily ever after under Serbian sovereignty.533  
 President William Jefferson Clinton was not initially inclined to intervene directly. The 
wording is instructive in that any variations of the modifier direct implied ground or combat 
forces. The President’s NSC gurus, Lake and Berger, were equally dovish. Culture, formative 
experiences, and ideology can be crucial determinants: Madeline Albright and John Shalikashvili 
saw things differently due to their similar formative influences owing to their family, personal, 
and ethno-cultural histories. In league with Wesley Clark, they pushed Clinton in a more active 
direction, toward direct intervention. Their motivations were humanitarian and out of concern for 
political stability. A counter argument was that U.S. military intervention in the Balkans was 
triggered by ethnic nationalities refusing to live in peace with one another. Ironically, the result 
of U.S. activism was a patchwork of ethnically pure mini-states in the Balkans, quite dissimilar 
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from America’s multicultural society.534 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot championed the 
principle of self-determination to promote integration, but the unintended result of U.S. 
diplomatic efforts was disintegration.535 In contrast to the Bosnian peace settlement, Talbot 
sought to resolve the region’s politics “without this time having to redraw the map …”536 
Talbot’s fluency in Russian no doubt aided the agreement negotiated with Russia. Moreover, 
Talbot had as much credibility with Yeltsin as Holbrooke did with Milosevic, and Talbot had 
entrée with Clinton due to their long friendship, the capstone being the simple fact Talbot entered 
government service at Clinton’s behest.537  
 Clinton’s ideology, worldview, and interpretation of history heavily influenced his 
decision making, which resulted in what might be called a “half-in” approach (perhaps similar to 
Barak Obama’s approach to Libya and Syria). The use of force was constrained to air power 
only, the President repeatedly stating before and during the seventy-seven day war against 
Serbia-Yugoslavia that combat troops were not an option. In this manner, Clinton was able to 
outmaneuver a bi-directional opposition of anti-intervention doves and hard-line hawks with a 
moderate, inherently limited approach. Additionally, the president skirted the big “never again” 
of Vietnam or the little “never again” of Somalia as mistakes of the past to avoid repeating. 
Within the Clinton administration the war hawks were led by Secretary of State Albright and 
field commander Clark, countered by a dovish NSC Director Berger and a passive-aggressive 
Defense Secretary Cohen in cahoots with a reluctant Pentagon. This cast of players, wittingly or 
not, bubbled up a policy that was perfectly suited to the commander-in-chief’s political 
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philosophy—a limited, moderate intervention compelled by humanitarian and human rights 
concerns rather than strategic or economic interests. The resulting end to ethnic cleansing and 
deposition of Milosevic fit Bill Clinton’s idealistic worldview. 
IV. Criteria for the use of force: 
 Let us begin by restating the Powell Doctrine and then assess the case of Kosovo in light 
of those principles. First, all other options should have been explored, such as diplomacy, 
sanctions, or negotiation. Second, the political, diplomatic, or military objectives are clearly 
understood. Third, the battle plan to be employed is realistic and the military objectives can be 
effectively maintained; in other words, are the strategy and tactics “doable” and “winnable”? 
Fourth, there are sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, often translated to mean going 
in with “overwhelming force.” Fifth, and lastly, there must be an exit strategy and timetable in 
place for the withdrawal of personnel once the mission’s goals have been achieved. 
 According to Martel, NATO’s credible threat of combat troops on the ground after the 
protracted bombing campaign led to victory in Kosovo. 538 The goal of the United States was a 
diplomatic solution agreed upon by the Serbians and Kosovar Albanians that would provide the 
latter with a degree of autonomy.539 Secretary Albright recalled Milosevic’s strategy was to 
blame the KLA insurgents for the crisis, labeling them as “terrorists.”540 Then Ambassador 
William Walker’s international inspection team verified the horrific Racak massacre (January 
1999). A high-level meeting at the White House led to President Clinton’s decision to call 
Richard Holbrooke out of civilian life and send him to negotiate with Milosevic (September 30, 
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1998). The ceasefire deal brokered by Holbrooke in October 1998 was breached by the Serbian 
leader in March 1999 and a second Holbrook mission came for naught. Thus, all other options, 
sanctions and diplomacy, were tried to no avail. 
 Operation Allied Force began March 24, 1999 and ended June 10, 1999. Some 300,000 
Kosovars had been displaced by that moment in time. The Serbs apparently believed they could 
defeat the KLA in “Operation Horseshoe,” an offensive launched on the basis of an erroneous 
assumption that the U.S. and NATO would not follow through on their threats. When Slobodan 
Milosevic broke the ceasefire he negotiated with Holbrooke, the Serbian president did not think 
NATO would go “all in.”541 The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1199, 
endorsing the air strikes (March 19, 1999). Serbia’s air defenses were “highly redundant” and 
“suffered little degradation.” Other targets were leadership and infrastructure.542 NATO and U.S. 
objectives were as follows: (1) destroy installations with minimal casualties (presumably allied); 
(2) effectively destroy Serb-Yugoslav targets (defenses, leadership, and infrastructure); and (3) 
target selection was controlled by President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, Chairman Shelton, and in 
consultation with General Clark.543 We might question whether such micromanagement, with the 
President of the United States being involved in target selection, is a workable model for this 
kind of intervention, especially when things go wrong, such as accidentally hitting the Chinese 
embassy. 
 General Wesley Clark points out that NATO deployed 60,000 troops in Bosnia for a 
population of four million and 40,000 troops in Kosovo with a population of two million, a 
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proportionally heavier commitment by 33%, reflecting the depth of the blood feud.544 
Negotiations commenced with Milosovic and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian Federation 
President Boris Yeltsin’s envoy, and Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Vice-President Albert 
A. Gore, Jr. and Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari. Sandy Berger of NSC detailed: (1) “We will 
win”; (2) “Serbs out, NATO in, Albanians back”; (3) “The air campaign is having serious 
impact”; and (4) Clinton was ready to use ground troops if necessary. “So go back to one. We 
will win.”545  
 The issue of sufficient resources illuminates the coming of age for the belief in the 
invincibility of high-tech air power as an attractive coercive method that entails little loss of life 
compared to front-line war fighters. Not only could air strikes be directed from long distances or 
by remote control, but also advanced technology could put a safe distance between logistical 
support and would-be targets. CIA Director George Tenet further holds that command, control, 
communication, and intelligence (called C3I) was not “over-centralized” by Washington during 
the Bosnia and Kosovo warfare insofar as soldiers in the field had access to intelligence data “in 
foxhole and cockpit.”546 
 As Undersecretary of State Talbot recollected, the presence of twenty-four Apache 
helicopters was supposed to indicate U.S. intention to follow up the air strikes with a ground 
war, although the President had virtually ruled this out.547 (As mentioned above, Cohen denied 
Clark’s request for the Apaches.) When a final ultimatum was ignored, NATO undertook the air 
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strikes.548 Power analyzed that allied commanders suffered from “fighting the last war” and 
“wishful thinking.” As discussed above under lessons learned, the “Vietmalia Syndrome” acted 
as a bit of a brake. NATO had an overwhelming advantage in numbers of troops; American 
leadership thought the air strikes unambiguously signified U.S. seriousness; and NATO 
commanders predicted the bombing campaign would last for a week since Bosnia had taken two 
weeks.549 Power suggested NATO’s risk-avoidance for its air force pilots by using missiles 
(“drones”) might have heightened civilian casualties. NATO drones hit Kosovar refugees, 
passenger trains, Serb civilians, bridges, TV and radio stations, satellite head-ends, and power 
generators.550 On August 7, 1999, a United States Air Force plane bombed the Chinese embassy 
in Belgrade, causing a number of deaths and no small amount of embarrassment.551 (Talbot was 
informed that Chinese officials believed the bombing was deliberate and a mob in Beijing 
stormed the U.S. embassy.552) By the end of May, British Prime Minister Blair and American 
President Clinton met to come up with a strategy to win the war, or, at least, forestall the 
possibility of losing. The NATO commander, Wesley Clark, offered the “Wes plan,” which 
called for 175,000 NATO troops to invade the province of Kosovo. The Pentagon’s Shelton and 
the Defense Department’s Cohen stood opposed to the idea, but NSC’s Berger endorsed it, 
saying, “All options are on the table.”553 
 Thus commenced NATO’s “virtual war,” so named by Canadian journalist Michael 
Ignatieff. 554 American commentator David Halberstam concurred, invoking the imagery of H.G. 
Wells and George Orwell. Jet planes took off from bases in the western hemisphere, carried out 
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missions over Europe, and returned home the same day.555 Unmanned drones and missiles were 
directed to targets by operators in front of viewing screens far from the battle zone. Laser-guided 
and photo-guided weapons honed in on targets selected by computers. Air Force B-2 stealth 
bombers from U.S. bases penetrated enemy defenses undetected, testing technology developed 
since the Persian Gulf War.556 While these advanced military technologies performed well, 
“winning” the war proved elusive, since the agreed-upon targets were so limited and Serb 
leadership stubbornly resisted surrendering.557 Only months later did the New York Times report 
that NATO was much closer to undertaking a ground war in Kosovo than most observers 
recognized.558 After six years of Balkan crisis management, President Bill Clinton, a reluctant 
commander-in-chief, sent in air power against Serbia and was ready, despite his reluctance, to 
follow up with a ground invasion of Kosovo.559 Serb-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic 
believed the threat of U.S. combat troops was real, though Clinton’s memoirs speak to his 
steadfast opposition to sending in ground forces. The truth may be somewhere in the middle. 
Blumenthal recalled Sandy Berger’s “Plan B-minus,” presented in a memorandum to the 
President dated June 2, which called for 100,000 American, 50,000 British, and 25,000 other 
troops to invade Serbia in early September.560 (Note that an expected ninety-day buildup, during 
which time the tyrant could murder at will, was always put forward as an impediment to a direct 
intervention.) The viability of Plan B-minus became moot. Milosevic capitulated June 3, 1999, 
and agreed to evacuate his forces from Kosovo June 9, 1999.561 
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 Observers credited Wesley Clark with “winning” NATO’s first war. However, Clark 
wrote about the frustration of air force pilots’ desire to apply strategic theory in practice. Clark 
indicated that they were eager to initiate what would later be dubbed “shock and awe” to 
decimate the enemy’s capacity to fight and bury his will to resist. The air warriors were 
frustrated and angry at the NATO high command for not letting them “turn out the lights in 
Belgrade.” 562 Martel’s analysis confirmed his opinion that mobilization of air power without 
deployment of troops in country led to a favorable outcome and limited the duration of the 
operation.563 This conclusion, shared by Wesley Clark himself, contrasted with Ignatieff’s view 
as well as Keegan’s and Halberstam’s proposition that de facto alliance with Russia, Russian 
withdrawal of support for Milosevic’s regime, and Russian collaboration with NATO 
peacekeepers comprised the “game changer.” Indeed, it was a kind of “perfect storm” wherein 
air power, the credible threat of ground combat, and Russian turnabout coalesced, but no factor 
alone was decisive or determinative.    
 The Clinton administration’s direct intervention adhered fairly well to the Powell 
Doctrine. (Anecdotally, the then-retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said as much.) The 
objective of restoring Kosovar autonomy and ending ethnic cleansing was limited yet clear. The 
war-fighting logistics, including troop strength, proved adequate. Sanctions and diplomacy were 
tried again and again. Plus, the Secretary of State undertook a multi-faceted approach to securing 
support within the administration and among the allies, while separating the Russians from the 
Serbs. The two-part strategy of air strikes for seventy-seven days followed by an invasion with 
combat troops on the ground ready to go was successful in forcing Milosevic’s regime to sue for 
peace. Public opinion was divided, but not bitterly so and there was nonpartisan support for the 
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administration’s decision to intervene, greatly aided by the total absence of battlefield deaths. As 
far as an exit strategy is concerned, U.S. and allied forces did not get bogged down in a 
prolonged military operation, never-ending occupation, or insurgency. Nonetheless, the Kosovo 
picture was far from perfect. Clinton and his decision-making team expected NATO bombing to 
bring a quick end to fighting in Kosovo as was the result in Bosnia. The air strikes continued 
much longer—eleven weeks rather than two. When Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin withdrew 
his support from Milosevic, he capitulated and allowed UN peacekeepers to enter Kosovo, where 
they encountered some hostility from Kosovar Albanians and Serbs.564 
CONCLUSION 
 Slobodan Milosevic was out of power by 1999 and died in prison in 2006.565 Martel and 
other scholars concluded the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were “political-military 
victories that led to comprehensive changes in the status quo, involved limited mobilization for 
war, and protracted post-conflict obligations for the United States and its allies…”566 With the 
benefit of hindsight, said obligations turned out not to be onerous, bloody, divisive, and 
expensive.   
 At the international level, the United States faced two major sources of structural 
constraints: (1) the pressure from alliance partners, and (2) the need to accommodate a still 
influential and engaged Russia. Of equal importance was the passionate advocacy of intervention 
by the chief U.S. diplomat and her influence on the chief executive. Additionally, strategic 
factors helped make Kosovo a “win” for Clinton: (1) successful use of surgical air strikes, (2) a 
                                                          
564
 Melanson, op. cit., Post-Cold War Policy. 
565
 Martel, Winning Modern Wars, p. 220. 
566
 Ibid., p. 231. 
132 
 
“cost-free” intervention with zero casualties, and (3) proving that the credible threat of force 
could be as effective as the actual use of force.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
BUSH II: IRAQ—GO 
INTRODUCTION 
133 
 
The most compelling rationale for the invasion and occupation of Iraq launched in March 
2003 in the context of post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy was to move the frontline of the eponymous 
War on Terrorism to the Arab Middle East, to fight the enemy in their own backyard instead of 
Manhattan. To quote Condoleezza Rice, testifying before the 9/11 Commission: “We were at 
war and we didn’t know it.”567 Iraq did not represent a direct threat to the United States. The 
United States did not target Iraq because of its strength, but rather it was the weakest potential 
target in the region due to twelve years of sanctions, international isolation and ostracism, and 
softening up from at least eleven bombing campaigns and more than a hundred “surgical” air 
strikes in retaliation or warning for myriad transgressions throughout the 1990s. While the 
American public might not have fully appreciated the underlying rationale for what Richard 
Haass labeled a “war of choice,”568 the President of the United States implicitly acknowledged 
that Iraq redux was Phase II of a “long war,” following Phase I in Afghanistan. In George W. 
Bush’s words aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, under the banner of “Mission Accomplished”: 
“the battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terrorism that began on September 11, 2001.”569  
 The defining moment for the Bush II administration was the 9/11 attack; hence, all 
decisions and their justification derived from that event and all policy planning referred back to 
it. During the 2004 electoral campaign, the President said, “We know that throughout the 1990s 
the terrorists were training and plotting against us. They saw our complacency as weakness and 
so their plans became more ambitious and their attacks more deadly until finally the twin towers 
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became ground zero and the Pentagon was in flames ... My outlook was changed on September 
the 11th.”570   
General Tommy Franks, the commandant of U.S. and allied forces in what was dubbed 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (an ironic code name for invading a sovereign state and overthrowing 
its government), sent a message to the men and women in his charge: “Our mission is clear. We 
will disarm Iraq and remove the regime that has refused to disarm peacefully. We will liberate 
the Iraqi people and we will help the Iraqi people to start anew to build a future of their own with 
a government of their choice.”571 His words, dripping with idealism, failed to acknowledge any 
objective U.S. interests in play or anticipate an eight-year-long protracted occupation.  
Our hypothesis is that the stated causes of war with Iraq, Iraq’s possession of weapons of 
mass destruction and Iraqi harboring of terrorists, were trumped up for popular consumption and 
the underlying national interests were prosecuting the War on Terrorism and promoting U.S. 
superpower hegemony. Thus, Bush II’s policy was based on a set of interrelated international 
factors—combating Islamist terrorism, jihadism, and militancy; pre-emption; and 
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (category I). The arguments were assembled for 
public consumption to justify the second war with Iraq, although it was, in fact, driven by the 
Bush II administration’s ideology, worldview, and belief in American power as a force for good 
in the world (category III). This vision went awry due to unanticipated consequences deriving 
from an unrealistically optimistic war plan.  
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1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), 
where  decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act? 
 
In his memoirs, George W. Bush made the case for going to war with Iraq by casting 
Saddam Hussein as a villain who waged “low-grade war against the United States,” paid money 
to terrorists, fired on U.S. aircraft, violated or defied UN sanctions, “ruled brutally,” and “didn’t 
just pursue weapons of mass destruction. He used them.”572 
In the words of Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Saddam Hussein’s willingness to use 
weapons of mass destruction was “well-known to the world.” Saddam was ready to add nuclear 
weapons to his arsenal after Iraq’s defeat in the Persian Gulf War and United Nations Security 
Council resolutions had had “little impact.”573 The Bush II team was concerned about how close 
Saddam had been to getting a nuclear weapon in 1990-1991, but subsequent U.S. intelligence in 
the ensuing years was outdated and inaccurate.574 Thus, Saddam Hussein and Iraq posed a 
“mortal threat,” quoting Cheney. The President and Vice President discussed Iraq in the days 
following September 11, 2001.575 This is factual, not speculation; therefore, what logic would 
dictate waiting and making Iraq the number two priority after the less powerful rogue Taliban 
state, Afghanistan? Cheney was one of the first key players in the Bush II administration to 
employ the syllogism: If 9/11 had used weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the attack would 
have been all the more deadly. Hence, if Saddam Hussein had WMDs, the United States would 
be justified in pre-emption. Although there was no compelling evidence of WMDs or delivery 
capability, the rhetoric suggested otherwise and they became the major selling point for the Iraq 
War. However, alternatives to the use of force existed and there was no urgency or decision-
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making timetable. The only timetable was whenever the Bush II team determined they were 
ready to go.  
In August 2002, George W. Bush’s introduction to The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America asserted that at the “crossroads of radicalism and technology … we 
cannot let our enemies strike first …”576 This statement established the Bush II administration’s 
intention, but did it express any distinguishable national interest other than an aggressive 
defensive posture or self-help? In the case of Iraq, the United States under Bush II proceeded 
significantly differently from the “go” decision for Afghanistan. The United States had an 
opportunity to bring the United Nations, and indeed NATO, into the Iraqi operation, but did not 
do so. Hence, the Bush II administration clearly chose to go essentially unilaterally in Iraq redux, 
except for the United Kingdom, its most predictably reliable partner. The objective was not to 
please friendly states, but to intimidate America’s foes. This approach would appear to be in 
response to the Bush II ideological environment, whereby, unlike the prerequisite of the Cold 
War era, solidifying alliances and honoring commitments to win and hold friends in the “free 
world” camp, the United States could work its will and would project its power during the 
“unipolar moment.” This was an article of faith for the Bush II circle of neoconservative 
ideologues. 
The atmosphere in which the decision to go into Iraq was made had been crucial. Vice 
President Dick Cheney recounted the “fog of war” immediately after the 9/11 attacks.577 “We 
needed a new way forward, one based on the recognition that we were at war.”578 In so doing, 
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those that 
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harbor them.”579 Cheney recalls, “We were confident that we would have help in the effort 
ahead.”580 However, what was the logic of linkage between Afghanistan and Iraq in the scope of 
the new policy framework? Iraq was under discussion from the outset. Whereas Cheney said he 
indicated Afghanistan should be first, Iraq was always a target.581  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shared Cheney’s interest in “getting Iraq,” just a 
day after 9/11. Rumsfeld lamented there were no easy targets in Afghanistan, whereas Iraq had 
better targets!582 At Camp David, September 15, 2001, Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued in favor of hitting Iraq.583 President Bush himself had suspected 
immediately after the 9/11attack that Saddam Hussein’s regime was involved.584 Terrorism 
expert Richard Clarke reported to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that evidence 
linking al-Qaeda with Iraq and 9/11 was “anecdotal” and there was “no compelling case” for 
Saddam Hussein’s involvement in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.585 Clarke, a 
holdover from the Clinton administration, later said bombing Iraq “was like our invading Mexico 
after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.”586 We caution that Clarke was outside the Bush II 
inner circle. Thus, his influence did not equate with his status as counter-terrorism czar and his 
dissent would appear to have been regarded as unwelcomed dissonance. 
At a subsequent Camp David crisis-management meeting, Rumsfeld told Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers that the United States should consider attacking Iraq and 
Afghanistan at the same time. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, as both Rice and Secretary of State 
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Colin Powell recalled, was obsessively concerned with Iraq and saw an opportunity to get rid of 
the problem.587 Therefore, the Bush II administration made a case against Iraq based on fear of 
Saddam’s regime taking advantage of 9/11.588 (Ironically, this led to the neoconservative 
ideologues in the Bush II team to take advantage of 9/11 to hit Iraq.) George W. Bush had ruled 
out action against Iraq by September 15th or 16th, but Wolfowitz continued to press the case for 
moving against Iraq at a September 17th National Security Council meeting.589 General Tommy 
Franks testified before the 9/11 Commission that the President told him Iraq was “off the table,” 
and rejected Franks’s request to draft a war plan. Regardless, among the small circle of 
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Franks, there was a clear presumption that Afghanistan was “round 1” 
of a longer war, one not limited to the hills of Afghanistan.590  
Cause of War 1: WMDs— Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and 
biological weapons or a nuclear bomb) made Saddam Hussein’s regime a threat to regional 
stability. However, as an anonymous Central Intelligence Agency staffer told the 9/11 
Commission, the Bush II administration’s “preliminary judgment” of Iraqi WMDs was based on 
an intelligence standard of proof rather than a legal standard of proof.591 Rumsfeld rationalized 
somewhat disingenuously, “Though the intelligence failures surrounding Iraq are now well 
known, recent history is abundant with examples of flawed intelligence that affected key national 
security decisions and contingency planning.”592 The Defense Secretary added, “the intelligence 
community reported near total confidence in their conclusions.”593 CIA Deputy Director John 
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McLaughlin concluded in August 2002: (1) Iraq had reconstituted its weapon facilities; (2) Iraq 
had a mobile biological warfare capability; (3) teams of weaponry experts were reassembled; and 
(4) the Iraqis were “clearly working” on a platform or delivery system.594 
A Report of the Project for a New American Century succinctly saw the issue as “The 
Right War for the Right Reasons” in Iraq: Setting the Record Straight.595 The Iraqi Survey 
Group (ISG), headed by David Kay and Charles Duelfer, was unable to verify the story that Iraqi 
officials had scuttled their stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in 1999 with 
documentation or any physical evidence. Although the ISG and UN inspectors accepted the story 
about the destruction of weapon stockpiles as factual, being “not able physically to verify that 
story” constituted “a weakness in our analysis.”596 It is important to note that the Bush II 
administration relied on essentially identical intelligence as had the Clinton administration and 
the most reliable information was gathered prior to the Persian Gulf War.597 Therefore, the 2002 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on which the Bush II White House based its decision 
making was outdated and flawed. Subsequently, the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction reported that the NIE 
“simply didn’t communicate how weak the underlying intelligence was.”598 The commission’s 
cover letter to the President states: “We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead 
wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction … 
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After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication that the Intelligence 
Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. What the 
intelligence professionals told you about Saddam Hussein's programs was what they 
believed. They were simply wrong.”599 Whether due to wishful thinking or single-focus 
myopia, the Bush II principals “cherry-picked” the intelligence to support their WMD claims. 
Cause of War 2: Iraqi harboring of terrorists—Defense chief Rumsfeld wrote after the 
fact: “Documents discovered after the coalition’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 shed more light on the 
depth of the regime’s links with terrorism … My view rested on the fact that previous attempts” 
to prove linkage “had failed.”600 Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Hugh Shelton “strongly 
opposed” an attack on Iraq in 2001 because he believed it would undermine allied support for the 
Afghanistan war.601 Nevertheless, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz persisted, keeping Iraq in their 
crosshairs. The Defense Secretary quoted CIA’s George Tenet: (1) there was “senior level 
contact” between Iraqis and al-Qaeda; (2) Iraq was a “safe haven” for Islamist militants; (3) there 
was “solid evidence” of al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq; and (4) al-Qaeda had sought aid to acquire a 
WMD capability from the Iraqis.602 The infiltration of al-Qaeda and other Islamists, jihadists, or 
militants into Iraq accelerated after the 2003 invasion and occupation. Iraqi participation in the 
guerrilla insurgency was subsequently fueled by popular resentment against the United States, 
United Kingdom, and their allies. Subsequently discovered evidence of Saddam’s defunct regime 
harboring, financing, or cooperating with outside militants was simply an example of the ancient 
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maxim: the enemy of your enemy is your friend. The underlying motivation for the Bush II 
policy makers was to make Iraq the primary base of operation for the War on Terrorism and a 
magnet to attract the radical forces to carry on an insurgency that would destroy them. The 
clearest evidence that the Bush II policy makers understood Iraq would become a magnet was 
the inseparability of the mission in Iraq and the global War on Terrorism in the public utterances 
of administration officials, none blunter than the President himself, who boasted, “Bring ‘em 
on!”       
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have 
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage? 
 
The case of Iraq redux suggests pre-existing involvement may well be a factor in “go” 
versus “no-go” decisions. Intuitively, the positioning of troops in or near the country of interest 
would facilitate any intervention under consideration and actions taken against the targeted 
country could have a cumulative effect, whereby each successive decision sets a precedent for 
further actions, or a kind of “escalation ladder.”  
There was undoubtedly a history of conflict between the United States and Iraq. Going 
back to the Carter administration (1977-1981), Paul Wolfowitz, Jeffrey Kemp, and Dennis Ross 
(later a Clinton advisor) drew up the Limited Contingency Study to reform U.S. military policy 
in the Persian Gulf region, based on three essential questions: Could the United States get troops 
into the region to repel a possible Soviet invasion? Could the United States defend Saudi oil 
fields? Or should the United States seize Saudi oil fields under the threat of a future oil embargo? 
The Limited Contingency Study further hypothesized a threat to Persian Gulf oil resources from 
within the region. Thus, a decade and a half before the first Persian Gulf War, Wolfowitz’s team 
projected Iraq as the “pre-eminent” military power in the region and anticipated its potential 
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threat to the Saudis and Kuwait.603 In July 1990, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens warned 
Bush I administration officials about Iraqi nuclear weaponry only one month before Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.604 Arens and Deputy Chief of Staff Ehud Barak met with Dick 
Cheney and unfurled reams of data on European assistance in Iraqi uranium enrichment. Arens 
said a nuclear-armed Iraq posed an existential threat to Israel. For Washington, the imperative 
was to keep Israel out of the war so as to keep the Saudis and other Arab partners in the 
coalition. The solution, as related by Cheney, was for the U.S. to guarantee anti-Scud missile 
defense for Israel, as the Iraqis provoked Israel with Scud attacks.605 Blackwill and Carnasale 
speculated that a single, crude, half-megaton nuclear bomb on the back of a flatbed truck could 
have inflicted 50,000 casualties on the U.S. and coalition forces during Desert Storm.606 CIA 
intelligence also raised warnings regarding Iraq. The consensus in 1990 was that Saddam 
Hussein would make some move against Kuwait, but not an invasion and occupation of the 
whole little country. Thus, Cheney, Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, and cohorts were all 
“consistently wrong” in their immediate expectations of what Iraq would do next.607 The 
precedent of having been wrong in 1990-1991 meant that those same decision makers would err 
on the side of the worst-case analysis in 2002-2003. 
There also may well be a pattern of policy continuity from one administration to the next, 
though not quite a “seamless web.” Following the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the June 1993 
Tomahawk missile attack was one of four retaliatory raids against Iraq; there was an earlier 
strike in January 1993, another in response to Iraqi bombing of a Kurdish city in 1996, and 
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Operation Desert Fox in 1998. January 19, 1993, Iraq refused to allow UN inspectors to fly into 
the country, and the Iraqi military began operations in the demilitarized zone between Iraq and 
Kuwait, and the northern no-fly zone. The United States fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at 
factories identified with Iraq’s nuclear weapons development. Henceforth, Iraq capitulated and 
allowed the UN weapons inspectors to resume their flights. The biggest U.S. action in the 1990s 
was Operation Desert Fox. George W. Bush quoted William Jefferson Clinton: “The best way to 
end that threat is with a new Iraqi government.”608 While the foregoing four actions taken in the 
form of surgical air strikes between 1993 and 1998 against Iraq by the predecessor 
administrations do not fit our criteria for intervention, targeted action by the Bush I regime to 
rescue the Kurds in northern Iraq in March 1991 is interesting because there was no push to 
follow up by “finishing the job” (i.e., regime change) begun in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.609    
Retaliation for the attempted assassination of Bush I on an April 1993 trip to Kuwait 
provided the circumstances for Clinton’s second hit on Iraq. On June 23, 1993, after Kuwaiti 
police thwarted an Iraqi intelligence plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush, 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher asked counter-terrorism chief Clarke “to plan retaliation, 
but insisted that it had to be limited to Iraqi intelligence headquarters and it had to be carried out 
on Saturday evening to minimize casualties”610 President Bill Clinton waited for verification that 
the missiles had successfully met their targets before making an announcement of the air 
strike.611 CNN reported “relative certainty,” following Clinton’s warning to Saddam Hussein, 
there had been no further Iraqi support or involvement in terrorist acts against the U.S.”612 
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According to Clinton’s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, “The U.S. has repeatedly said 
that any state that sponsors or supports terrorism against us will pay a price for its conduct.” 
Christopher wrote, “the president [Clinton] made it clear that he wanted to send an unmistakable, 
dramatic message to Iraq.”613 Christopher insisted the strike caused “relatively few casualties in 
the civilian population.”614 (Perhaps “relatively few” adds up to wishful thinking.)  
Operation Desert Fox (1998) followed, in association with the British, against Iraq’s 
“repeatedly unwilling cooperation” with the UN Special Commission on Weapons Inspection. 
Overall, under the Clinton administration, U.S. forces executed 130 air strikes for violations of 
no-fly zones between northern and southern Iraq.615 Note that Clinton failed to consult Congress 
in the 1993, 1996, and 1998 incidents.616 Significantly, the Clinton administration seems not to 
have considered a ground invasion, despite the Iraqi regime’s repeated infractions. Clinton’s 
successor, George W. Bush, pointed out that “Congress overwhelmingly passed and President 
Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act” in 1998.617 According to Bush, “as Colin Powell put it, 
[the U.S. was] keeping Saddam in his box. Then 9/11 hit…,” thus leading the Bush II 
administration to take “a fresh look at every threat in the world.”618 Yet the cause-and-effect 
relationship is not clear and the sequence of events suggests the momentum for acting against 
Iraq was already underway. As early as December 2001, George W. Bush was considering two 
possible avenues toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime: (1) “coercive diplomacy” involving 
economic sanctions, no-fly zone enforcement, arms embargo, and weapons inspections; (2) a 
                                                          
613
 Christopher, Warren: Chances of a Lifetime (New York: Scribner, 2001), pp. 232-235. 
614
 Ibid. See also Von Drehle, David, and R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush, Washington Post, 
June 27, 1993. 
615
 Hendrickson, Ryan C., Clinton, Bush, Congress and War Powers (Eastern Illinois University, 2004), pp. 4-8. 
616
 Ibid. 
617
 Bush, George W., Decision Points, p. 228. 
618
 Ibid. 
145 
 
military build-up aimed at overthrowing the regime by force. Condoleezza Rice explained that 
over time the two avenues “merged into one”: diplomacy and force.619 
Vice President Cheney, in hindsight, asserted, “Saddam Hussein did not find Desert Fox 
persuasive. In 1999 he began firing on U.S. and British planes that were enforcing the no-fly 
zone in northern and southern Iraq.”620 Cheney further revealed he and the president-elect were 
given intelligence reports that Iraq was steadily pursuing WMD capabilities in December 
2000.621 However, a pattern—indeed, a progression—of retaliation under Clinton provided a 
precedent for Bush II as well as momentum. 
Richard Haass, NSC staffer for the Bush I administration and director of policy planning 
at the State Department during Bush II, contrasted the two very different U.S. wars in Iraq. The 
1990-1991 Persian Gulf War was a “traditional war” to oppose aggression and restore 
equilibrium to the regional order. (See Chapter 2.) The 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom was a 
“radical” pre-emptive war designed to overthrow Iraq’s government and remake the Arab Middle 
East on new premises, presumably democratic and secular ones. (Albeit Saddam’s regime was 
secular, not Islamist, but decidedly undemocratic.) The Persian Gulf War cost an estimated $100 
billion with considerable contributions from allies, and Operation Iraqi Freedom cost $70 billion 
the first year, with cumulative costs approaching $1 trillion after eight years. (Exact cost of the 
Iraqi war is not definitively known, since all expenditures were essentially off-budget by way of 
supplemental appropriations, with much of the specifics classified.) The Persian Gulf War cost 
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about 150 U.S. personnel killed in action (KIA),622 whereas Operation Iraqi Freedom cost 5,000 
KIA plus as many as 40,000 wounded in both Afghanistan and Iraq.623  
The Persian Gulf War to liberate Kuwait gave the U.S. military “semi-permanent” 
presence in Iraq. In contrast, Iraq’s army, defense budget, and arms imports decreased to a 
fraction of their previous levels. Iraq had also suffered measurable social and economic decline 
after its previous eight years of war against Iran. With Iraq weakened and vulnerable, Paul 
Wolfowitz, then a private citizen, wrote Bill Clinton a letter in 1998, urging a U.S. invasion and 
occupation of southern Iraq. The letter, co-signed by a number of notables including Donald 
Rumsfeld, received no reply from Clinton.624 The transition between the Clinton and Bush II 
administrations is symbolized by a “no-fly zone” versus a “mushroom cloud” or surgical air 
strikes versus tanks rolling across the Iraqi border, insofar as Cheney, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, 
Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith (but perhaps not so much Powell and Rice) had more ambitious 
political-military objectives in U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Arab-Muslim Middle East than 
the Clintonians.625  
An unambiguous conclusion is that (1) pre-existing involvement or previous intervention 
and (2) continuity of policy weighed significantly in the “go” decision in Iraq redux, facilitating 
and contributing a momentum to the 2003 intervention. Rather than the “sea change” in thinking 
following 9/11, to which President Bush II attributes his decision-making, the Wolfowitz letter, 
for example, was part of the paper trail linking the second Iraq War to a larger, evolving strategic 
vision of U.S. post-Cold War hegemony. 
                                                          
622
 Table 8: Persian Gulf War, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Report for Congress: American 
War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics by Hannah Fischer, Updated July 13, 2005. 
623
 Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, pp. 7-9. 
624
 Porter, Gareth, Manufacturing the Threat to Justify Aggressive War in Vietnam and Iraq, in Lloyd C. Gardner 
and Marilyn B. Young, eds., Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam (New York: New Press, 2007), pp. 88-105. 
625
 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
147 
 
3.  How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or management 
style) have a determinative effect?   
 
The first place to look for answers defining the Bush II administration’s decision-making 
style is the National Security Council and the National Security Advisor. “George W. Bush had 
no trouble making decisions when the search for consensus failed,” according to Condoleezza 
Rice.626 One observer wrote: “Of all the top-level officials, she was by far the closest to Bush … 
She operated at the interface between the president and his advisors.” Rice was a “tough-
minded” realist whose worldview transitioned from cautious conservatism to assertive idealism 
in Bush II’s apocalyptic first year in power. During the 2000 presidential campaign, she said the 
United States “should avoid becoming bogged down in nation-building enterprises.” After 9/11, 
Rice guided Bush II toward “realism in the service of ideals.”627 According to political scientist 
Jean Edward Smith, in contrast to Dwight David Eisenhower, who convened some 300 NSC 
meetings, George W. Bush met once with the full NSC (January 30, 2001) and thereafter 
delegated titular authority over the body to Rice.628 Yet, the personalities with the real power, 
Rumsfeld and Cheney, were openly disdainful of Rice. According to Rice’s biographer, 
Elisabeth Bumiller, she and the Defense Secretary openly argued in meetings, requiring Andy 
Card’s mediation.629 Worse, Rumsfeld withheld vital war plans for Iraq from Rice and her staff. 
Her relationship with Rumsfeld improved somewhat with her promotion to Secretary of State. 
Conversely, Rice’s working relationship with the Vice President deteriorated from 2005 onward, 
she and Cheney sparring over the troop surge in Iraq plus other issues, including policy toward 
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Iran, Syria, and North Korea.630 
Advisers exercised a decisive hand in Bush II’s foreign policy for the simple reason the 
President was largely inexperienced and unknowledgeable in world politics.631 According to 
Condoleezza Rice, Bush II’s decision-making style “requires a very good administrator who can 
‘keep the trains running on time’ internally and work seamlessly with the other agencies … 
[where] there is a kind of bureaucratic continuity.”632 As Rice explained her role: “The national 
security advisor is staff—rarified staff, to be sure, but staff nonetheless.”633 Regardless of the 
expressed administrative theory at work, Bush II policy decisions appear to have emerged from 
trench warfare among the key players and the bureaucracies they controlled. 
The respective staffs of the National Security Advisor, Vice President, and Secretaries of 
State and Defense were the loyal facilitators of their bosses’ power-driven egos. Vice President 
Cheney’s “fresh wrinkle” was to create his own shadow national security council, headed by 
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, his chief of staff. Cheney’s “footprints” started from a January 2, 2002 
meeting with CIA Director Tenet to “review possibilities” to overthrow Saddam Hussein. 
“Within a month” Tenet presented a plan to Rumsfeld. Concurrently, Wolfowitz asked the CIA 
to investigate the chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix—there proved to be no evidence of 
complicity, dishonesty, laxity, or that intelligence findings on WMD data were “fudged” or 
“cooked.”634 The point was not to implicate Blix, but rather to add a building block in the case 
for war. Cheney’s “freedom of action” contrasted with and contributed to Rice’s “weakness.” 
She had been one step down in status from Powell, Cheney, and Rumsfeld during the Bush I and 
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Nixon-Ford administrations (in the case of Rumsfeld), hence “outclassed” by the alpha males at 
the table.635 As John Prados notes: “Rice had also determined to stay close to the president, 
usually a good recipe for a security advisor, except that in this White House the line of action ran 
through Cheney’s office.”636 
“To be sure, tensions between Defense and State are almost endemic,” Rice conveyed in 
her memoirs, and “there are many times when the secretary of state is more willing to use force 
than the Pentagon … Nonetheless, secretaries of state find the Pentagon all too willing to exert 
influence on foreign policy.”637 Rice witnessed the antagonism between Colin Powell and 
Donald Rumsfeld as “beyond such almost inescapable tensions.” Much of the infighting was 
carried on by way of Rumsfeld’s “slices” or “snowflakes,” cryptic little notes that floated 
through the corridors of the Pentagon, hence evading direct or face-to-face confrontation.638 
Additionally, Rice had to contend with the meddlesome Vice President. “The problem was 
[Cheney’s] staff, which seemed very much of one ultra-hawkish mind, was determined to act as 
a power center of its own.”639 The internecine bureaucratic warfare further inhibited a more 
efficient policy-making process, as Rice envisioned, whereby lower ranking staff could iron out 
details and leave higher strategy to the departmental secretaries. “The truth is that we would have 
had fewer Principals’ meetings had the distrust between Don [Rumsfeld] and Colin [Powell] not 
made the levels below the secretaries incapable of taking decisions.”640 With all due respect to 
the future Secretary of State, this might have been the result of the overbearing personalities of 
the players involved. Moreover, the National Security Advisor lacked the clout to contain these 
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conflicts in the service of a commander-in-chief with scant expertise and little inclination to 
force his will on policy outcomes. 
The staff’s paralysis in information gathering and policy recommendation led to 
decisions being made on the basis of limited, rather than diverse, input. The contest in 
bureaucratic politics became a mismatch: State had 57,000 employees and a $45 billion budget; 
whereas Defense had 700,000 employees and a $700 billion budget (ca. 2012)641 Thus, Powell 
faced challenges from Rumsfeld at Defense, Cheney, and key appointees such as the ultra-hawk 
Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who owed loyalty to Bush and Cheney, not Powell.642 
Therefore, Powell’s assistant, Richard Armitage, and chief of staff, Colonel Lawrence 
Wilkerson, lacked entrée and influence in the Bush II White House.643 Powell wanted foreign 
policy decision making to be “inclusive” and “transparent.” Unlike Bush I’s “collegiality” and 
Clinton’s “messiness,” Bush II’s NSC meetings were “rehearsed” with “formality” and “run 
behind the scenes … with Condoleezza Rice orchestrating.”644  However, Rice was the 
conductor, but not the composer; she didn’t write the score. According to O’Sullivan, “A back 
channel existed by which Cheney and Rumsfeld, with Rice’s complicity, made most of the 
important decisions.”645 Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill was surprised to see the “deepest 
division” and “open combat” between Powell and Cheney so early in the new administration’s 
tenure.646 Colin Powell was “confounded by Cheney,” who “played by his own rules.”647 The 
Vice President became a confident crusader. Dick Clarke described Cheney as “quiet and soft-
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spoken,” which hid “almost extreme views … out of place if aired more broadly.”648  
Who was in charge? Without a doubt, Cheney wielded enormous authority under Bush II. 
He picked O’Neill to head Treasury and Rumsfeld to run Defense. Rice’s assistant Stephen 
Hadley and Rumsfeld’s assistant Paul Wolfowitz had served on Cheney’s Defense/Pentagon 
staff during Bush I’s term, 1989-1993. Thus, strong personal ties, combined with institutional 
memory of Bush I’s Persian Gulf War, predisposed key players as war hawks. As historian 
O’Sullivan ascertained, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith ran the government.649 
Journalist Woodward “speculated” about Powell’s “deep-seated anger” at Cheney. “The 
relationship between the two was so bad that they could not even discuss their differences.”650 A 
direct line of access to the chief executive might have mitigated this toxic environment, but Bush 
and Powell had “little personal chemistry” and never achieved any general rapport.651 As British 
Ambassador to the United States, Christopher Meyer, opined, Bush and Powell’s was “not a 
relationship made in heaven.”652 Anecdotally, since Powell was the most highly regarded Bush II 
official, domestically as well as internationally, the fledgling president might have been jealous 
or intimidated by the former general. The Bush II administrative structure further undermined 
Powell’s ability to influence outcomes. Powell was described as a “shrewd briefer” who 
presented all “available options” while “shading briefings” to illustrate the efficacy of his 
preferred course. Unfortunately, George W. Bush “did not like debate or discussions about 
policy.”653 Clarke claimed the President “looked for simple solutions, the bumper sticker 
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description of the problem.”654 Powell’s nemesis Rumsfeld was known to be “as bold and as 
relentless as any modern ministerial figure,” allowing him to dominate policy making for the 
time being.655 As policy toward Iraq coalesced, Bush and Rice made compelling “mushroom 
cloud” analogies regarding WMDs, even as Cheney and Rumsfeld alleged al-Qaeda operated 
from Iraq.656 By February 2003, Colin Powell found himself investigating the triangular 
connection between al-Qaeda, Iraq, and WMDs, although he doubted its validity.657  
The Secretary of Defense came to be identified with his press conference allusion to 
“known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns.” Rumsfeld wrote: “The idea of 
known and unknown unknowns recognizes that the information those in positions of 
responsibility in government, as well as in other human endeavors, have at least disposal is 
almost always incomplete.” Nevertheless, incomplete information should not be an excuse for 
incompetence. Rumsfeld further elaborated: “It emphasizes the importance of intellectual 
humility, a valuable attribute in decision making and in formulating strategy.”658 Humility was a 
character trait he showed inconspicuously659 and the resultant strategy was undercut by 
“unknown unknowns” that were overlooked by a policy process that was a backformation, 
whereas the decision was predetermined in search of an acceptable rationale.  Interestingly, 
Rumsfeld applauds Bush II’s “leadership” and “sound stewardship” and notes that “even the 
New York Times called for “a fundamental reassessment of intelligence and defense activities” 
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following 9/11.660 As one of the key insiders driving the Iraq war policy, Rumsfeld curiously 
revealed: “While the President and I had many discussions about the war preparations, I do not 
recall his ever asking me if I thought going to war was the right decision.”661 Although the 
Pentagon boss implied Bush’s decisiveness, this revelation also exposed the limited range of 
voices involved in policy formulation. Tellingly, Rumsfeld reiterated, “Not one person” on the 
Bush II team was “opposed to, even hesitant, about the President’s decision.”662 This statement 
would indicate the absence of contrary and divergent viewpoints at the table, a process bordering 
on groupthink. 
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or nonintervention 
scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an administration and from 
one presidency to the next? 
Vice President Dick Cheney recollected September 11, 2001: “On this day, all our 
assumptions about our own security had changed. It was a fundamental shift … The first war of 
the 21st century wouldn’t simply be a conflict of nation against nation, army against army. It 
would be first and foremost a war against terrorists who operated in the shadows, feared no 
deterrent, and would use any weapon they could get their hands on to destroy us.”663 The 
evidence, factual and subjective, does not bear this vision out. International political terrorism 
and its transnational character was nothing new. Neither were the Twin Towers and the Pentagon 
the first symbolic or high-value American targets attacked by Islamist militants. Previous 
terrorist assaults (e.g., Kobar Towers and U.S.S. Cole) were simply outside U.S. borders, except 
for the Twin Towers bombing in 1995.  
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Unburdened by self-doubt or countervailing logic, President George W. Bush saw “[t]he 
lesson of 9/11 … We would confront the threat from Iraq, one way or another.”664 CIA Director 
George Tenet proposed a counterterrorist strategy combined with regime change in Afghanistan, 
relying primarily on covert operations, special forces, and domestic allies inside Afghanistan.665 
Even though Tenet saw Iraq as “a different matter,” Dick Cheney wanted to know what the CIA 
could do “inside Iraq.” The Vice President emphatically recalled Bush I’s “mistake” in standing 
by while Saddam Hussein’s regime “slaughtered” Kurdish rebels in the wake of Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm.666 Ironically, Cheney, then Defense chief, was one of the voices that 
worried what worse evil might replace Saddam if the U.S.-led coalition had deposed the 
dictator.667 “During the first Gulf War,” Rumsfeld recounted, “[t]he question was whether the 
U.S. should end the conflict or move to Baghdad … I remember very clearly Colin Powell 
saying that this was turning into a massacre.”668  Rumsfeld added: “A campaign to take Baghdad 
and oust Saddam was a daunting notion [in 1991] … Colin Powell, who had played such a 
prominent role in the decision not to attempt regime change, responded to the criticism: ‘[I]n due 
course, Saddam Hussein will not be there.’”669 In terms of a diplomatic alternative for Iraq redux, 
Rumsfeld put forward a particularly bizarre proposal: “I thought a diplomatic overture on Iraq 
from the Bush [II] administration—a ‘Nixon goes to China’ approach” might be possible. Iran 
and Iraq were still hostile, reasoned Rumsfeld, but both were hostile to the United States, so 
maybe Saddam could be wooed to befriend the enemy of his enemy.670 Rumsfeld had been 
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Ronald Reagan’s emissary to Iraq in the 1980s to try to do just that, but there was no indication 
Rumsfeld actually made this suggestion to Bush II in 2002-2003. 
The immediate antecedent of the second Iraq War was Operation Enduring Freedom. In 
Afghanistan, Day 1: losses were forty wounded and eight killed in action; al-Qaeda and Taliban 
were more heavily concentrated than expected, but essentially the war was over in fifteen days, 
although, as General Wesley Clark pointed out, the U.S. Air Force was brought into planning 
“only at the last minute.”671 According to Dick Clarke, “when we attacked, we treated the war [in 
Afghanistan] as a regime change rather than a search and destroy against terrorists.”672 The 
Afghan War commenced on October 7, 2001, “by implementing the bombing plans … that had 
been prepared but unused during the Clinton administration.”673 The pre-existing plans illustrated 
continuity and momentum rather than the highly touted sea change after 9/11. As Clarke 
affirmed, “Not until November 25 [2001] … did the U.S. insert a ground force unit 
[Marines].”674 Thus, the Afghan intervention was the prototype for Operation Iraqi Freedom, but 
Operation Enduring Freedom was the wrong lesson for Iraq.675 Colonel Gian Gentile has 
determined that counterinsurgency failed in Vietnam and it failed in Afghanistan as well.  
Likewise, nation-building failed. Why? Gentile’s thesis laid the blame on an ideology that held, 
“War can be made to work (if only the right general can be brought in to fix it).” Failure of U.S. 
strategy in Afghanistan was tied to an unproved capability to reconstruct the country, 
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economically and politically. Another factor was that the American public was not “morally 
connected” to the war.676   
A number of elements contributed to the debate over strategy within the Pentagon prior to 
the second Iraq War. In September 2001, the Pentagon’s boss was thoroughly disheartened by 
the war plan briefing presented by CENTCOM. Two problems were that it was essentially a 
reprise of the first Iraq War and it assumed chemical and biological weapons would be used 
against U.S. troops with no provision for counteracting them. Rumsfeld related three additional 
assumptions woven into the fabric of prewar planning: Saddam’s loyalists would concentrate 
around Baghdad, leading to a protective siege; anti-Saddam opposition groups would support 
U.S. intervention; and Iraqi forces would launch diversionary attacks on Israel, as they had done 
in 1990-1991.677 A year later, in November 2002, Rumsfeld was dismayed that the war plan 
revised by Tommy Franks called for 450,000 troops, described as “the mother of all deployment 
orders.”678 Rumsfeld ultimately approved Franks’s war plan because it initially put 150,000 
troops on the ground with an additional 300,000 in reserve.679 The unanticipated contingency 
omitted from war planning that had the deadliest consequences was the insurgents’ use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the concomitant vulnerability of U.S. lightweight 
trucks and Humvees.680 Rumsfeld later denied forcing a minimalist approach on the war in Iraq, 
but even George W. Bush characterized the Franks battle plan as a “light footprint.”681  
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Secretary of State Colin Powell was in charge of the effort to line up international support 
for the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the first NSC meeting after the 9/11 
attacks, Powell tried to steer the Bush II focus toward the threat from Osama bin Laden, al-
Qaeda, and Islamist militancy, as he worried that Iraq would be a dangerous distraction.682 
Powell applied lessons learned from his first-hand experience. For example, Manuel Noriega 
evaded U.S. forces for several days in December 1989 and Afghanistan was eightfold larger than 
Panama. As Donald Rumsfeld suggested that bin Laden would be “bottled up” in Afghanistan, 
Powell rebutted, “Bottled up! They can get out in a Land Rover.”683 In addition, Powell feared a 
replay of the Vietnam War’s “conspiracy of illusion,” where wishful thinking undergirded a 
policy of continuing more of the same based on a flawed initial premise.684 Powell realized that 
international consensus was vital to the legitimacy of the Iraq War, but his predecessor James 
Baker had traveled to dozens of capitals to enlist support for the Persian Gulf War, whereas 
Powell traveled no further than London and New York. The Secretary of State acquiesced to a 
policy for which he had serious doubts and as a result Iraq redux came to be perceived as a 
unilateral American operation. Iraq could be seen as Powell’s failure, but not his alone.685 Ten 
years afterward, Vice President Cheney said, “sure and swift victories are likely to be rare.” At 
the time, U.S. forces took “a remarkably short time” to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
casting the “fast-forward” mold for Operation Iraqi Freedom.686 Moreover, Cheney interpreted 
further rhetorical flourishes: “two dangerous lessons learned” by terrorists in the 1980s and 
1990s was that the militants could attack U.S. targets “with impunity” and in response the United 
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States would likely cut its losses and withdraw.687 The only problem with Cheney’s two lessons 
was that they had no empirical basis in fact. The Bush II White House did not lack good 
intelligence about the “lessons” drawn by al-Qaeda. The President’s Daily Briefs (PDB) from the 
CIA mentioned specific threats from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda forty times between 
January 20th and September 10th, 2001.688   
The so-called “neocons” or self-styled Vulcans brought a “grand strategy” to foreign 
policy decision making, beginning in 2001. The Project for a New American Century (PNAC) 
proposed a “blueprint” for maintaining the pre-eminence and power of the United States, 
precluding any rival superpower from emerging, shaping the international security order in 
support of U.S. interests, and molding the global civic culture to conform to American values.689 
Although PNAC predated 2001, this worldview actuated U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 
universe. At the same time, historical lessons were applied to serve policy justification. 
Historical analogies are usually distorted and so are lessons of history. After his perceived 
success in the first Iraq war, President Bush I said, “We’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once 
and for all.” Nevertheless, the Vietnam syndrome haunted Colin Powell, the former Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs and later Secretary of State. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was not plagued by 
such nightmares: “It’s a different era … It’s a different place.”690 That bald claim might be true, 
but neither was Iraq the same place as Afghanistan, nor was 2003 a re-enactment of 1991.  
The Iraq War plan of attack was the outcome of a confluence of applied historical lessons 
and perceived opportunities: adjudged successful counterinsurgency and regime change in 
Afghanistan; resolve to confront the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; a robust commitment to 
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the War on Terrorism; and applying the “lessons” of the Persian Gulf War without repeating its 
“mistakes.” Underlying the foregoing was a deeply rooted belief in the objectives of United 
States military assertiveness and dominance in the PNAC principles to which key Bush II players 
ascribed. 
I. International, systemic, or structural factors: 
In the week after 9/11, Paul Wolfowitz proposed Iraq as the third target in the first round 
of the “War on Terrorism”: al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Iraq. Colin Powell objected that the Allies 
would balk (using the terminology of a “bait and switch”), whereupon George W. Bush returned 
the focus to al-Qaeda and Afghanistan.691 Secretary of State Powell was unquestionably the most 
highly regarded and credible spokesperson in the Bush II administration, but his stature in 
Europe was eventually undermined by his connection of Iraq to al-Qaeda at the United Nations 
in February 2003. At a more fundamental level, the Bush II administration clearly did not 
consider the West European allies as the essential foundation of U.S. foreign relations.692 The 
Bush II White House built strong ties with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s right-wing 
Likud bloc and was sympathetic with Israel’s strategic objectives. Thus, Secretary Powell’s 
influence on policy toward the Arab Middle East was limited. This liability allowed the Bush II 
neocons to push their radical idealist agenda of regional transformation through regime change in 
Iraq.693 Richard Haass, State’s head of policy planning, noted “Powell saw 9/11 as an 
opportunity … The tragedy could be used to rebuild damaged relationships” with Europe. 
Immediately after that catastrophic event, NATO declared an attack on the USA would be 
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considered an attack on all member states (NATO Charter, Article V).694 Defense’s Rumsfeld 
revealed that the NATO allies even sent AWACs to help patrol U.S. airspace in the days 
following 9/11, thus illustrating the initial goodwill subsequently squandered.695 Powell was 
optimistic: “We are engaging the world … We want to make this a long-standing coalition.”696 If 
allies were necessary, the premier ally, UK’s Tony Blair, insisted that the use of force required 
United Nations authorization.697 That was the rationale for Powell’s “show and tell” performance 
at the UN.698 Such was the context in which Powell was working that he became the “go-to” 
communicator for a military policy he disagreed with. The soldier turned diplomat had 
envisioned an altogether different direction from the foreign policy conceived by the Bush II 
inner circle. Meanwhile, the president himself boasted America could indeed go it alone.699 
Prior to Bush’s “Axis of Evil” reference in his State of the Union address, January 29, 
2002, the president asked for Iraq war plans. He was briefed on revised war plans for Iraq in 
February, April, May, June, and August (when the final plan of attack was approved).700 Yet, 
from February to April, George W. Bush said there was no war plan or (cryptically) he was 
holding it close to his vest if there was one. By the “Axis of Evil” moment, the Bush II 
administration had “progressively shifted the focus” of the War on Terrorism: from retaliation 
for 9/11 to stopping terrorists from acquiring WMDs to preventing states from supplying WMDs 
to terrorists. In an odd twist, presidential speechwriter David Frum recalled that the target of the 
“Axis of Evil” speech was Iraq; Iran and North Korea were afterthoughts.701 Curiously, if the 
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threats from Iraq were multifaceted and quite clear, why confuse the issue by bringing other 
actors into the discussion?702 Frum’s contentions would appear dubious insofar as intelligence 
not only confirmed the North Koreans’ possession of nuclear weaponry, but also that they were 
sharing nuclear technology and materials with Iran, Syria, and Libya. (See Chapter 7.) 
Although simmering on the back burner for a year and a half, the run-up to war with Iraq 
was nonetheless “hasty.” The anticipated participation of Germany, France, and Russia never 
materialized.703 In August 2002, Powell obtained Bush II’s approval of a “diplomatic track” to 
take the U.S. case to the United Nations. British Prime Minister Tony Blair had said the UN’s 
stamp of approval was the only way that the UK could support the United States. Jack Straw 
replaced Robin Cook as British Foreign Minister largely because of Cook’s doubts about the 
wisdom of invading Iraq. Then, on August 26, 2002, Cheney gave a speech accusing Iraq of 
having nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons – immediately, the Vice President’s words 
were interpreted as a “virtual declaration of war.”704 Cheney’s speech, deliberately or not, 
undermined Powell’s diplomatic track and appeared to call for “pre-emption.” Also alarmed 
were Bush I veterans, including Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Lawrence Eagleburger.705 (What a 
pity there was no reconstituted “wise men” group!) The President of the United States addressed 
the United Nations, September 12, 2002. In less than two months, the UN Security Council voted 
15-0 for Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002). “This was seen as a Powell victory,” and for Iraq 
it was “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” and to renew weapon 
inspections. Still, as had been the case in the Persian Gulf War, Powell found the diplomacy, 
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sanctions, and inspections would not allow enough time to work and could not slow the advance 
preparations for war that were well underway.706  
The United States failed to bring allies, France and Germany, on board. On January 22, 
2003, France and Germany went public with their opposition to an attack on Iraq.707 Donald 
Rumsfeld hence disparagingly referred to Germany and France, “That’s the old Europe.” The 
Defense Secretary contended his use of the phrase “old Europe” was exaggerated, but he meant 
what he said.708 The Secretary of State was caught off-guard when French President Jacques 
Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opposed the United States over Iraq.709 
Indeed, Powell’s worldview was more in line with Chirac’s and Schroeder’s than with that of the 
Bush II neocons. Also, support for Bush II in Iraq seriously undermined Blair’s popularity with 
the British electorate. Hence, Bush’s public criticism of Germany disregarded and devalued 
Germany’s active engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.710  
Powell ordered the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to recruit exiles and organize some 
seventeen committees to work on postwar planning and nation-building; this effort resulted in 
the thirteen-volume “Future of Iraq Project” under Thomas Warrick. President Bush signed 
National Security Presidential Directive Number 24, incorporating the “Future of Iraq Project,” 
on January 20, 2003.711 Subsequently, Rumsfeld and Feith excluded Warrick from postwar 
planning and worked with Ahmad Chalabi, an Iraqi expatriate, who had no support or credibility 
in Iraq.712 In terms of Iraqi WMDs, Powell pored over CIA data and UN weapons inspectors’ 
                                                          
706
 O’Sullivan, Colin Powell, p. 165.                                 
707
 Rumsfeld, Known & Unknown, p. 443. 
708
 Ibid., pp. 444-445. 
709
 O’Sullivan, Colin Powell, p. 166. 
710
 Ibid., p. 167. 
711
 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 198 (posted September 1, 2006). 
712
 O’Sullivan, Colin Powell, pp. 173-174. 
163 
 
reports before his presentation to the Security Council.713 However, Powell found the CIA’s 
intelligence weak, not Tenet’s “slam dunk.”714 Rumsfeld acknowledged “Powell left no room for 
doubt” at the UN based on “more than a decade of proof” regarding Iraqi pursuit of chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons and connections with terrorism, in particular, the “Zarqawi 
network.”715 In effect, Powell’s public position contradicted his private misgivings, as he 
expressed later. Note Robin Cook resigned his post in the UK because of the use of discredited 
British intelligence in Powell’s evidence.716  
At the outset of the invasion of Iraq, Deputy Secretary Douglas Feith presented the Bush 
II advisers with a plan to transfer power to an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA), composed of exiles 
and Kurdish leaders. The Defense and State Departments disagreed on the wisdom of using 
“externals” (i.e., Iraqi expatriates and exiles) and State was overall much more pessimistic about 
the prospects for a peaceful postwar Iraq.717 The State Department reportedly paid $33 million to 
Ahmed Chalabi and the expatriate Iraqi National Congress, from 2000 to 2003, according to the 
General Accounting Office (GAO).718 At one time called the “George Washington of Iraq,” 
Chalabi and his group fell out of favor by 2004 amid allegations of fraud. Any plan to install 
Chalabi in power in the immediate aftermath of the invasion was described by Dick Cheney as 
possibly substituting a new demagogue for the old one and would be “immoral.”719 Instead of 
Feith’s transitional body, Bush II put Jerry Bremer in charge of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) with full executive power, apparently with Rumsfeld’s blessing. According to 
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Condoleezza Rice, the CPA was “overblown and grandiose” and made mistakes. In September 
2003, a twenty-five-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was created, but it had only an 
advisory capacity. In January 2004, Chalabi (who had been forced to resign as head of the IGC 
after a month) told Rice: “We need you to respect our need for sovereignty.” She hence told the 
president: “We’re running out of time and the Iraqis are running out of patience.”720   
George W. Bush admitted, “There was one important contingency for which we had not 
adequately prepared. In the weeks after liberation, Baghdad descended into a state of lawlessness 
…” as police “collapsed” and military “melted away.” Note Bush’s use of passive voice, begging 
the question – Why did anarchy or chaos break out? De-Ba’athification, disarming and 
dismantling of Iraqi military and police were executed at U.S. direction!721 As for the de facto 
alliance or protective umbrella for the Kurds, Tenet of the CIA told Iraqi Kurds that this time the 
United States was “really on the march,” implying a decade-long abandonment of them. Great 
Britain’s Blair and allies in the Arab Middle East (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait) were on 
board with Iraq redux, but not France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey (a potential base of 
operations).722 While the Bush II war planners did not expect Iraqi forces to capitulate in five 
days as they had in the Persian Gulf War, the expectation once the ground war began was that 
resistance would peak as U.S. and allied forces converged on Baghdad, which was projected to 
fall in three weeks. What did not happen was winning the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people. 
Four years into the war, General David Petraeus would argue that U.S. military personnel had to 
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get out of their compounds and ensure the security of Iraqi civilians, as the prerequisite to the 
“troop surge” in 2007-2008.723   
II. National, domestic, or internal political: 
John Prados argued that a factor common to the Iraq and Vietnam Wars was 
“congressional sanction short of declarations of war and deceptive measures to obtain those 
approvals.”724 The Bush II administration went into Iraq in 2003 with wider bipartisan support 
than Bush I had enjoyed for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, partly because of the backlash some 
liberal Democrats suffered for voting against what turned out to be the late 20th century’s most 
popular war. John Kerry was one of these reinvigorated Democrats. In the subsequent 
presidential electoral campaign, when Kerry became the Democratic nominee, the incumbent did 
not home in on Kerry’s roundtrip flights from dove to hawk and back to dove, but rather the 
“shallow illusion of peace” that had existed under Clinton and to which the United States would 
allegedly return under Kerry.725 For his part, Senator Kerry charged Bush II was “acting alone” 
in Iraq redux, though Rumsfeld and Cheney noted correctly Kerry had voted in favor of the 
original decision in the U.S. Senate alongside fellow liberals, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden.726 
Upon his re-election to the Senate in 2002, Kerry had stated, “No military in history has 
conquered as much territory and given it back to the people who live there.”727 This circumstance 
illustrates an ideological idealism of “messianic democracy” and “American exceptionalism” 
that transcends Democratic-Republican and liberal-conservative dividing lines.  
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       October 4, 2002, the House of Representatives voted 296-133 and the Senate voted 77-23 
to use force against Iraq. By contrast, the U.S. Senate narrowly voted 52-47 “to authorize the use 
of force” in the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991. The congressional authorization of the use of 
military force against Iraq cited (1) violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions; (2) 
the 1993 attempted assassination of Bush I; (3) al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq; and (4) Iraq’s 
continuing to aid and harbor terrorist organizations.728 The Bush II strategy of holding the vote 
just before the 2002 congressional election effectively circumscribed Democratic opposition to 
the Iraq War for fear of a backlash at the polls. 
The Bush II administration’s promotion of the “War on Terrorism” created a “siege 
mentality,” in the words of former National Security Adviser Zbigniev Brzezinski. Historian 
Terry Anderson identified “a cult of fear in America,” which persisted for several years.729 On 
March 18, 2003, George W. Bush broadcast to the nation about the need to end Iraq’s “history of 
reckless aggression … For the sake of peace in the world and security for our country and the 
rest of the world.”730 Initially, the rally effect contributed to a solid foundation of support for 
Bush II, based on the erroneous assumption that this second Iraq War would be cost-free like the 
first one twelve years earlier. Bush II also benefited from the public’s consensus against Saddam 
and the belief that decapitating his regime was justified for multiple reasons: WMDs, War on 
Terrorism, and the heinous nature of the Ba’athist regime. The war’s popularity would fade 
against the impact of the American public’s casualty sensitivity.  As was the case for Bill Clinton 
in places like Somalia and Kosovo, the American public supported military combat so long as 
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the casualties were minimal.731 Public enthusiasm for the Iraq War faded as the death toll 
approached 5,000 and the number of wounded ballooned to 40,000 over the course of the next 
eight years. 
Congressional deference has given wide latitude to the commander-in-chief ever since 
the Cold War era, beginning with the Korean War, 1950-1953. The uptick in congressional 
opposition—or, at minimum, criticism—of Bush II’s war in Iraq was uncharacteristic of an 
otherwise acquiescent legislative branch that essentially abdicated its constitutional war 
powers.732 The friendly bipartisan consensus dissolved as Iraq redux deteriorated into a guerrilla 
insurgency, dysfunctional nation-building, billions of dollars in unbudgeted costs, more than 
minimal casualties, and not a trace of WMDs found by Paul Bremer or Jay Garner, the 
bureaucrats in charge. 
Therefore, the rubber stamp of Congress was preceded by the Bush II team’s flawed 
assumptions and preconceived determinants of their decision making. The nonexistence of 
weapons of mass destruction, more than any other factor, poisoned the atmosphere within ninety 
days of Bush’s erroneous assertion of “mission accomplished.” The scandal involving 
Ambassador Joseph Wilson, Valerie Plame, and Scooter Libby began with a Washington Post 
article (June 12, 2003), followed by Wilson’s Op-Ed piece (“smoking gun”) in the New York 
Times (July 6, 2003), and syndicated columnist Robert Novak “outting” Plame as a CIA officer 
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(July 14, 2003).733 The imbroglio revealed that Bush II had relied on corrupted data to support its 
belief in Iraqi WMDs. “When Saddam didn’t use WMD on our troops, I was relieved … [and] 
surprised,” Bush said. “The press corps constantly raised the question: ‘Where are the WMDs?’ I 
was asking the same thing.”734 CIA Director Tenet enlisted David Kay to lead a weapons 
inspection team, as he had done for the UN in 1991.735 Simply, “We were all wrong.” President 
Bush II hastens to add, so too were Hillary, Kerry, Edwards, and the “vast majority of 
Congress.”736 David Kay’s inspection team would find Iraq’s nuclear weapon progress was at 
“the very most rudimentary.”737  
The salience of the WMD issue is its implication that the underlying premise for the Iraq 
War was not only false, but fabricated. A poll conducted between June and September 2003 
asked people whether they thought evidence of WMDs had been discovered in Iraq since U.S. 
forces invaded the country. They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those 
who obtained their news primarily from Fox News (33%) were three times as likely to believe 
that evidence of WMDs had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR 
(11%) for their news, and one-third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS (23%), 
and twice as likely than readers of print media (17%).738 Recall Wolfowitz’s admission that the 
WMD argument was the one that most justified war. 
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A month after invading Iraq, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich demanded Powell’s 
resignation for misleading the American public and the world.739 Rumsfeld, for one, said Powell 
and everyone else in the Bush II administration did not lie. “The far less dramatic truth is that we 
were wrong.”740 Might we ask at what price error? 
III. Individual, personal, and ideological factors: 
Mann argued that the decision to invade Iraq derived from the ideology and worldview of 
the key Bush II foreign policy mavens, especially those neocons known as the Vulcans.741 First, 
the centrality and the efficacy of American military power was essential to a stable world order. 
Second, the United States was a force for good around the globe. Third, they held “an 
extraordinarily optimistic” opinion of U.S. capabilities. Fourth, despite the historical importance 
of alliances, the neocons were ready and willing to see the United States act unilaterally. Fifth, 
the U.S. military should be so powerful that it would be impossible for any other nation-state to 
compete with it.742 
The Bush II foreign policy makers envisioned something of a new world order well 
before 9/11 as a function of the new post-Cold War reality. Paul Wolfowitz said, “The world of 
2001 is fundamentally different from that of 1972.”743 Even Condoleezza Rice stepped away 
from her previous pragmatic realism. “Then September 11 greatly accelerated the 
administration’s willingness to rethink cold war ideas about national security,” as she explained 
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Bush II’s “sense of impatience” in foreign policy formulation, unlike the Bush I and Reagan 
administrations.744    
Is this the crux of the Bush II wars, whereby hubris and ideology (neoconservative 
idealism) trumped pragmatism and principle, even international law? Kinzer contends: “The 
[9/11] attacks brought out the president’s unilateral and chauvinistic instincts … arguing 
publically that America was engaged in a biblical struggle of ‘good’ versus ‘evil,’ that others 
hated America for its freedoms.”745 Unquestionably, the Bush II White House envisioned a 
“new” Arab-Muslim Middle East.746 This vision resulted from “America’s historic missionary 
zeal to ‘enlighten’ other societies,” in short, “exceptionalism.”747 A document titled Joint Vision 
2010, prepared by the Joint Chiefs in 1996, defined five pillars of post-modern warfare: “full-
spectrum domination, precision air strikes, dominant maneuvering, full-dimensional protection, 
and focused logistics.” As explained by General Wesley Clark, “The vision heavily emphasized 
information dominance and precision strikes.”748 This strategic philosophy was put into practice 
in Iraq in 2003 and predates Bush II, 9/11, and the Bush Doctrine.    
One cannot disregard the ideological lens or prism through which events are understood 
and decisions are made by politicians in response. George W. Bush recalled, “The bombs that 
fell on Iraq that night [March 19, 2003] marked the opening phase in the liberation of Iraq.”749 It 
does not take a heavy dose of cynicism to see an Orwellian touch in labeling the invasion and 
occupation of a sovereign state as “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Neither is it an indictment of 
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human nature for an individual leader to promote his policy as serving a greater good rather than 
selfish interests. Yet such a crusade-like pursuit might incur compromised principles or even 
laws. “In responding to terrorism, Paul Wilkinson warned, a democracy must not use “methods 
which are incompatible with liberal values of humanity, liberty, justice.”750 Unfortunately, Bush 
II’s crusade mentality invited acquiescence, if not instigation, of actions at variance with liberal 
democratic values.  The conservative Cato Institute published a study that characterized the Bush 
II administration’s activities as “a ceaseless push for power”751 based on the belief in “a 
president who can launch wars at will.”752 (Note this is a generic POTUS to which the authors 
refer, not a cult of personality centered on Bush II.) Similarly, Bacevich argues that 9/11 gave 
the Bush II administration an unprecedented opportunity to advance their ambitions for 
American hegemony.753 “They seized that opportunity with alacrity.”754 
Bush’s “moral clarity” coincided with a “protective bubble,” where the president’s 
information was provided “by a small coterie of advisors,” including Rice and chief of staff 
Andrew Card. According to O’Sullivan, “His White House was airtight, not unlike Reagan’s, 
with his schedule rigidly controlled by his gatekeepers.”755 Francis Fukuyama has observed, 
“[The] neocons became extremely distrustful of anyone who did not share their views … [and] 
that extended to Secretary of State Powell and much of the intelligence community.”756 Quoting 
O’Sullivan: “They believed America had entered a postmodern, postdiplomatic age, where raw 
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military power created radically new realities.”757 General Tommy Franks saw that “these 
advisors’ deep and inflexible commitment to their own ideas was disruptive, as they sought to 
influence their bosses—and ultimately George W. Bush—with respect to Iraq policy.”758 Powell 
reportedly told British Foreign Minister Jack Straw he thought the neocons were “[expletive] 
crazies”759 Powell was of a much different mindset and worldview from the neoconservatives’ 
“fundamentalist faith in the indispensability of American military power” and their “illusion of 
America’s unchallenged military dominance.”760 Basic ideological and philosophical differences 
made conflict “inevitable” for Powell with Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the neocon coterie.761 In the 
final analysis, Colin Powell was a soldier, loyal to his commander-in-chief to the bitter end. His 
style was to lay out the options, weighted in his preferred direction. “But once the decision is 
made, the debate ends.”762  
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, pompously or piously, opened a cabinet meeting 
shortly after 9/11 by invoking the blessing of “ever faithful God.”763 Tellingly, Rumsfeld’s 
opening statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, in August 2006, bordered on 
paranoia and flirted with conspiracy theory on an apocalyptic scale: “If we left Iraq prematurely 
…” the forces of militant jihad would be emboldened to move against “Afghanistan … the 
Middle East … [and former Muslim territories] from Spain to [the] Philippines.”764 Secretary 
Rumsfeld additionally invoked American folklore, equating the U.S. mission in the world to the 
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triumphal narrative of courageous ancestors to “cross oceans” and “settle a wilderness.”765 
Rumsfeld is also on record as saying the large number of troops in Kosovo led to a “culture of 
dependence,” hardly an evidence-based finding, but rather an ideologically biased assumption.766 
Likewise, proposals from Ambassador Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to 
build a market economy in a “free and democratic” Iraq indicated an ahistorical ignorance of the 
fact that Mesopotamia was where marketplaces were invented 5,000 years ago, thus illustrating 
the skewed and truncated worldview of staffers recruited by ideological criteria rather than 
professional or academic expertise. Rumsfeld dismissed the idea of Bush II finishing Bush I’s 
“unfinished business.”767 This disdain was in keeping with Rumsfeld’s belief in the “limits of 
future knowledge” and “inability to predict the future,” negating hindsight as well as foresight. 
According to Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “[Rumsfeld’s] big strategic 
theme is uncertainty.”768 As a result, dissonant information, including contradictory intelligence, 
could be dismissed. However, Mann rejected the viewpoint that considered the Iraq War to have 
been “a mismanaged effort with tragic consequences,” akin to conservative revisionism on the 
Vietnam War. The Iraq War was a stepping stone in a strategic vision, based on Mann’s assertion 
of an historic mission annunciated by Condoleezza Rice and the Vulcans in the wake of 9/11.769 
This vision was encapsulated in the document, National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, co-authored by Rice, Phillip Zalikow, her academic collaborator, and Stephen Hadley, 
her assistant.770 The document contained three key elements of neoconservative strategy: (1) pre-
emption; (2) the United States as unchallenged sole superpower; and (3) to promote democratic 
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values.771 Alongside the stratagem of idealism in pursuit of hegemony, or hegemony as the 
vehicle for ideality, the propaganda impact of the belief that interventionism was necessary for 
“our freedoms,” as parroted by Bush II, would be long-lasting. 
IV. Criteria for the use of force: 
Simply, the policies of the Bush II administration completely contradicted the Powell 
Doctrine, notwithstanding the presence of that canon’s author in a key position.772 This section 
presents the five criteria for the use of force and examines the Bush II White House’s adherence 
to the principles. First, have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or 
negotiation? Second, are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood? 
Third, is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively maintained? (In 
other words, are the strategy and tactics “doable” and “winnable”?) Fourth, are there sufficient 
resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with “overwhelming force”? Fifth, is 
there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel once the mission’s 
goals have been achieved? Let us examine the evidence.  
#1 – Have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or negotiation? 
Sanctions were not given enough time to work, and weapon inspections yielded no fruit. For 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, “one of the more complex strategic challenges we faced was how 
to fight an enemy that was present in numerous countries.” He thus contended, “The mission 
must determine the coalition … The coalition ought not determine the mission.”773 However, 
disregarding the reservations and objections of those unwilling to join the coalition—Canada, 
France, and Germany in particular—imperiled not only the North Atlantic alliance, but 
                                                          
771
 Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 381-383. 
772
 O’Sullivan, Colin Powell, p. 125. 
773
 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 354. 
175 
 
potentially other global interactions as well. As discussed above, the “go” decision caused a rift 
with Germany and France; discredited intelligence prominently featured in Powell’s Security 
Council presentation compromised the position of Blair’s UK government; and disregarding the 
findings of UN weapon inspectors strained the credibility of the United States at the United 
Nations, a body whose support the United States had very publically courted.    
#2 – Are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood? From 
the outset, General Tommy Franks saw the interrelationship of functions: “In addition to 
boots on the ground, we would need ‘wingtips’ on the ground” to rebuild Iraq’s government, 
economy, and society.774 Franks, as the would-be “MacArthur of Iraq,” saw the double-
edged sword of military occupation: “improved security” counterbalanced by the United 
States “perceived [as] occupying bully.”775 The three legs of Iraq’s occupation and 
reconstruction: (1) CENCOM commanded by Franks; (2) retired general Jay Garner’s 
occupation headquarters; and (3) the Iraqi provisional authority during the transition to a 
new national government.776 Franks’s tour of duty as CENCOM commander was 
quintessentially post-modern or 21st century warfare insofar as he spent the run-up to the 
invasion of Iraq “shuttling to Washington regularly.” Franks said Garner was a good choice 
to lead the occupation and transformation, but the war against Iraq required a plan derived 
from a concept based on the two equal imperatives, “security” and “civil action.”777 The 
problem was that the people on the scene in Iraq ignored State’s research on security during 
occupation in the “Future of Iraq Project” directed by Thomas Warrick.  
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Former ambassador Jay Garner was tied up looking for WMDs when the Iraqi 
government, military, and police were being dismembered by Paul Bremer’s Iraqi 
Governing Council in carrying out nation-building, without the benefit of Mideast, Arabic, 
or diplomatic expertise. De-Ba’athification and privatization were therefore inept. Hence, 
insurgency began within 90 days!778 Bremer’s authority dismembered the Ba’ath party and 
dismissed the army. The president said in retrospect, “I should have insisted on more 
debate.” The decapitation of Iraqi governance “cut too deep.”779  
The most profound miscalculation of the Bush II administration was not their failure 
to predict the insurgency—because the architects of the War on Terrorism conspicuously 
invited it. They should have expected infiltration, based on intelligence about Iraqi links to 
Islamist militants, even if they exaggerated the threat to “hype” or “sell” the war. Rather, 
the Bush II team failed to anticipate that the media and public would see the confluence of 
Fedayeen (Ba’ath guerrillas), foreign militants affiliated with al-Qaeda, and Iranian-backed 
Shi’ia and other Islamists as evidence of a “hopeless and unwinnable” quagmire like 
Vietnam. George W. Bush countered this perception with respect to three audiences: first, 
the American public; second, U.S. troops; and third, the enemy.780 Thus, we have the 
context of his comment: “Bring ‘em on.” What is puzzling is that Bush maintained his 
words were misconstrued, whereas the evidence suggests this was the desired result, to 
make Iraq Act II of the “long war” a.k.a. War on Terrorism—whereby U.S. troops 
constituted a magnet to draw militant forces into battle. It follows that a guerrilla insurgency 
should have been expected. Yet Rumsfeld denied guerrilla warfare was underway for weeks 
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until the commander of troops in the field, General John Abizaid, acknowledged it, using 
the term insurgency, in July 2003.781   
#3 – Is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively 
maintained? Franks characterized Operation Iraqi Freedom in idealistic political terms: 
“The goal of this campaign was not conquest, not oil, but freedom for twenty-six million 
Iraqis.”782 Under the direction of Franks, the invasion kicked off with the largest special 
forces operation in history, deploying American, British, and Australian veterans of the 
Afghanistan war. The first mission was to destroy the Iraqis’ visual observation posts, 
followed by air strikes to “blind” the enemy forces.783 Early on, Franks worried about the 
Rumilyah oil fields, fearing that Saddam would order them burned.784 Thus, Franks’s 
modified “shock and awe” strove to preserve vital economic assets in the midst of the 
conflagration. 
As the Vice President remembered the first NSC briefing by videoconference, 
Tommy Franks presented an operational plan that was the same blueprint as the Persian 
Gulf War, calling for 450,000 troops and a six-month build-up.785 That did not happen. With 
the expressed support of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, the CENTCOM commander told the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Leave me the hell alone to run the war.”786 General Franks disagreed 
with the prevailing logic of the top brass, saying, “in their view numbers and weight of fire 
counted.”  This viewpoint has been around since Ulysses S. Grant in the American Civil 
War. Although promoting modernization, the military, by nature, took a cautious approach 
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to reworking standard procedures.787 Thus, Rumsfeld exploited the disconnect between 
Franks and the JCS. In December 2002, the Pentagon’s boss recommended that Franks and 
his planners review a study titled Shock and Awe.788  The doctrine argued for “rapid 
dominance” of the enemy’s communication, command, and control by deploying 
technology-intensive weaponry.789 According to Gordon and Trainor, “Franks appropriated 
the term ‘shock and awe’ but not the details.”790 The rapid dominance concept comprised 
four core components: (1) “total” knowledge; (2) “rapidity”; (3) “brilliant execution”; and 
(4) “control of the environment.” The shock and awe doctrine also included “decay and 
default,” defined as: “The imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but 
without the application of massive destruction.”791 However, Rumsfeld further 
recommended U.S. Air Force General Charles Hoover’s article: “How and When to Use 
Shock and Awe,” which stated: “In the end, if we are going to lead[,] then we must be 
considered the madmen of the world … It is only our ends that must be admired … If we are 
to achieve noble purposes[,] we must be prepared to act in the most ignoble manner.”792 
This extraordinary statement that emerged from the recommended reading of Pentagon 
personnel set the stage for the introduction of extraordinary interrogation techniques and 
still cruder actions, whether openly authorized or not, that tainted Bush II’s legacy in Iraq as 
well as Afghanistan.  
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld disputed the idea that Army Chief of Staff Eric 
Shinseki and Marine Corps Commandant James L. Jones opposed the Iraq War plan due to 
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minimal troop levels (130,000 versus 400,000-500,000 in the Persian Gulf War), or their 
disagreements with Franks.793 On February 25, 2003, Senator Carl Levin (Democrat-
Michigan) questioned General Shinseki, who responded that “a significant ground-force 
presence … of several hundred thousand soldiers” would be required, seemingly implying 
the force level assembled was inadequate.794  Shinseki claimed his comments were 
“misinterpreted” and Rumsfeld disingenuously denied forcing the General into early 
retirement in June 2003.795 When the President asked Rumsfeld and the Pentagon chiefs if 
they had enough manpower, “I accepted Don and the military’s judgment.”796 The Iraq 
War’s operational planning essentially failed to match the Powell Doctrine’s necessary 
condition of committing sufficient resources to accomplish the job. The invading force was 
just too small. Whereas Cheney charged Powell with undermining the Bush II 
administration by openly criticizing the minimalist battle plan behind the scenes to the 
Western European alliance partners, George W. Bush wrote that Powell honestly expressed 
his reservations to Tommy Franks, but promised to support the war, notwithstanding those 
concerns.797 Rumsfeld, as the “transformational” leader and “war minister,” doggedly 
pushed through a course of action that suited his ideological proclivities and bullied anyone 
who stood opposed.798 Franks was “eager to please Rumsfeld [and] went along with the 
Defense Secretary’s desire to prove the days of half-million troop mobilizations were a 
thing of the past.”799 The basic problem was that the only previous large-scale military 
action taken by the United States in Iraq had passed the performance test. Powell told 
                                                          
793
 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 452. 
794
 Ibid., p. 454. 
795
 Ibid., p. 455. 
796
 Bush, George W., Decision Points, pp. 258-259. 
797
 Ibid., p. 251. 
798
 Gardner, Lloyd C., “Mr. Rumsfeld’s War,” in Gardner and Young, op. cit., p. 185. 
799
 O’Sullivan, Colin Powell, p. 170. 
180 
 
Franks: “I’ve got problems with force size and support of that force.” Franks responded that 
Powell “no longer wore Army green.”800 One might counter that Rumsfeld, Cheney, and the 
other neocons never wore green, while the officer turned diplomat was applying his 
experiential education (acquired from Vietnam and the first Iraq War) to the problem at 
hand. In the words of Marine General Anthony Zinni: “all others who have never fired a 
shot and are hot to go to war see it another way.”801 Zinni, who preceded Franks as 
CENCOM commander, charged that Bush II “had to create a false rationale for going in to 
get public support … the books were cooked, in my mind. The intelligence was not there.” 
Zinni criticized the “lack of planning” for post-war Iraq because the administration should 
have expected that chaos would result from “regime change” by force.802 Zinni’s plan for 
Iraqi nation-building, “Desert Crossing,” predicted post-war stabilization and reconstruction 
would be “a massive challenge.”803 Moreover, no one addressed the tacit illogic: If the 
United States was engaged in a new kind of struggle against a new kind of enemy, 
comprised of nonstate and substate actors, then why did the U.S. deploy conventional 
combat forces in a “traditional” military invasion and occupation?  
A recurring theme in the history of warfare is the personalization or villainization of 
the enemy. As Bush II’s forty-eight-hour deadline approached, CIA Director Tenet reported 
the possible location of Saddam Hussein and his two sons. “We discussed the possible 
outcome if a strike were ordered.” All favored it, as Rumsfeld recounted. Special forces hit 
Dora Farms, where Saddam and sons were reportedly holed up—but they were not there!804 
Franks succumbed to this impulsive side issue by recommending the raid “to decapitate the 
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regime and end the war early” during Bush II’s final ultimatum before boots hit the ground. 
The Dora Farms raid failed to corral the Iraqi leader and was a complete waste of time. 
Moreover, the failed attempt was enough of a warning for the deposed Iraqi leader to avoid 
capture (literally “holed up”) for months. 
 #4—Are there sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with 
“overwhelming” force? Gordon and Trainor observed, “For years, conservatives had seen 
the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force as an impediment to action and an inhibition 
against the exercise of American power.”805 Bacevich argued that Rumsfeld’s strategy was 
flawed, convoluted, and contradictory. Rumsfeld’s grand plan for “transformation” of the 
21st century military into a downsized, technology-intensive, global fighting force 
contradicted the neocon’s new vision for democratizing the Arab Middle East. “Imperial 
projects don’t prosper with small armies that leave quickly; they require large armies that 
stay.”806 Or, in the words of journalist Tom Friedman, Rumsfeld sent in “just enough troops 
to lose” Iraq redux.807 Rumsfeld has countered that no one in the Pentagon thought the 
“Desert Storm on Steroids” plan, calling for a six-month build-up of half a million troops, 
was workable. The former Defense chief added that millions if not billions of dollars’ worth 
of equipment had been unused and thus wasted after Desert Shield/Desert Storm.808 “Shock 
and awe,” the post-modern reincarnation of blitzkrieg, aims at demolishing the enemy’s 
morale as much as its infrastructure. The variant directed by Tommy Franks missed both 
targets. “I had decided to leave Iraq’s electric power grid untouched,”809 said Franks, a 
decision that would have caused the precursors of modern “total” war, Grant and William T. 
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Sherman, to cringe. Those winning generals ripped and crumpled the enemy’s infrastructure 
so that they could never again use it.  The president told Tommy Franks, “we’re not going to 
destroy Iraq. We’re going to liberate the country from Saddam Hussein’s regime.”810 The 
commanding general concurred, “excluding power plants [etc.] … preserving the national 
infrastructure outweighs any momentary tactical advantage.”811 Hence, in the following 
weeks and months, unemployed Iraqi soldiers, police, and militia would take their weapons 
home to well lighted houses, where they could communicate over hard-wired and wireless 
telephones and watch CNN coverage of the unfolding insurgency they would sooner or later 
join. As informed observers predicted and witnessed, the armed insurgents did not join any 
sort of war for the true faith or against the infidel, but simply to compel the foreign invading 
and occupying army out of their country. 
In June 2003, Franks retired to accolades as the guiding hand that “won” two small wars, 
whereas in reality Franks presided over two early phases of a “long war,” which might be 
considered superficially successful if taken independently of unintended consequences. On 
March 19, 2003: “The invasion went ahead … with almost effortless success.” Some 135,000 
troops reached Baghdad in three weeks.812 Instead of erroneous and irrelevant discussion of 9/11, 
al-Qaeda, and WMDs, there needed to be a policy-making debate in Congress and the media 
about why the war was necessary, postwar goals for Iraq, and actual costs. An initial figure of 
$70 billion in total rose to $70 billion per year as a modest estimate. Who paid for the war? 
Instead of Iraqi oil revenue, as the President ventured at a June 2003 press conference, it would 
be the U.S. national debt. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard Myers said al-Qaeda comprised 
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only a small fraction of the Iraqi insurgency, even as President Bush called Iraq the “central front 
of War on Terrorism.”813 Australian author and consultant David John Kilcullen proposed a new 
strategic approach to the global War on Terrorism, arguing that the strategy is best understood as 
a “global Islamic insurgency,” initiated by a diffuse group of Islamists with conflicting goals. 
Kilcullen questioned the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theory to modern conflict. 
There may be numerous competing insurgencies in one theatre, meaning that the 
counterinsurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy. 
Therefore, Kilcullen called for “conflict ethnography: a deep, situation-specific understanding of 
the human, social and cultural dimensions of a conflict, understood not by analogy with some 
other conflict, but in its own terms.”814 The absence of such a culturally specific political track 
illustrated one of the major shortcomings of Bush II’s handling of Iraq redux: the wrong strategy. 
One is reminded of General Omar Bradley’s famous quote about extending the Korean War into 
China: “The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”815  
#5—Is there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel 
once the mission’s goals have been achieved? As Franks himself described, the morale of 
Iraqi loyalists was not snuffed. “A pattern soon emerged: The Fedayeen [Saddam Hussein’s 
martyrs] would attack our convoys, and then the surrounding enemy would gather in the 
cities inside walled compounds.”816 The U.S. and allied troops tried to weed out such 
pockets of resistance to little avail insofar as “the Fedayeen continued to fight savagely … 
The enemy’s tactics became even more unorthodox and brutal,” for example, dropping 
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white flags and using women and children as human shields.817 Three months after the 
invasion, the Sadrist movement, led by Shi’a imam, Muqtada al-Sadr, which had opposed 
Saddam and applauded U.S. intervention, announced it was time for United States and 
coalition troops to go home. In short order, the Sadrist militia joined the insurgency.818  
The Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Stanley McChrystal, recalled: “Over the summer [of 2003], the post invasion elation of April and 
confidence of May had quickly muddied, turning to growing unease in June. By August, 
nervousness tempered the halls and offices of the Pentagon.”819 As for WMDs, Paul Bremer 
inspected 900 sites (from a list compiled by CIA) and found zero evidence of chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weaponry.820 There would be no exit strategy or timetable for withdrawal 
until 2007-2008, when a “troop surge” finally, in the opinion of many, put sufficient personnel 
and firepower in place to weaken the insurgency and reduce it to a dying ember.  
CONCLUSION 
How could we judge the second Iraq War as a success? Even if we return to our initial 
proposition that Iraq redux was designed to go on the offensive in the War on Terrorism, a good 
deal of research would rebut the effectiveness of fighting a tactic (terrorism as the tactic of the 
weak) rather than a specific enemy. Jay Garner, a retired military man, told Rumsfeld that the 
United States under Bush II made “three tragic mistakes” in Iraq: (1) de-Ba’athification went too 
far; (2) the foregoing purge unemployed 30,000 to 50,000 soldiers and police and drove them 
“underground”; and (3) Jerry Bremer could not be “the face of the government to the Iraqi 
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people” during the extended transition period to self-government. When Garner returned to 
Washington in June 2003, he told Rumsfeld, “There’s still time to turn it around.” The Pentagon 
boss answered, “We’re not going to go back.”821 Garner never told George W. Bush about his 
“three tragic mistakes.”822 The president joked to Garner, “Hey, Jay, you want to do Iran?” 
Garner replied in jest, “we want to hold out for Cuba.”823 (Was this just Bush II’s meaningless 
little joke? See Chapter 7.)  
The 9/11 Commission stated, “the global conflict against Islamist terrorism became a 
different kind of struggle.”824 The apparently successful model of Afghanistan, where the CIA 
employed intelligence, covert capabilities, and cash while the U.S. military supplied firepower 
and logistics against an insurgency, was applied to Iraq with deleterious effects. The 9/11 
Commission’s final report went on to say, “Our enemy is twofold: al-Qaeda, a stateless network 
of terrorists … and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world.” Thus, the United States 
was engaged in “more than a war on terrorism … Terrorism is a tactic … Calling this struggle a 
war accurately … Our effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or 
more political as it is military.”825 This is where Bush II’s policy misfired and fell short, leaving 
aside whether it was a war of necessity or choice. The 9/11 Report concluded, “If the United 
States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do 
the job for us.”826 Donald Rumsfeld summed it up: Saddam’s regime collapsed twenty-one days 
after the war began … Less than two years after 9/11, the U.S. military had changed the regimes 
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in Afghanistan and Iraq, two of the world’s leading sponsors of terrorism.”827 However, the 
United States under Bush II failed to “close the deal” in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, both wars 
requiring escalation (“troop surge”) before an exit strategy or protracted timetable for withdrawal 
could be installed. (See Chapter 8.) As for exercising superpower hegemony by projecting power 
in Iraq, the United States was handicapped from intervening in any other wars of choice or 
necessity that might have popped up while being weighed down in Iraq and Afghanistan for the 
next eight years. For example, if a hypothetical threat from Iran or North Korea materialized, the 
United States would have been hard-pressed to deploy troops rapidly and effectively.  
The unintended consequences of Iraq redux highlight that the decision-making process 
was flawed from the outset. The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was driven by international 
factors, but failed to enlist the support of important allies (Category I). The Iraqi decision was 
driven by an ideology of messianic democracy, American exceptionalism, and a belief in the 
efficacy of American power (category III). The occupation of Iraq floundered due to myriad 
misconceptions and wishful thinking regarding strategy and tactics on the ground during an 
unplanned, under-resourced, and overextended counterinsurgency (category IV).  
One is reminded of Napoleon Bonaparte’s caveat: “Never ascribe to malice that which 
can be adequately explained by incompetence.”828 
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CHAPTER 7 
BUSH II: IRAN—NO-GO 
INTRODUCTION 
All of the factors that contributed to the Bush II administration’s “go” decision in the Iraq 
War, 2003, were present in the circumstances surrounding a possible strike against Iran. The two 
primary causes of war with Iraq, weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism, applied 
to Iran, especially during the period of 2006 to 2008. One could argue that the case for action 
was even more compelling given Iran’s real potential nuclear threat and its close ties to 
Hezbollah. The momentum toward intervention and continuity from one administration (Clinton) 
to the next (Bush II) were equally applicable to Iraq and Iran. Systemic factors, including 
alliance issues, were present in the case of Iran as well. Intuitively, we suspect military factors 
might have been decisive in keeping direct intervention against Iran off the table: there was an 
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established operational base in the region, but it was not clear whether a surgical strike against 
Iranian nuclear facilities would have been effective by itself; the scope and scale of an Iranian 
intervention, beyond a simple air strike, would be far greater than the Iraqi and Afghan 
operations because of Iran’s larger geographic area and population; while counteraction by other 
states was unlikely, there was weak cooperation from diplomatic partners, particularly Russia; 
and the ongoing campaigns, including troop surges, in Iraq and Afghanistan, precluded opening 
up a third theatre. At the same time, we ought not rule out the influence of public opinion 
(casualty sensitivity and intervention fatigue) and potential partisan opposition. The evidence 
strongly suggests a larger recognition of the limits of projected power by the Bush II “Vulcans,” 
however belatedly in their tenure. Additionally, provocation by Iran was much less in 
comparison to the excessive WMD and terrorist-support claims made by Bush II in the case of 
Iraq. The “cry wolf” phenomenon had seriously undermined the administration’s credibility. 
Similarly to the case of Iraq, an array of international (category I) and ideological 
(category III) factors would have driven Bush II to intervene militarily had it not been for the 
reality that U.S. military power (category IV) was overextended. 
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), 
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act? 
     Gaddis posits that the response to “surprise attacks” altered the strategy of U.S. foreign 
policy three times in diplomatic history: (1) initiating continentalism and unilateralism after the                                                            
1814 burning of Washington, D.C. by the British; (2) instituting the intercontinental grand 
alliance strategy after the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese; and (3) declaration of the 
so-called Bush Doctrine, “unilateralism,” and “pre-emption” after 9/11.829 Rather than a sea 
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change, we propose a gradual evolution in the direction of intervention, occupation, and nation-
building. Gaddis’s view seemed logical in the near term, but became less so as 9/11 receded into 
history. 
     At the time of Desert Storm and Desert Shield, Colin Powell had stated: “For the previous 
ten years, Iran, not Iraq, had been our Persian Gulf nemesis. We wanted Iraq to continue as a 
counterweight to Iran.”830  Even as the first war with Iraq wound down, in March 1991, “our 
practical intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to an Iran that 
remained bitterly hostile to the United States.”831 There were also concerns about the economic 
impact of disruption in the flow of Persian Gulf oil. Parra has written: “The collapse of the 
[worldwide oil] market and the reluctance to accept the need for some collective action to restore 
supply was considerably delayed by reductions in production that were forced on Iraq and Iran 
by the appalling war that Iraq so rashly started in September 1980.”832 Thus, Iran was of 
longstanding strategic and economic importance to U.S. foreign-policy interests. 
     Cause of War 1: WMDs— In May 2001, Bush I’s Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
“reminded the president of the intelligence community’s reports [that] Iran was pursuing 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.”833 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was 
launched by the Bush II administration in 2003 as a voluntary intergovernmental program to 
inhibit the global trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related 
materials.834 As Condoleezza Rice explained in 2005, PSI did not have a “formal support 
                                                          
830
 Powell, Colin, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995; rev. ed., New York: Ballantine, 2003), 
p. 490. 
831
 Ibid., p. 531. 
832
 Parra, Francisco, Oil Politics (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 276. 
833
 Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), p. 332. 
834
 U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm, accessed 
August 18, 2013. 
190 
 
structure, secretariat, headquarters or chairperson,” but instead was based on commitments from 
participating states to cooperate with interdiction efforts through national legal channels.835 PSI 
operated according to a “broken tail-light scenario,” whereby member states interdicted the 
transportation of WMDs or related cargo in their own ports when the shippers violated the host 
country’s national laws.836 PSI members (U.S., U.K., Australia, France, Italy, and Bahrain) 
conducted multilateral exercises and war games (for example, a live exercise to find a nuclear 
detonator aboard an oil tanker) to enhance cooperation in interdiction. In February 2005, based 
on U.S. intelligence, a European government denied an export license in accordance with 
national export law for an Iran-bound shipment of coolers that might have been used in the 
Iranians’ heavy water reactor program.837 In October 2006, the PSI held its first training exercise 
in the Arabian Gulf with an intelligence-sharing war game.838 In accordance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1696, a “third country” denied the transfer of missile components to 
Iran in November 2006, and a shipment of material used for ballistic missile propellant intended 
for delivery to an Iranian entity was denied access to an Asian port and rerouted to its port of 
origin.839  
     The advancement of Iranian nuclear weaponry development was indicated by an 
unclassified Defense Department report to Congress in 2010: “In late 2008 and early 2009, Iran 
launched the Safir, a multi-stage space launch vehicle, which indicates progress in some 
technologies relevant to ICBMs.” The report also predicted: “With sufficient foreign assistance, 
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Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of 
reaching the United States by 2015. Iran could also have an intermediate-range ballistic missile 
(IRBM) capable of threatening Europe.”840 Thus, if not the actual WMD, the Iranian nuclear 
delivery capability seemed neither fabricated nor exaggerated, unlike the case with Iraq. While 
the evidence in the 2010 CDA is post-Bush II, the logical conclusion is that U.S. military 
capacity was already stretched to the limit by two concurrent wars. Moreover, the level of threat 
from Iran seemed more of a long-term concern than a short-term one. This perception of threat 
continued into the Obama administration.841 
     Cause of War 2: Iranian sponsorship of terrorists–Defense chief Rumsfeld summarized the 
malignant character of U.S.-Iranian relations: “Since the radical Islamist regime came to power 
there, no other nation in the world has been responsible for as many deaths to U.S. troops as 
Iran.”842 Although that claim is not credible, Rumsfeld’s exaggeration highlights the degree of 
enmity toward Tehran in Washington, where the hardliners in the Bush II administration had 
been weighing their options for dealing with Iran as early as the summer of 2003.843 The Quds 
Force, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was founded by Ayatollah Rouhollah 
Khomeini in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as a paramilitary militia to defend the 
Islamic Republic against internal and external threats. The Quds Force’s power has expanded far 
beyond its original mandate to include managing Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and insurgent 
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operations through its elite guerrilla force and proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.844 
According to Reidel, the Revolutionary Guard was created as a “counterweight to the regular 
military, and to protect the revolution against a possible coup.”845 In establishing the Quds Force, 
Khomeini was seeking to avoid a reprise of the successful 1953 coup that overthrew Mohammed 
Mossadegh’s reform government and reinstated Shah Reza Pahlavi. The Quds Force’s activities 
since 1979 had been aimed at fishing in troubled waters far beyond Tehran, including 
involvement in the insurgency in Iraq. In 2007, Bush II accused Iran of providing roadside 
bombs to networks inside Iraq, coalition forces captured several militants in Iraq with alleged 
links to the Quds Force and Hezbollah, and the Treasury Department designated the Quds Force 
as a supporter of terrorism for aiding the Taliban and other terrorist groups. Whereas some 
analysts held that Iran’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan was exaggerated, analyst Mehdi Khalaji 
stated, “the Revolutionary Guards are the spine of the current political structure [in Iran] and a 
major player in the Iranian economy.”846  
The Quds Force’s political influence grew in opposition to reformist president Mohammad 
Khatami, 2001-2005, and a number of Quds Force members entered politics when Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad won the presidency in 2005. Despite a lack of evidence of excessive deaths at the 
hands of Quds in Iraq, institutional players such as Treasury and State were building a case 
against the Revolutionary Guards, even if their influence was exaggerated in the Iraq insurgency. 
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism pointed to a “marked resurgence of Iran’s 
state sponsorship of terrorism, through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, its 
Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Tehran’s ally Hezbollah … [and] have reached a 
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tempo unseen since the 1990s.”847 The Quds Force exploited the antagonism between Ayatollah 
Ali Khomenei and Ahmadinejad because the second Supreme Leader became dependent on the 
group’s power, in the opinion of Iran expert Milani.848 The Quds Force policed the streets of 
Tehran, carried out domestic surveillance, conducted foreign intelligence operations, and also 
controlled Iran’s ballistic missiles.849 According to a RAND study, released in January 2009, 
“much of the institution’s rise to prominence over competing militias and paramilitaries in the 
revolutionary period was due to its effectiveness in suppressing internal dissent.”850 Quds Force 
guardsmen and Basij militia were accused of violently crushing demonstrations in cities and on 
campuses,851 and the Ashura Brigades were created in 1993 to suppress civil unrest.852 The Quds 
Force was without question cut from the same cloth as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah. 
However, the Quds Force was not seen as directly attacking U.S. interests beyond the immediate 
Middle East environs. At this point, however, Rumsfeld’s alarmism came to no avail. 
After 9/11, Rumsfeld maintained: “we had little specific intelligence to support targeting 
terrorist operatives themselves.”853 Nonetheless, Iranian organization and sponsorship of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon was widely known.854 Hezbollah’s anti-Western militancy began in 1983 
with attacks on Western targets in Lebanon, expanded to attacks on Israel and other activities in 
retaliation for threats to the organization or Iran’s interests, and aimed to intimidate foreign 
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governments into releasing imprisoned operatives.855 Hezbollah and the Quds Force executed 
joint missions, including the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996.856 The symbiotic 
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah was not only based on ideological and religious affinity. 
Hezbollah was heavily dependent on its Iranian mentors for financial support, estimated by the 
Pentagon to have been between $100 and $200 million annually.857  Therefore, Hezbollah 
became Iran’s primary militant proxy. Although Hezbollah continued its guerrilla warfare 
against Israel, it ceased terrorist activities against American or Western targets after the Khobar 
Towers incident.858 Thus, once the Quds Force ceased attacking U.S. targets, the pressure to pre-
empt or prevent would be less. Regardless, the Iranian-Hezbollah connection clearly indicated 
that Tehran fit the Bush Doctrine’s definition of a state sponsor of terrorism.  
     More directly, the Quds Force was accused of aiding the Taliban resistance in 
Afghanistan and assisting the Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.859  
Given that Iraq redux was the overriding preoccupation of U.S. military and foreign policy from 
2003 onward, the Iranian Quds Force was “deployed to challenge the United States presence” as 
a deterrent in Iraq.860 The collaboration between the Quds Force and Shi’ite militia groups 
predated the Bush II invasion, originating in the clandestine opposition to Saddam Hussein’s 
Sunni-dominated regime.861 General John Abizaid charged the Quds Force with sponsoring 
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“Shi’a death squads” in November 2006.862 As sectarian violence continued, U.S. Army 
commanders in Iraq accused the Quds Force of having a hand in planning a raid on the city of 
Karbala in January 2007.863 Later that year, General Ray Odierno concluded that Iranian support 
for Shi’a insurgents escalated as U.S. forces carried out the “troop surge” policy in 2007.864  
     At this time, considering Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory 
remarks about Israel and the assertion of his country’s right to pursue a nuclear program, one 
could argue that Ahmadinejad could prove to be a legitimate impending threat, like Saddam and 
Iraq circa 2002-2003, thereby justifying a pre-emptive response by Bush II, as per the vaunted 
Bush Doctrine. Yet the evidence would suggest the meddling of Iran in the Iraq insurgency was 
exaggerated. For example, CNN cited studies that reported half of the foreign insurgents 
infiltrating into Iraq were Saudis.865 Additionally, counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke 
observed that the Ayatollah, not the Iranian president, controlled the Quds Force.866 Moreover, a 
prominent Iranian defector, Mohsen Sazegara (Deputy Prime Minister, 1981-1989), stated: “Not 
only the foreign ministry of Iran; even the president does not know what the Revolutionary 
Guards does [sic] outside of Iran.”867 Thus, the evidence of state sponsorship of terrorist activity 
was ambiguous at best, if not a rogue elephant.  
     According to Donald Rumsfeld, Iran was supplying insurgents in Iraq with deadly 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as early as 2004. The Defense Secretary queried the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a November 2006 memorandum: “If we know so much 
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about what Iran is doing in Iraq, why don’t we do something about it?” Rumsfeld answered his 
own question some years later: “a country strained by two wars and an administration battling 
criticism and declining public approval was not ready to be firm with Iran.”868 Dick Cheney 
might have been inclined to rally the Vulcans to beat the tom-toms for war with Iran, but the vice 
president had become increasingly marginalized in Bush II’s second term.869 
2. Why did a president decide to intervene (or not) where his predecessor or successor may 
have weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage? 
 
     As noted earlier, the momentum toward intervention and continuity from one 
administration (Clinton) to the next (Bush II) was equally applicable to Iraq and Iran. As with the 
case of Iraq, there was a prior history of conflict involving military action with Iran as well. The 
most significant and infamous dispute between the United States and Iran came during the 
Iranian hostage crisis, November 1979 to January 1981. The Carter administration’s military 
intervention, Operation Eagle’s Claw, failed in April 1980.   
     On April 21, 1980, a Delta Force team of 132 elite soldiers, commanded by Colonel 
Charles Beckwith, nicknamed “Charlie’s Angels,” was dispatched to a staging area in Egypt, 
where they deployed by transport plane in a two-step trip to Iran’s Dasht-e-Kavir, an inland 
region known as the Great Salt Desert, some 200 miles away from Tehran. Three days later, 
eight Sea Stallion helicopters took off from the USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman, between the 
Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The helicopters were to refuel and rendezvous with Beckwith’s 
commandos at a location identified as “Desert One.” From there, Charlie’s Angels and the Sea 
Stallions would proceed to a mountain location sixty-five miles outside Tehran. The commandos 
would move on to the capital by truck, infiltrate the embassy, rescue the hostages, and then the 
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helicopters would fly in and pick up everyone. Meanwhile, U.S. Army Rangers would seize an 
abandoned airfield thirty-five miles out of the city and wait for Charlie’s Angels to arrive with 
the freed hostages, who would later be flown to safety by transport planes standing by. The 
intervention commenced April 24, whereupon a fiasco of errors ensued. The operation 
unexpectedly encountered a busload of civilians and a fuel truck at Desert One, and the Sea 
Stallions never arrived. The combat helicopters suffered a broken rotor, malfunctioning 
gyroscope, and failed hydraulic pump. The mechanical failures put three of the eight choppers 
out of commission, and Beckwith aborted the mission. In a macabre finale, one of the helicopters 
collided with one of the transport planes during the evacuation, killing eight Delta Force 
members.870 Author Mark Bowden wrote that Carter’s “go” decision in Operation Eagle Claw 
“defined the word ‘debacle.’”871 The official investigation by the Holloway Commission 
attributed the mission’s failure to “the ad hoc nature of the task force and an excessive degree of 
security.”872   
     The next controversy in U.S.-Iranian relations was the Iran-Contra Affair during the 
Reagan administration. A small circle of advisers within Reagan’s White House, led by the 
National Security Adviser, Admiral John Poindexter, illegally sold arms to the Iranians in the 
Iran-Iraq War and secretly funneled the money paid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. In 
addition to aiding the right-wing insurgents to overthrow Nicaragua’s Sandinista government, the 
Reagan administration’s objectives were to appease Iran and to facilitate Iranian influence with 
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militant groups to release a number of American hostages in Lebanon.873 The ill-conceived 
scheme failed in both regards: only three hostages were freed over the next eighteen months874 
and the U.S.-Iran relationship remained hostile and would soon lead to a second intervention in 
less than a decade.   
     To keep Persian Gulf oil flowing to the outside world, the U.S. Navy skirmished with 
Iranian naval forces in 1986; two years later, U.S. air and sea power intervened against Iran to 
compel a ceasefire to end the war with Iraq.875 On April 14, 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. 
Roberts sailed into a floating minefield and within twenty minutes was nearly blown apart by an 
Iranian mine. In the space of seventy-two hours, the U.S. Joint Task Force—Middle East carried 
out Operation Praying Mantis in retaliation.876 During a two-day period, units from all four 
armed services destroyed two Iranian oil platforms that had been utilized in attacks on merchant 
shipping. The U.S. forces subsequently destroyed three Iranian warships and disabled half a 
dozen Iranian speedboats.877 After U.S.A.F. aircraft destroyed one Iranian frigate and crippled 
another, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and Joint Chiefs Chairman William J. Crowe ordered 
American forces to stand down in order to give the Iranians an opportunity to end the combat. 
Operation Praying Mantis concluded the next day and cost the lives of two service members.878 
In contrast to the Desert One fiasco, Operation Praying Mantis provided a positive precedent for 
future intervention, albeit one in which U.S. forces went in and out quickly.  
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     Momentum toward intervention continued from Reagan to Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II. 
In 1992, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Gore-McCain Act) was passed to give the 
president authority to impose sanctions against individuals or foreign governments that 
“knowingly and materially” enhanced Iran’s or Iraq’s WMD capability or certain types of 
conventional weapons.879 The legislation was motivated by concerns about Russian conventional 
arms exports to Iran.880 In 1996, Congress amended the Gore-McCain Act to sanction arms 
suppliers to state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran. In 1997, the Clinton administration opted 
not to sanction China under Gore-McCain for transferring cruise missiles to Iran because the 
weaponry was not considered “destabilizing,” but the ensuing debate in Congress indicated the 
increased worries about Iran.881 The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (Glenn Amendment), 
enacted in 1994, called for penalties against individuals that might assist in the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. The Glenn Amendment also empowered the president to impose sanctions on 
non-nuclear countries for acquiring or exploding nuclear devices.882 Lastly, the Iran Sanctions 
Act bolstered attempts to deny the Iranians access to resources that contributed to their nuclear 
program as well as support for terrorist organizations.883 The act, passed by Congress in 1996, 
enabled the President to impose financial sanctions on foreign individuals, businesses, or 
organizations that invested in the Iranian energy sector, WMD technology, or advanced 
conventional weapons.884 Indeed, there began preparations for possible war with Iran under Bill 
Clinton. Specifically, intervention was under consideration in response to the Khobar Towers 
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attack (June 25, 1996), but, as explained by Richard Clarke, the Iranians subsequently ceased or 
suspended terrorist activities against the United States from 1997 onward.885  
     Momentum and continuity were evident in U.S. policy toward Iran as the Bush II 
administration followed the Clinton administration, employing sanctions with the threat of force 
ever present in the subtext. “The possibilities of military pressure and diplomatic engagement 
were not mutually exclusive,” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld contended. “DOD policy officials 
wrote a number of memos suggesting ways to reach out to the Iranian opposition movement … 
Ultimately, the President decided that negotiations were the best way to deal with Iran.”886 In the 
following section, we will examine Bush II’s perceptions of Iran in the context of coercive 
diplomacy and the potential use of force. 
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or 
management style) have a determinative effect? 
     By 2006, George W. Bush faced a crucial moment of decision with regard to Iran. The 
president analogized the situation as “two ticking clocks.” One counted down to Iranian nuclear 
weapons; the other marked time to political reform in Iran. “My objective was to slow the first 
clock and speed the second.”887 Bush II wrote: “I had three options to consider. Some in 
Washington suggested that America should negotiate directly with Iran. I believed talking to 
Ahmadinejad would legitimize him and his views and dispirit Iran’s freedom movement, slowing 
the change clock … The second option was multilateral diplomacy conducted with both carrots 
and sticks … [i.e.,] a package of incentives … [plus] tough sanctions … [thus] slowing the bomb 
clock … The final option was a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. This goal [sic] would 
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stop the bomb clock … Some thought destroying the regime’s prized project would embolden 
the opposition; others worried that a foreign military intervention would stir up Iranian 
nationalism and unite the people against us.”888 The Texan “decider-in-chief” entertained a broad 
mix of opinion in considering which way to go with Iran. “I discussed the options with the 
national security team extensively in the spring of 2006. I consulted closely with Vladimir Putin, 
Angela Merkel, and Tony Blair … In May, [Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] announced 
that we would join the Europeans in negotiating with Iran, but only if the regime verifiably 
suspended its enrichment.” The United Nations Security Council backed the United States and 
set a deadline of August 31, 2006 for Iran’s response. “The summer passed and the answer never 
came.”889  
     More than a year later, the Bush II White House was thrown off course by the National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November 2007. The President lamented with some 
consternation: “Despite the fact that Iran was testing missiles that could be used as a delivery 
system and had announced its resumption of uranium-enrichment, the NIE opened with an eye-
popping declaration: ‘We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear 
weapons program.’ [emphasis added] … I decided to declassify the key findings so that we 
could shape the news stories with the facts. The backlash was immediate. Ahmadinejad hailed 
the NIE as ‘a great victory.’ Momentum for new sanctions faded almost immediately among the 
Europeans, Russians, and Chinese.”890 The president seemed to fault his own government’s 
intelligence for undermining his policy, but his decision to make the finding public seemed to 
contradict his apparent goals. “The NIE didn’t just undermine diplomacy. It also tied my hands 
                                                          
888
 Ibid., p. 417. 
889
 Ibid. 
890
 Ibid., pp. 418-419. 
202 
 
on the military side.” Bush II listed the major concerns for military intervention in Iran as: “its 
uncertain effectiveness and the serious problems it would create for Iraq’s fragile young 
democracy. But after the NIE, how could I possibly explain using the military to destroy the 
nuclear facilities of a country the intelligence community said had no active nuclear weapons 
program?” With inadvertent irony, Bush II reasoned: “I wondered if the intelligence community 
was trying so hard to avoid repeating its mistake on Iraq that it had underestimated the threat 
from Iran.”891 
     If there was a forward-looking vision in the Bush II worldview that could be applied to 
Iran, it was elaborated in the transformational diplomacy initiative promoted by National 
Security Adviser and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in order to reinvigorate the Foreign 
Service. As an ideological hybrid of the liberal “indispensable nation” and neoconservative quest 
for hegemony, Rice and Bush II championed the expansion of democratic governments. 
Therefore, any war goals for Iran would implicitly include regime change and nation-building 
rather than simply eliminating uranium-enrichment and ending sponsorship of terrorism. Rice 
stated that the 9/11 attacks had been rooted in “oppression and despair” and the United States 
must support democratic reform and human rights throughout the Middle East.892  
     Rice also tried to reform and restructure the Foreign Service and State Department as a 
whole. She described transformational diplomacy as a grand design to “work with our many 
partners around the world … [and] build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will 
respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international 
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system.”893 As Secretary of State, Rice worked at the intersection of Bush II’s military and 
diplomatic tracks. She proposed: “We will not meet the challenges of the twenty-first century 
through military or any other means alone. Our national security requires the integration of our 
universal principles with all elements of our national power: our defense, our diplomacy, our 
development assistance, our democracy promotion efforts, free trade, and the good work of our 
private sector and society. And it is the State Department, more than any other agency of 
government, that is called to lead this work.”894 Unfortunately, the Department of State’s 
influence on the nation-building and political operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was minimal— 
with the Pentagon’s civilian and military policy makers dominating the post-invasion occupation 
and reconstruction. There was little reason to expect that a post-intervention Iran would have 
been handled differently by the Bush II White House.  
          According to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Bush II attempted engagement, 
but became frustrated over time at Iran’s failure to respond.895 Mid-year 2003, Iranian officials 
reportedly offered to turn over three suspected al-Qaeda terrorists to the United States and 
promised more of the same in exchange for ending operations of an Iraq-based Iranian rebel 
group, the People’s Mujahedin (MEK).  The Iranian offer was discussed by Cheney, Rumsfeld, 
Powell, and Rice at Bush II’s ranch in July 2003. Powell and Rice wanted to engage Iran and the 
State Department held one meeting with the Iranians soon afterward. However, “hard-liners” in 
the Pentagon and the vice president’s office opposed a deal with Tehran, which they saw as a 
sponsor of terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferator, and on the verge of being overthrown in a 
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popular revolution—through either covert U.S. action or outright military intervention.896 The 
Islamic Republic fit into the worldview of Bush II as an implacable enemy, engaged in 
actionable offences—nuclear weapons development and sponsorship of terrorism—that might 
have invited U.S. military intervention were it not for overstretched resources during the critical 
period of 2006-2008. 
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or 
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an 
administration and from one presidency to the next? 
     As stated above, the case of Iran might have been part of a belated recognition of the 
limits of projected power by the Bush II “Vulcans.” George W. Bush hinted at a lesson learned 
from the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq when he offhandedly recounted: “others worried 
that a foreign military intervention would stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against 
us.”897  
     The Bush II administration engaged Iran in diplomatic initiatives on several occasions. In 
May 2003, U.S. and Iranian officials met in Geneva “under U.N. auspices” to discuss 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and related regional issues.898 The United States and Iran cooperated on 
Afghanistan issues, including enforcement of an arms embargo on the Taliban, counter-narcotics 
operations, humanitarian relief, and planning and intelligence assistance for Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF).899 The Bush II administration reportedly assigned Foreign Service Officers as 
“Iran-watchers” in embassies and consulates in countries neighboring Iran and in cities with a 
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significant Iranian exile presence.900 Late in Bush II’s tenure, Secretary Rice explored the idea of 
opening a diplomatic interest section in Tehran, a step toward normalization, but such a 
controversial move never came to a formal decision.901 In the period from 2006 to 2008, Bush II 
attempted to support civilian nuclear programs in the Middle East through nuclear cooperation 
agreements so that nations developing nuclear energy would not need to engage in uranium-
enrichment that could be diverted to nuclear weapons. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Mary Alice Hayward bluntly asserted, the intent of the initiative was to counter Iran’s expressed 
need to develop nuclear power for civilian uses. She stated, in December 2008: “We believe that, 
within the region, [civilian nuclear agreements] can serve as powerful counter-examples to Iran’s 
irresponsible enrichment program.”902 In January 2009, upon signing a civilian nuclear 
cooperation agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates, Condoleezza 
Rice called the agreement a “powerful and timely model,” but the Bush II administration had 
failed to end Iran’s uranium-enrichment by either diplomacy or coercion.903 
          The failure to divert Iran’s movement toward nuclear weapons development through 
other means left the Bush II White House with the military option, even as the Pentagon was 
elaborating its “long war” doctrine. David Kilcullen, an adviser to General David Petraeus, stated 
the long war concept was born in “a series of windowless offices deep inside the Pentagon” and 
the term was coined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).904 Hence, George W. 
Bush adopted the term in his State of the Union address: “our own generation is in a long war 
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against a determined enemy.”905 Andrew Bacevich questioned the origin of the long war 
doctrine, by a “small, self-perpetuating, self-anointed group of specialists.”906 Tom Hayden 
critiqued the contradiction between the QDR’s recommendation to finish “our current wars 
before thinking about the next,” on one hand, and how “we fight wars that bleed into each other 
without clear end points,” on the other.907  The term was absent from the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review issued in February 2010 by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.908 However, 
the phrase might have disappeared, but the rationale of the long war continued to underlay the 
U.S. military posture in the Middle East. 
The Bush II team failed to cement a diplomatic solution to the perceived Iranian threats 
of terrorism and WMDs, thus leading to consideration of military options, which hence became 
increasingly unrealistic under the shadow of the extended stalemates in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
eroding public support, and declining international prestige. 
I. International, systemic, or structural factors: 
     Systemic factors, including alliance issues, were present in the case of Iran as well. 
George W. Bush recalled Condoleezza Rice’s first European trip abroad as Secretary of State: 
“‘They’re not talking about Iraq,’ she said. ‘They’re all worried about Iran.’”909  Bush II 
characterized the threat to peace posed by “the world’s leading sponsors of terrorism.” 
Additionally, an Iranian opposition group brought information to the attention of U.S. 
intelligence to show the Islamic Republic was pursuing uranium-enrichment and heavy-water 
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production in August 2002. “All of a sudden there weren’t so many complaints about including 
Iran in the axis of evil,” the President noted.910 Iran suspended its uranium-enrichment in 
exchange for financial aid and trade from the U.K., Germany, and France in October 2003, but, 
by June 2005, according to Bush II, “everything changed” when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came 
to power.911 Russia and the European Union offered Iran help in developing civilian nuclear 
power, but these offers were rejected.912 Therefore, the Bush II administration followed a two-
track policy on Iran: sanctions plus diplomacy. The President consulted with the British, 
German, and Russian heads of government. The Secretary of State told the European allies that 
the United States would join them in negotiations with Iran on the condition that the Ayatollah’s 
regime verifiably suspended its uranium-enrichment activities.913 At this time, Rice said, “we’d 
taken a number of small steps to unify the international community on the Iran issue … but there 
seemed to be little motivation to levy Security Council sanctions against Tehran … with the 
Russians signaling publicly that they didn’t favor punitive actions … The big carrot for the 
Iranians was U.S. participation in the negotiations.”914 The international level was only half the 
problem for Rice. “Getting consensus around a U.S. policy shift of this magnitude would not be 
easy. I wasn’t even sure that I could get the President to that point,” said Rice. “The President 
was not immediately convinced that we ought to offer to join the negotiations.”915  To complicate 
the matter further, in May 2006, “the stepped-up aggression against our forces led by Iranian 
allies in Iraq … made the President and other members of the NSC wonder whether ‘rewarding’ 
the Iranians with an offer to talk made any sense while they were killing our soldiers.”916 Bush II 
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discussed the idea with Tony Blair of the U.K. and wondered whether the Europeans would 
follow up with tough sanctions if negotiations failed. Blair supported the idea of sanctions and 
carried it to Angela Merkel of Germany and Jacques Chirac of France, who promised they would 
not “go soft.” Vladimir Putin was glad the United States was “taking Russia’s advice.”917 The 
Secretary of State’s statement was described by her successor as National Security Adviser, 
Stephen Hadley, as “pretty tough.” Hence, Secretary Rice explained: “I didn’t want Tehran to 
think that it had gained the upper hand.” Rice made the offer public May 31, 2006: the U.S. was 
ready to negotiate in exchange for “verifiable suspension” of uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities. She said “all issues” were open to negotiate; in effect, a “political thaw” 
between the Islamic Republic and the United States was key. “Left unsaid was the central point: 
we were not, in the short run, seeking regime change,” she later admitted.918  
Iran replied to what they interpreted as the “disrespectful tone” of Rice’s message. First, 
talking tough had backfired, contradicting the conciliatory intention. Second, the U.S. required 
Iran to capitulate on the main area of contention, uranium-enrichment, as a condition for 
negotiating.919 Third and finally, to Rice’s disappointment, the Russians were less cooperative 
than she had hoped.920 In July 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1696 demanded that Iran 
suspend uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities. Then Tehran’s chief negotiator refused 
to meet with the EU representatives while Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended the UN General 
Assembly in New York. Rice considered this a ruse to cover Ayatollah Ali Khomeini’s pulling 
the plug on the negotiations.921  
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“The next challenge was to develop effective sanctions,” as the President saw it. “I 
directed the Treasury Department to work with its European counterparts to make it harder for 
Iranian banks and businesses to move money. We also designated the Iranian Quds Force of 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, which allowed [the U.S. 
government] to freeze their assets.” In December 2006, Resolution 1737 condemned Iran and 
imposed sanctions, followed by Resolution 1747, which tightened those sanctions, in March 
2007. Bush II considered Resolutions 1737 and 1747 to be major successes; they banned arms 
exchanges, froze assets, and prohibited sale or transfer of nuclear equipment. “Persuading the 
Europeans, Russians, and Chinese,” he later boasted, “was a diplomatic achievement.”922 
Not all of the players in the Bush II White House thought diplomacy was the right road to 
take. On October 9, 2006, President George W. Bush publically accused North Korea of 
transferring missile technology to Syria and Iran. Vice President Dick Cheney hoped for a more 
forceful U.S. stance. “I believed that our intelligence would have a far greater chance of being 
effective if the North Koreans and Iranians understood that they faced the possibility of military 
action if the diplomacy failed.” 923 To the contrary, the bottom line for the Bush II “Vulcans” 
was expressed by Condoleezza Rice: “It was well understood that we didn’t have the bandwidth 
for unilateral confrontation with Iran and North Korea, given the situation in Iraq.”924 Thus, the 
gap between capabilities and desire imposed realistic limitations on action. 
The United Nations Security Council voted five times to sanction Iran for its pursuit of a 
nuclear weapons capability during the 2006-2008 period.925 The objectives of these sanctions 
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were to stop WMD-related trade; freeze Iranian assets associated with nuclear development; 
inhibit Iranian arms exports; monitor international travel by Iranians; subject Iranian sea and air 
cargo shipments to inspection; and restrict Iranian banking and financial activities.926 The long-
range success of the policy of isolation and sanctions against Iran seemed to bear fruit as of 
November 23, 2013, with the tentative agreement with the United States and P5+1 partners, 
whereby Tehran agreed to suspend uranium-enrichment activities and centrifuge production.927  
By 2008, the Bush II White House was attempting to reassemble the diplomatic coalition 
against Iran, push sanctions on “dual-use technologies” (materials and equipment that could be 
diverted for weaponry development), and proposing a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe 
(Poland and Czech Republic). “I worked to speed the reform clock by meeting with Iranian 
dissidents, calling for the release of political prisoners,” among other activities, including 
propaganda against the Islamic Republic’s regime. “I regret [leaving the presidency with] the 
Iranian issue unresolved,” Bush recalled.928  
The Bush II administration primarily worked on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program 
through the P5+1 group, an ad-hoc cooperative consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Russia, and China. At a P5+1 meeting with Iranian envoys in Geneva, July 
2008, Undersecretary of State William Burns conveyed the Bush II administration’s position that 
Iran must suspend uranium-enrichment before negotiations would proceed.929 The Bush II brain 
trust made ending Iran’s enriched-uranium production its policy priority.930 This policy 
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comprised disincentives and inducements to alter Iranian behavior and to coax them into 
suspending uranium-enrichment and committing to a verifiable civilian nuclear program. 
Secretary of State Rice reiterated Bush II’s preference for a diplomatic approach to Iran, while 
also insisting that “President Bush never took any of his options [regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program] off the table.”931 According to Rice, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah “somehow held out 
hope George W. Bush would ‘take care of Iran’ before leaving office.”932 Instead, the Secretary 
of State told foreign ministers at the Gulf Cooperation Council: “We’re not in a position of 
strength right now.”933 Thus, by January 2009, outgoing National Security Adviser Hadley 
identified Iran as the most serious foreign policy challenge that the next administration would 
face in the Middle East.934 
The reason for Bush II’s failure to resolve the Iranian situation was simply that the 
United States was precluded from utilizing military force or a credible threat of doing so because 
of its overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. posture had been based on the use of force 
since 2001, but the situation had changed to the effect that concepts such as the Bush Doctrine, 
pre-emption, and the long war were no longer practicable. Once again, the gap between 
capabilities and desire was apparent. As the memory of 9/11 receded into history, the more 
frustrating the war in Iraq and the less likely the United States became to intervene anywhere 
else, especially when the threat was distant rather than immediate. 
II. National, domestic, or internal political: 
                                                          
931
 Rice, Condoleezza, Interview with Andrea Mitchell, MSNBC, Washington, D.C., January 12, 2009. 
932
 Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 625. 
933
 Ibid., p. 543. 
934
 Hadley, Stephen, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 7, 
2009. 
212 
 
While lessons learned from prior interventions affected Bush II’s range of options, at the 
same time we ought not rule out the influence of public opinion (casualty sensitivity and 
intervention fatigue) and potential partisan opposition. 
By the second half of Bush II’s second term, the logic of military intervention against 
Iran was implicit in the Bush Doctrine, War on Terrorism, and long war policies. At an October 
2007 press conference, a reporter asked about Iran and the President responded: “I’ve told people 
that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in 
preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.”  There 
followed a hailstorm of criticism for the World War III reference. “They all missed the point. I 
wasn’t looking to start a war. I was trying to hold our coalition together to avoid one.”935 Be that 
as it may, George W. Bush understood the point: There would be no “rally round the flag” this 
time. The media and informed public were not inclined to accept Bush II’s third intervention on 
blind faith. 
          Among the general public’s concerns about Iran, an existential threat to Israel loomed as 
ominously as nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism. After Bush II left office, the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) 
found that Americans were still very concerned about Iranian development of nuclear weapons. 
An overwhelming majority of opinion believed Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons, which 
presented a real threat to U.S. national security. They doubted that the prospect of nuclear 
retaliation would be a deterrent against Iran’s attacking Israel with a nuclear weapon.936 
Nevertheless, U.S. public opinion favored sanctions over military force. Only 33 percent of 
                                                          
935
 Bush, George W., Decision Points, p. 418. 
936
 Chapter 12b: U.S. Opinion on Transnational Threats: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Public Opinion on Global 
Issues, July 16, 2012. www.cfr.org/public_opinion.  
213 
 
respondents favored imposing sanctions to stop Iran from uranium-enrichment, but even fewer, 
13 percent, supported military action and fewer still, 8 percent, would accept a nuclear-armed 
Iran. A German Marshall Fund (GMF) survey revealed that a near majority, 49 percent, of U.S. 
opinion would support military action as a last resort.937 Yet a clear-cut majority of the U.S. 
public preferred engagement with Iran through diplomacy, 55 percent, rather than action, 15 
percent.938 According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, public opinion was pessimistic 
about the consequences of military strikes and unconvinced they would deter Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program.939 Other polling results indicated over 80 percent of Americans believed that 
military strikes alone would fail to stop Iran’s nuclear program, increase support for the Iranian 
regime, and potentially lead to retaliation in the form of terrorist attacks. By an overwhelming 
majority, 74 percent of the American public thought the United Nations Security Council should 
deal with Iran, compared with 20 percent that preferred the United States acting unilaterally.940 
Important to note is that most polling questions assumed bombing or a similar “surgical” strike 
could effectively eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons stockpiles, whereas, in reality, there were no 
such guarantees.941  
Public opinion on hypothetical military intervention against Iran followed an evolution 
from support for the use of force to a decline of support and increased distrust of the Bush II 
administration. In April 2003, a Los Angeles Times poll found 50 percent of respondents 
supporting the use of force if Iran continued to pursue developing nuclear weapons and 36 
percent opposed. Support was strongest among Republicans (59 percent) and Democrats (52 
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percent) as compared with independents (45 percent).942 In 2006, a Fox News survey found 54 
percent support for using air strikes versus 35 percent opposed, but only 42 percent support for 
using ground troops versus 48 percent opposed. In addition, support for “whatever military force 
is necessary” dropped from 59 percent (with 33 percent opposed) to 50 percent (with 42 percent 
opposed) between January and March 2006.943 When registered voters were asked whether they 
supported the United States taking military action if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon before Bush 
II left office, 48 percent said yes, 44 percent said no, and 8 percent were unsure, as of May 
2006.944 The next month, a similar question produced an even stronger result: 52 percent in 
favor, 37 percent opposed, and 12 percent unsure in a Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg survey.945 
Here support for military intervention to halt the Iranian nuclear program peaked and began to 
decline, even as the Bush II administration increasingly focused attention on the issue during the 
summer of 2006. By autumn, a Newsweek/Princeton poll found that a majority (54 percent) 
would not support air strikes against suspected nuclear sites, while 38 percent would support 
them. More tellingly, a mere 18 percent supported sending in ground troops and an 
overwhelming 76 percent said they would not.946 In 2007, on the issue of the Iranians supplying 
insurgents in Iraq with explosive technology, 55 percent supported taking military action and 45 
percent did not.947 However, a similar poll asked respondents if they trusted the Bush II 
administration. Only 14 percent believed the administration was telling the “entire truth”; 24 
percent thought they were “mostly lying” and 56 percent thought they were “hiding 
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something.”948 By late 2007, 54 percent of those surveyed preferred that Bush II should “let the 
next President deal with Iran,” while 29 percent supported military action and 16 percent were 
unsure.949 The public mood concerning Iran in Bush II’s final year expressed a preference for 
diplomacy (61 percent) rather than military action (10 percent) and some 20 percent thought 
Iranian WMDs were not a threat.950  
Israeli diplomatic pressure and the pro-Israel lobby (such as the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, APIC) had been repeating the mantra that Iranian nuclear weapons 
represented an existential threat to Israel.951 However, whether it was the responsibility of the 
United States or Israel to do something about it was another matter. Clearly, U.S. public opinion 
had recoiled from attacking Iran. Although the polls did not survey the underlying psychology of 
the shift in opinion, our intuitive assumption is that intervention fatigue, intolerance for 
casualties, and a generalized distrust for the Bush II White House contributed to the public’s shift 
in attitude. The “cry wolf” syndrome would appear to have undermined Bush II’s credibility and 
constrained the administration’s ability to shape public opinion. 
  Overall, Congress was compliant on Bush II’s policy toward Iran and the issues of 
sponsoring terrorism, proliferating nuclear weapons, and assisting the insurgency in Iraq were 
virtually nonpartisan at this time. In 2004, the House of Representatives passed Resolution 398, 
urging the administration “to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade and prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons” by a vote of 376-3.952 As of 2006, Congress passed the Iran Freedom 
Support Act (IFSA), which reinforced previously imposed sanctions and expressed support for 
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“independent human rights and peaceful pro-democracy forces in Iran.”953 Congress also passed 
the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (INKSA), a statute which 
prohibited the sale of equipment and technology that could be used for nuclear weaponry or 
missiles by penalizing foreign “individuals and entities” involved in such transactions.954 In 
September 2007, the Senate declared the Quds Force a terrorist organization and in a separate 
resolution called for a diplomatic approach to the Islamic Republic.955 These measures passed the 
Senate 75-22 and 75-23, respectively, wherein the opposition comprised a minority of dovish 
Democrats averse to Bush II’s interventionism. 
In the 2004 presidential election campaign, George W. Bush stated, “On Iran, I hope we 
can … continue to work with the world to convince the Iranian mullahs to abandon their nuclear 
ambitions,” at the debate in Coral Gables, Florida. Democratic candidate John Kerry, for his part, 
agreed Iranian nuclear development was the most serious emergent threat.956 Four years later, the 
issue of Iran was not a point of partisan contention in the 2008 campaign, as both Democrat 
Barack Obama and Republican John McCain said military action would remain an option if 
Iran’s uranium-enrichment program continued.957  
III. Individual, personal, and ideological factors: 
                                                          
953
 Library of Congress, H.R. 6198: To hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and 
to support a transition to democracy in Iran, September 30, 2006. http://thomas.loc.gov. 
954
 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “Iran, North Korea, and 
Syria Nonproliferation Act Sanctions (INKSNA).” http://www.state.gov/t/vci/inksna/index.htm, accessed September 
20, 2013.   
955
 Herszenhorn, David M., “Senate Urges Bush to Declare Iran Guard a Terrorist Group,” New York Times, 
September 27, 2007. 
956
 Presidential Debate, Coral Gables, FL (October 8, 2004), “Bush, Kerry: Nukes most serious threat. First debate 
covers Iraq, homeland security,” CNN, Saturday, October 9, 2004. www.cnn.com. 
957
 CNN, Election 2008, Issues—Iran. http://www.cnn.com, retrieved September 20, 2013. 
217 
 
In 2005, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran, George W. Bush 
said, “This guy could be nuts.”958 The chief executive set the tone for U.S. policy toward Iran in 
his “Axis of Evil” conceptualization. Five years later, President Bush charged that the Quds 
Force was interfering in Iraq. At a press conference in early 2007, he stated: “I can say with 
certainty that the Quds Force, a part of the Iranian government, has provided these sophisticated 
IEDs that have harmed our troops. And I’d like to repeat, I do not know whether or not the Quds 
Force was ordered from the top echelons of government. But my point is what’s worse – them 
[sic] ordering it and it happening, or them not ordering it and it happening? ... My job is to 
protect our troops. And when we find devices that are in that country that are hurting our troops, 
we’re going to do something about it, pure and simple ... [D]oes this mean you’re trying to have 
a pretext for war? No. It means I’m trying to protect our troops.”959  
There emerged a division of opinion in the Bush II administration over the correct 
approach to Iran. Vice-President Cheney and others called for a hardline policy, arguing that the 
Iranian regime could not reform and conditions would soon be primed for a democratic 
revolution. A more realistic assumption was that the Islamic Republic was stable and firmly in 
control, and the United States ultimately must deal with the existing regime.960 Nevertheless, 
Bush II proceeded on the assumption that the Ayatollah and mullahs could be toppled in Tehran. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice requested $75 million in “emergency funding” from 
Congress “to promote political change inside Iran,” in February 2006.961 Two-thirds of the 
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funding ($50 million) was earmarked for radio and satellite television broadcasting of 
propaganda in Farsi into Iran.962 
By spring 2007, Cheney was concerned about Iran’s reported joint venture with Syria in 
nuclear weaponry. The Vice-President recalled: “Much of our conversation focused on the bad 
intelligence about Iraq’s stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. That experience made some 
key policy makers very reluctant to consider robust options for dealing with the Syrian plant.” 
He lamented that such gun-shyness was “regrettable,” as there was “no question…in the Syrian 
desert was a clandestine reactor, built by two terrorist-sponsoring states.”963 Cheney insisted Iran 
“had a robust program underway based on uranium-enriched centrifuge technology…” 
(estimated to be 3,000 centrifuges, circa 2007). Also, Cheney could not discuss nuclear weapons 
without linkage to terrorism (that is, his “mushroom cloud” nightmare scenarios). Iran was 
providing money and weapons to foreign insurgents in Iraq, while Iran and Syria were 
supporting Hezbollah against Israel and Lebanon. “They constituted a major threat to U.S. 
interests in the Middle East.” Subsequently, Cheney became the “lone voice” calling for air 
strikes on Syria. At the National Security Council, the President asked: “Does anyone here agree 
with the Vice-President?” Cheney pointed out bitterly that nobody supported him, including a 
number of advisers who had enthusiastically promoted the intervention in Iraq a few years 
earlier.964 Nevertheless, Iran’s persistent nuclear development efforts sufficiently concerned the 
President to repeat: “all options were on the table.” This statement prompted the U.S. regional 
commander, Admiral Fox Fallon, to label Bush II’s rhetoric: “bellicose” and “unhelpful.” Not 
surprisingly, Fallon later quit, but other voices echoed a similar aversion to a tough line on Iran. 
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Robert Gates, who succeeded Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, allegedly told the Saudi king that 
George W. Bush would be “impeached” if he hit Iran.965 Rice’s version of the comment is that 
Gates said Bush II “would face the wrath of the American people over such a decision.”966 Was 
Secretary Gates speaking for himself, or was he dramatically expressing the negative lessons 
learned from Iraq redux? Regardless, the cumulative effect of Bush II’s preceding interventions 
defined a clear set of limitations for the administration.  
          Vice President Cheney was not inclined to let the “alleged” mistakes in Iraq circumscribe 
what he saw as the right course in Iran. Cheney was critical of the 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) that maintained Iran had halted its nuclear quest four years earlier. Cheney 
contended the NIE only referred to “covert” uranium-enrichment and weaponization, but not 
the production of nuclear (fissionable) material and reported “significant progress” in Iran’s 
“declared centrifuge enrichment activities.” According to Cheney, “As it was, the NIE clearly 
gave a false impression.” Also, Cheney asserted, the Director of National Intelligence, Mike 
McConnell, “later testified that he would have presented the key findings differently if he had it 
to do over again.”967 Thus, the lone wolf howled solo. 
          Meanwhile, Condoleezza Rice was at first extremely skeptical with respect to the “troop 
surge” in Iraq in 2007. Rice changed her mind because of (1) David Petraeus’s 
counterinsurgency strategy; (2) U.S. pressure on Iraqis to end sectarian bickering; and “if we 
didn’t double down,” she believed, “[t]he US would be toast in the Middle East.”968 As 
discussed in Chapter 6, internecine strife began early in the Bush II era. Rice battled over 
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policy and process with Defense chief Rumsfeld as well as with Dick Cheney. Rice and the 
vice president locked horns over Iran as early as August 2002 when she complained to the 
president about Cheney’s “declaration of war” speech on Iran.969 Rumsfeld, somewhat 
arrogantly, opined on Rice: “From 2001 to 2005, I sent Rice a series of memos suggesting ways 
I thought the [NSC] process might be strengthened … No one likes to have his or her style of 
management questioned. Rice was a person whose general performance over the years had 
undoubtedly been seen as above reproach. She seemed unaccustomed to constructive 
suggestions, and not much changed for the better.”970 Rumsfeld was more respectful and 
deferential after Rice became a cabinet member, which her biographer, Bumiller, suggested 
was due to the weak National Security Adviser having become a “forceful” Secretary of 
State.971 Rice also had become Bush II’s top adviser. Her personal bond with the president, 
always strong, deepened as she supplanted Cheney as Bush II’s “go-to” person during the 
second term.972 
          When Donald Rumsfeld had served as Ronald Reagan’s emissary to Iraq in the 1980s, he 
saw promise in Saddam Hussein as the “bitter adversary” of Syria and Iran. In Rumsfeld’s 
view, U.S.-Iran relations were “poisoned” by Khomeini’s radical regime and the Tehran 
hostage crisis (1979-1981); to contain Syria and Iran was “our mutual interest” with Iraq; and 
“Iran’s leadership,” wrote Rumsfeld, “remained unapproachable.”973 At this time (circa 1984), 
“I was troubled by the unreal expectations some in the region had of the United States, of the 
ways and how rapidly we could assist them if their neighbors took aggressive actions … [in 
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response to] looming dangers posed by Iran and Syria and potentially Iraq … to undertake 
planning to deter aggression … Many leaders seemed to believe that American forces would be 
able to appear magically from over the hill and deliver them from Iran’s or Iraq’s clutches.”974 
Rumsfeld’s dour assessment of the post-Cold War era was that the United States took a 
“holiday from strategic thought” and “overconfidence had spurred complacency. U.S. 
intelligence capabilities had atrophied, and abortive U.S. operations from Somalia to Haiti had 
communicated uncertain American resolve. The problems of Islamist extremism, the nuclear 
weapons programs of North Korea and Iran … had been exacerbated.”975 Like Cheney, the 
Pentagon czar was skeptical of a diplomatic approach to Iran. “Beginning with Ambassador 
Zalmay Khalilzad [Afghanistan-born American diplomat] in December 2001, the Bush [II] 
administration also authorized American diplomats to hold discussions of one type or another 
with representatives from Iran …” Nothing came of this idea. Of the proposed U.S.-Iranian 
talks, April 2006, Rumsfeld said: “I think they are a disaster. We’re stepping on a rake.”976 
Again, Rumsfeld emphasized, nothing came of this initiative. “To the contrary, Tehran seemed 
to have accelerated its illegal weapons programs, continued to fund Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
crushed its domestic dissidents, threatened to erase Israel from the map in another Holocaust, 
and escalated their attacks against American service [men and women] in Iraq.”977 We may 
assume that Rumsfeld would certainly have been a hawkish voice during the crucial 2006-2008 
period had he still been at the table. Thus, Gates represents a change in policy and viewpoint as 
well as personnel. 
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          According to Rice’s biographer: “Well into 2007, Rice and Cheney were on opposite 
ends of the administration’s attitude to stop the nuclear threat from Iran. Rice was the chief 
advocate of diplomacy and Cheney the chief skeptic and by June [2007] a furious debate had 
broken out between Rice and her deputies and Cheney’s staff. Dick’s staff warned of air strikes 
… Rice was dismissive of the saber rattling.” However, Rice tried to gloss over their 
disagreement, saying, “we’re probably a lot closer than people think on this issue … I am 
skeptical one day and optimistic the next.”978 Did Rice’s worldview differ greatly from 
Cheney’s? Her biographer writes: “Rice would say ‘transformational diplomacy,’ her Bush-
inspired vision of spreading democracy around the world. But in reality—and by instinct, 
training, and experience—she is a pragmatist who for four overwhelming years got swept away 
by her devotion to the president and to the hawks who held power.”979 By 2008, the Secretary 
of State was working on the chronically crisis-ridden Lebanon and supported Israel’s renewed 
talks with Syria, a move that Cheney and his staff opposed because Bashar al-Assad was allied 
with Iran and Hezbollah. Secretary Rice also made overtures to Ahmadinejad. In July 2008, 
Rice refused to meet unless Iran stopped uranium-enrichment and she dispatched 
Undersecretary of State William J. Burns to Geneva to conduct fruitless discussions with the 
Iranians.980 The metaphorical window of opportunity had closed. 
          IV.     Criteria for the use of force:  
          The foregoing criteria apply to Iran if and only if plausible military contingencies could 
be determined and evaluated. Was Iran a “no-go” because the Bush II administration 
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determined the United States could not win? Were U.S. resources spread too thin and the 
military overextended? Were the limits of military intervention realized under Bush II, brought 
on by imperial overreach?981 Intuitively, we suspect military factors must have been decisive in 
keeping direct intervention against Iran off the table: although there was an established 
operational base in the region, it is not clear whether a surgical strike against Iranian nuclear 
facilities would have been effective by itself; the scope and scale of an Iranian intervention 
would be far greater than the Iraq and Afghan operations; the possibility of counteraction by 
other states, particularly Russia; and the ongoing campaigns, including troop surges, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan precluded opening up a third theatre in the war-ravaged Middle East. Additionally, 
the difficulty of targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, whether singularly or as part of a larger 
scale operation, had to have been a major question, such that “surgical air strikes” were 
probably a fiction. This case echoes Allison’s analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which the 
Air Force could not guarantee 100% effectiveness.982 Hence, the potential blowback would 
comprise everything from counterattacks against U.S. forces or allies in the region or retaliation 
against “soft targets” elsewhere. A computer simulation mapping of the fallout from a Trident 
D-5 warhead, the largest U.S. nuclear weapon (455 kilotons), showed that a detonation in the 
middle of the desert would bring radiation to within 100 kilometers of major Iranian cities.983 
The Israelis previously had hit Iraqi and Syrian facilities, but these were much smaller. Admiral 
William Fallon, former CENTCOM commander, judged that the Iranian installations were 
hardened and eliminating them would not be “a one-time job.” According to U.S.M.C. General 
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James Cartwright, former JCS vice-chairman: “Not even a 30 thousand pound ‘bunker buster’ 
could knock out the Iranian uranium-enrichment unit, such as Fordow, built 250 feet under a 
mountain.”984 As General Michael Hayden, Bush II’s CIA and NSA Director, related: “When 
we talked about this in the government, the consensus was that [attacking Iran] would 
guarantee that which we are trying to prevent — an Iran that will spare nothing to build a 
nuclear weapon and that would build it in secret.” Former CIA official John McLaughlin had 
also been quoted as saying that an attack on Iran “would be a very bad option.”985 
         #1—Have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or negotiation? 
The United States developed a military posture through cooperative security arrangements in 
the Persian Gulf region directed at containing Iran.  In 2000, the United States organized the 
Cooperation Defense Initiative (CDI) with Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to facilitate active defense, passive defense, early 
warning systems, crisis management, and medical countermeasures.986 By June 2004, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had developed the “front-end of 
a nuclear fuel cycle,” leading to speculation that the Iranians could acquire a nuclear weapon as 
soon as 2007 or 2008.987 In May 2006, Condoleezza Rice initiated her overture to Tehran and 
subsequently the United States pushed sanctions through United Nations Security Council in a 
series of resolutions. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates participated in the Gulf 
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Security Dialogue (GSD) to cooperate on conventional, unconventional, asymmetric, terrorist 
threats, and regional stability related to Iran.988 Previously, Rice hoped the GSD would bolster 
the defense of regional allies to stabilize the region.989 In June 2009, Secretary Gates stated that 
regional cooperation and intelligence sharing would contain Iran and aid “the interdiction of 
illegal shipments of weapons or [nuclear] material.”990 In the end, Bush II “kicked the can 
down the road” to the Obama administration. 
          #2—Are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood? A report by 
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), titled Iran: Time for a New Approach (July 2004), 
advocated limited dialogue with Iran because the regime was firmly entrenched and U.S. 
military intervention to bring about regime change would be ill advised. Iran had triple the 
population of Iraq and promised a fierce response to a U.S. invasion and occupation. The CFR 
study acknowledged the U.S. military was overextended by its commitments in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and called on Bush II officials to devote their energy to winning Iranian cooperation 
in areas of mutual interest. The study urged the administration to open a dialogue with Iran that 
could lead to normalizing diplomatic relations.991 According to Soeren Kern of RIE (Madrid): 
“the massive projection of U.S. power on Iran’s periphery has led a critical segment of Iran’s 
power brokers…to reconsider the value of a rational relationship with Washington.” Reformers 
and pragmatists, led by former Iranian president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were convinced 
the regime must revise its foreign policy to end Iran’s isolation and exclusion from the world’s 
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economy. Therefore, a rapprochement with Washington was in Tehran’s interests, but could 
only occur if the Iranians addressed the issues of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and aiding the 
Iraqi insurgency.992 After a period of stasis, a new, more moderate Iranian President, Hassan 
Rouhani, responded positively to overtures from the Obama administration.993 
          #3—Is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively maintained? 
Let us ask whether the strategy and tactics were “doable” and “winnable.” A one-dimensional 
strategy of precision air strikes against Iran’s nuclear development program held limited 
promise. Even if the air strikes destroyed Iran’s uranium-enrichment and weaponization 
capacity, they could be reconstituted elsewhere and would do little to change the regime’s 
behavior. As George W. Bush himself acknowledged, “a foreign military intervention would 
stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against us.”994 A more robust air and naval 
assault on Iran would have four major targets: Iran’s economic infrastructure, including oil 
refineries; Iran’s military infrastructure, including defense electronics; the regime’s political 
leadership; and enforcing an external blockade and sanctions.995 An air and sea campaign could 
eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program, or at the very least set it back by years. If the Bush 
II administration’s objective was regime change or long-term transformation of Iranian political 
culture, the United States would need to follow up the “shock and awe” bombardment with an 
invasion by combat forces.996 A conservative estimate of troop levels might be 450,000 to 
750,000, based on the deployment in the two Iraq wars, adjusted for Iran’s proportionally larger 
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population. Those troops would have had to come from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the “backdoor 
draft” of the National Guard and Reserves. 
          The United States Strategic Command carried out an exercise in November 2004 to test a 
global strike plan code-named “Global Lightening.” The simulated attack used both 
conventional and nuclear weapons against a fictitious enemy, a thinly disguised Iran. 
According to Hans Kristensen, of the Nuclear Information Project, Global Lightening is “an 
actual plan that the Navy and the Air Force translate into strike package for their submarines 
and bombers.” The Strategic Command declared an advanced state of readiness following the 
Global Lightening exercise. CONPLAN was the operational global strike plan and CONPLAN 
8022 was “the overall umbrella plan for sort of the pre-planned strategic scenarios involving 
nuclear weapons.” CONPLAN 8022 was designed for the “new” threats from proliferators Iran 
and North Korea as well as sub-state terrorists.997 In May 2004, National Security Presidential 
Directive #35 (NSPD-35), on Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization, landed on the 
President’s desk.998 The classified report covered the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in 
the Middle East as part of CONPLAN 8022.999 The use of both nuclear and conventional 
weapons was assumed by CONPLAN 8022 under the Bush II administration’s pre-emptive war 
policy. This assumption predated the Iraq War. An earlier directive, NSPD-17, dated December 
2002, explicitly states, in the event of an attack on U.S. forces: “The United States will 
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continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—  
including potentially nuclear weapons.”1000  
         By 2008, Bush II announced plans to construct ten long-range interceptors and a fixed-
site radar in Eastern Europe to defend against Iranian long-range missile threats.1001 The Bush 
II administration appeared to be dramatizing its linkage of WMDs with terrorism. Additionally, 
Bush II authorized the deployment of an aircraft carrier, Patriot missiles, and intelligence 
sharing with Gulf allies.1002 The missile defense sites in Eastern Europe were later canceled by 
the successor Obama administration. Ultimately, it was not clear whether the anti-ballistic 
missile program ever served legitimate counterterrorism purposes. 
           #4—Are there sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with 
“overwhelming force”? A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
recommended an initial strike against nuclear research facilities, missile bases, 
mobile missile launchers, and missile production facilities. The CSIS study determined 
that only the United States had the firepower and logistics to launch a campaign of such a scale 
and scope.1003 As early as 2003, the Pentagon was conducting an analysis of a war scenario 
with Iran, called Theatre Iran Near Term (TIRANNT). The President asked the Strategic 
Command for a global strike plan for an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities in conjunction 
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with CONPLAN 8022. According to William Arkin, a U.S. Army intelligence expert, 
TIRANNT commissioned Pentagon planners to examine all aspects of a major combat 
operation in a war with Iran, including mobilization and deployment of forces for invasion, 
occupation, and postwar political operations.1004 Arkin wrote in the Washington Post that 
TIRANNT called for a land invasion by Marines, targeting the Iranian missile force, and a 
global strike plan against Iranian weapons of mass destruction. An additional study, titled 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Iran (BMD-I) examined scenarios involving Iranian missile 
capacity. In June 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld alerted the Strategic Command to 
be prepared to implement CONPLAN 8022. “The new task force,” Arkin said, “mostly worries 
that if it were called upon to deliver ‘prompt’ global strikes against certain targets in Iran under 
some emergency circumstances, the president might have to be told that the only option is a 
nuclear one.”1005   
Because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had dragged on interminably, U.S. 
intervention in Iran by ground troops was a nonstarter by 2007. Apart from limited Special 
Operations, the United States did not have the ground force numbers to invade and occupy Iran. 
As a result, the only feasible operation would be the limited use of air and naval forces.1006 
#5—Is there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel 
once the mission’s goals have been achieved? Would an invasion and occupation of Iran have 
devolved into a protracted guerrilla insurgency as had been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq? 
General Yahya Rahim Safavi, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, threatened the United 
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States not to attack Iran, warning that U.S. troops in the region were “vulnerable” in 2006. 
“You can start a war but it won’t be you who finishes it,” Safavi said.1007 The Iranian Quds 
Force or surrogates, such as Hezbollah, were definitely capable of diversionary attacks on 
American, British, Israeli, or Saudi targets. The Sunday Times (London) reported the Iranians 
had formed squads of suicide bombers to retaliate against American and British targets if Iran’s 
nuclear installations were attacked. Members of the Martyr Seekers of the Revolutionary 
Guards marched in a military parade in Tehran in March 2006.1008 The special unit appeared to 
be wearing explosive packs and holding detonators. The director of the Centre for Doctrinal 
Strategic Studies of the Revolutionary Guards, Hassan Abbasi, gave a public speech, promising 
that: “We are ready to attack American and British sensitive points if they attack Iran’s nuclear 
facilities.”1009 Therefore, it is very unlikely that an Iranian intervention could have been 
resolved in a brokered diplomatic and political settlement on the order of Haiti, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo. 
Bush II hawks postulated that an attack on Iran would create a political upheaval, 
presenting the opportunity for regime change, but it was equally likely to bolster hardliners and 
enflame a nationalistic backlash, leading to an extended occupation and insurgency, as had 
been the result in Afghanistan and Iraq.1010  
CONCLUSION 
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 An array of compelling reasons inhibited the Bush II administration from military 
intervention against Iran. The United States was overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
continued involvement eroded public support for military action as well as respect for the 
administration in general. The issues of WMDs and support for terrorism resonated negatively 
for the Bush II White House, whose credibility was seriously undermined by the history of 
manipulated intelligence data in the prelude to the second Iraq War. In addition to weak support 
in public opinion, key members of the administration were chastened as a result of the 
intelligence failures in the case of Iraq, as Cheney complained in his memoirs. Military assets 
were stretched thin owing to the strains of the ongoing Afghan and Iraqi interventions, as 
Rice’s reflections had revealed, thus limiting the credibility of the threat of force. Most 
importantly, the scope of the Presidential Directives NSPD-17 and NSPD-35, TIRANNT, and 
CONPLAN 8022, particularly the presumptive involvement of nuclear weapons, made the war 
plans for Iran more daunting than any intervention since the Persian Gulf War. Until 2006, 
there might have been the momentum for a “go” decision, reinforced by perceived positive 
outcomes in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, but by 2007-2008 both the momentum and 
perception of success had reversed and become negatives. Therefore, Bush II ruled out 
intervention and pursued a combination of diplomatic pressure and sanctions because U.S. 
resources were stretched too thin to make a credible threat of military force. 
          As suggested late in Bush II’s reign, a nuclear Iran was a problem left to the next 
administration. As journalist Fareed Zakaria wrote in early 2013: “President Obama will face a 
crisis on Iran. He has categorically ruled out living with a nuclear-armed Iran under a Cold 
War-style policy of containment. That means either Iran will capitulate to U.S. demands or the 
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U.S. will go to war with Iran.”1011 Political scientist Robert Jervis has pointed out that coercive 
diplomacy had not worked in several recent cases. The United States used sanctions, diplomatic 
pressure, and the threat of force in Panama, Kuwait, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but each 
time had to make its threat real and went to war. Jervis argues that coercive diplomacy requires 
a mixture of threats and promises.1012 Although all issues of contention between the United 
States and Iran were still unresolved, diplomatic overtures emerged at the United Nations 
General Assembly gathering in September 2013. The recent discussions leading to a tentative 
agreement might suggest that diplomacy works best if detached from threat or crisis scenarios, 
where U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry credit the value of 
international sanctions while Iranian President Hassan Rouhani hailed the agreement as a 
victory that had forced the “collapse of the sanctions regime.”1013 At the time of this writing, 
we leave the subject as an ongoing dilemma.  
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ANATOMY & TYPOLOGY OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING 
INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter reviews the selected case studies (Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Kosovo, Iraq, and Iran) and a range of additional cases of U.S. military intervention since the end 
of the Cold War, including Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, as well as the recent cases 
of Libya and Syria, in order to build an anatomy and typology of presidential decision making. 
We will refer to our focused, structured comparison, using the same four categories (systemic, 
national, individual, and strategic) and the same four questions in applying conclusions from our 
“go” and “no-go” case studies. 
The original impetus for this study was the observed increased frequency of U.S. military 
intervention since the end of the Cold War. This trend could be shown empirically (see Tables 1, 
2, 3, and 4) and merely accelerated and increased in scope after 9/11, as it was demonstratively 
evident well before that unprecedented event. In Table 1, during the Cold War era, the United 
States intervened militarily ten times in forty-five years, from 1945 to 1990. Thus, the frequency 
with which the U.S. administrations decided to use force was an intervention every 4.5 years. 
(Intervention = 10/45 years; frequency = 4.5) By comparison, in Table 2, the United States 
intervened militarily eleven times in twenty-three years, from 1990 to 2013. Thus, the Post-Cold 
War frequency was an intervention every 2.1 years. (Intervention = 11/23 years; frequency = 
2.1). Alternatively, if we do not count the Iraqi and Afghan troop surges as discrete decisions, 
nine interventions in twenty-three years equals a frequency of 2.55 years. Of significance is the 
cumulative number of years in wars (if not “at war”) during the Cold War period was 21/45 
years = 42% of the time. Even if we use the extended dates of 1960-1975 for the Vietnam War, 
the United States armed forces were in wars 62% of the time. By contrast, the cumulative 
number of years in wars during the Post-Cold War period equals 30/23 = 130% of the time. Note 
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that we have rounded off the beginning and ending dates of the interventions, counting a day as 
one year (for example, the Mayaguez engagement consisted of three days of action, but we count 
it as one year). 
TABLE 1—COLD WAR ERA INTERVENTIONS* 
Korea    Truman-Eisenhower   1950-1954 
Lebanon I    Eisenhower    1958 
Cuba (Bay of Pigs)**  Kennedy    1961 
Dominican Republic   Johnson    1965 
Vietnam***    Johnson-Nixon   1965-1973 
Cambodia (Mayaguez)  Ford    1975 
Iran I (Desert One)   Carter    1980 
Lebanon II    Reagan    1983 
Grenada    Reagan    1983 
Iran II (Nimble Archer & Praying Mantis)  Reagan 1987-1988 
*Excluded events (by definition) are Greece 1948, Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Chile 
1973, as well as El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan in the 1980s, since these 
actions did not involve “boots on the ground.” 
** Some may question the Bay of Pigs as example, since U.S. troops were not directly 
involved on the ground. 
***The beginning of U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War arguably could be dated as 
early as 1960 (Eisenhower) or 1961 (Kennedy) and the end point as late as 1975 with the 
fall of Saigon. 
 
TABLE 2—POST-COLD WAR INTERVENTIONS 
Panama   Bush I    1990 
Iraq (Persian Gulf War) Bush I    1990-1991 
Somalia    Bush I-Clinton  1993 
Haiti    Clinton    1994 
Bosnia (Phase II)  Clinton    1995 
Kosovo    Clinton    1999 
Afghanistan   Bush II   2001-2014 
Iraq Redux    Bush II   2003-2011 
Iraq (Troop Surge)*  Bush II   2007 
Afghanistan (Troop Surge)* Obama    2010 
Libya     Obama    2011 
*The decision-making for the “troop surges” in Iraq by Bush II and Afghanistan by 
Obama involved similar considerations as the original intervention decisions, although 
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there is a fundamental difference between initiating an intervention and expanding or 
contracting the operation. 
 
 If we consider a subcategory of “fail” apart from “go” and “no-go,” three of the listed 
cases would fit that designation: Cuba (Bay of Pigs), Iran I (Desert One), and Lebanon II. Table 
3 presents a subjective listing of non-interventions in the Cold War era. It is important to note 
that Berlin Crisis I (1949), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and Arab-Israeli War IV (1973) 
involved proactive actions akin to intervention short of the use of force and led to acceptable 
outcomes. These actions were the Berlin airlift, Cuban “quarantine,” and Soviet-American 
mutual deterrence and “shuttle diplomacy.” 
 
TABLE 3—COLD WAR ERA NON-INTERVENTIONS* 
Berlin Crisis I   Truman    1948-1949 
Vietnam    Eisenhower    1954 
Hungary    Eisenhower    1956 
Suez Crisis    Eisenhower    1956 
Berlin Crisis II  Kennedy   1961 
Cuban Missile Crisis   Kennedy    1962 
Czechoslovakia  Johnson   1968 
Arab-Israeli War IV  Nixon    1973 
Angola    Ford-Carter    1976-1978 
 
Table 4 presents a list of “no-go” decisions in the Post-Cold War period. As in the 
preceding era, the list of non-interventions could be expanded indefinitely, but the 
abovementioned events would seem to be the most prominent cases.  
 
TABLE 4—POST-COLD WAR NON-INTERVENTIONS 
Bosnia (Phase I)  Bush I-Clinton  1992-1993 
Rwanda   Clinton    1994 
Afghanistan (al-Qaeda) Clinton    1998 
Iran     Bush II    2004-2008 
North Korea    Bush II   2006 
Syria    Bush II   2006 
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Darfur (South Sudan)  Bush II   2007 
Georgia (South Ossetia War) Bush II   2008 
Syria*    Obama    2013 
*The case of Syria went from “no-go” to “go” and back to “no-go” for the Obama 
administration in September 2013.  
 
We selected the case studies in the preceding chapters on the basis of the following 
criteria: to have a “go” and “no-go” decisions from each of the three consecutive—Bush I, 
Clinton, and Bush II—in order to compare different decisions made by an administration and to 
compare decisions across administrations. The Persian Gulf War was selected because the 
intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait was the most traditional intervention of the post-
Cold War period and the largest U.S. military undertaking since the Vietnam War. The non-
intervention in Bosnia was significant because the successor administration decided differently. 
The non-intervention in Rwanda was important because it was colored by previous intervention 
experiences and influenced subsequent decisions. The intervention in Kosovo was notable in 
comparison to the previous decisions for Bosnia and in contrast to the case of Rwanda. Bush II’s 
Iraq decision making was selected for its obvious comparison with Bush I’s decision making in 
the Persian Gulf War. Lastly, Bush II’s policy toward Iran illustrates how the gap between 
capabilities and desire imposed realistic limitations on action.    
TABLE 5–SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
CASE   DECISION  FACTORS 
Persian Gulf War Go   I. International, IV. Military 
Bosnia   No-Go   III. Individual 
Rwanda  No-Go   I. International, III. Individual, IV. Military 
Kosovo  Go   I. International, III. Individual, IV. Military 
Iraq   Go   I. International, III. Individual 
Iran   No-Go   IV. Military 
 
Table 5 illustrates the selected case studies and prioritizes the variables that factored into 
the intervention or non-intervention. Each “go” decision entailed international or systemic 
factors (category I), while two of three “no-go” decisions involved individual or ideological 
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factors (category III) and two of three “no-go” decisions were influenced by military uncertainty 
(category IV). Two “go” decisions were facilitated by a realistically optimistic military strategy, 
whereas two of the three “no-go” cases (Bush I, Bosnia and Clinton, Rwanda) were determined 
by individual factors in which the commander-in-chief and his key aides saw little to gain and 
much to lose by intervening (category III). Importantly, no case of intervention was found to be 
driven by the force of public opinion, political constituencies, or domestic interest groups 
(category II). 
An anatomy of presidential decision making will emerge from a review of our focused, 
structured comparison by reviewing our four questions and four categories of factors.  
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), 
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act? 
 
Given the absence of a countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as 
the Soviet enemy in the Cold War period, there are potentially two types of military 
interventions: (1) humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other 
atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or other threats, regionally or globally, 
such as under the Bush doctrine. Note that Antizzo categorizes three types of interventions: 
active, reactive, and restorative/humanitarian.1014 The “go” decisions of the post-Cold War 
period, including the detailed case studies considered herein, all involved a U.S. leadership or 
hegemonic role, triggered by alliance pressure, coordinated response with IGO (i.e., NATO or 
UN) member states, or a policy paradigm, such as the Bush doctrine or War on Terrorism. The 
Persian Gulf War (Bush I) entailed the strangest of bedfellows, the Saudis and Israelis, as allies; 
Bosnia and Kosovo (Clinton) interventions and diplomatic efforts had been urged on by NATO 
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partners; and the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (Bush II) fit under the umbrella of the Bush doctrine 
and War on Terrorism. The interventions in Panama (Bush I) and Haiti (Clinton) did not 
represent international crises on the order of the Persian Gulf War, nor did they entail pressure 
from alliance partners or international organizations, such as the UN or NATO, but both cases 
were located in the backyard of the United States. Geography counts!  
Furthermore, to some extent, all intervention decisions involved a moral argument (at 
least, for propaganda or “spin”). Nonetheless, we distinguish between morality and legality; in 
the Panama scenario, the legality of invading and apprehending the titular head of government of 
a sovereign state was dubious—however odious that individual might be. Corruption was 
widespread during Manuel Noriega's rule, and he was able to use his power to imprison and 
sometimes kill any who opposed him. In 1987, a former officer of the Panamanian defense force 
publicly accused Noriega of cooperating with Colombian drug producers. The United States 
responded by imposing strict sanctions that took an extensive toll on the country. On December 
15, 1989, the Panamanian legislature declared Noriega president (he had previously ruled 
informally without such a title) and that the United States and Panama were in a state of war. 
Following the shooting of a U.S. Marine, President George Bush I ordered Operation Just Cause, 
December 20, 1989, an invasion consisting of more than 25,000 soldiers. The mission was 
controversial due to the resulting loss of hundreds of Panamanian lives and the subsequent 
damage to Panama City and El Chorillo. The military was quickly able to achieve its goals as 
Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990.1015 He was taken to the United States, tried, convicted, 
and jailed on drug trafficking charges and subsequently served a 40-year sentence in Miami.1016 
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The foremost outcome of the Panamanian adventure was demonstration of U.S. resolve to use 
force.1017 As a quintessential realist, it is doubtful that National Security Adviser Brent 
Scowcroft had much faith in the United States being able to install democracy and demolish the 
drug trade in Panama.1018 For President Bush I, the primary importance of Panama was 
diminishing, though not quite “kicking,” the Vietnam syndrome.1019  
In Haiti, a coup d’etat overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, September 1991. 
Subsequently, Aristide fled into exile and supporters of his party, Lavalas, were subjected to 
repression at the hands of the police and military.1020 The Clinton administration moved covertly 
and publicly against the military junta, October 4, 1993. U.S. task force commander and staff, 
numbering six people, secreted into Port-au-Prince and joined Special Forces “trainers” already 
there. Defense Secretary Les Aspin had delayed deployment of Psy Ops teams “on the ground.” 
Attachés (right-wing paramilitary militia) carried out small “probes,” while Haitian military junta 
leader, Joseph Raoul Cédras, called the dispatch of the USS Harlan County, under UN 
authorization, an “invasion.”1021 The warship attempted to dock in Port-au-Prince with U.S. 
Special Forces and Canadian troops onboard, November 11, 1993. Pro-junta operatives chanted: 
“Somalia! Dead American soldiers.” Unprepared for a hostile landing, the USS Harlan County 
withdrew.1022 Given long-term cooperation and short-term verbal support from the United States 
for the Haitian army, “Cedras found it impossible to believe that the U.S. would actually 
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invade.”1023 Diplomatically, the Clinton administration had “brokered” the failed Governors 
Island Agreement, July 1993. According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the 
agreement “floundered on the cynicism and brutality of the Haitian regime.”1024 National 
Security Adviser Anthony Lake advocated a “force-based strategy,” but Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili had “doubts.” Vice President Albert A. Gore, Jr. supported 
intervention on the basis of a moral argument, saying that returning Haitian refugees would be 
like “throwing crabs back into a barrel.”1025 The Clinton White House benefitted from successful 
diplomacy at the last minute, and the Haitian operation proceeded with a bloodless intervention. 
The case of Haiti involved no clear and present danger to the United States and was largely 
motivated by humanitarianism (refugees) and political concern for democracy in the region. 
Moreover, sending troops to Haiti in 1994 was reminiscent of U.S. interventionism under the 
Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine a hundred years ago.1026   
The non-intervention in Rwanda was a stillborn humanitarian operation that may or may 
not have prevented or minimized bloodshed if it had occurred. The most profound result of the 
“no-go” in Rwanda was that decision makers hence thought twice about hesitating in 
humanitarian crises to follow.  
The non-intervention in Iran was determined by a confluence of domestic and external 
factors that proscribed the Bush II administration from fully engaging the issue of Iranian nuclear 
weapons development as a threat to international stability. One could imagine few issues being 
so crucial, but Bush II was unable to act effectively due to declining support at home, decreased 
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prestige abroad, and overstretched military resources. Thus, the gap between capabilities and 
desire imposed realistic limitations on action. Once again, we are reminded of Lincoln’s dictum: 
one war at a time!1027 
The South Ossetia War could be characterized as a “near-miss” or “no-go” in the Bush II 
administration. Geography cuts both ways! Russian regional hegemony deterred overt 
deployment of U.S. forces in the South Ossetia-Georgia War. The Bush II White House accused 
Russia of “bullying and intimidation” and described the conflict as an “incursion by one of the 
world’s strongest powers to destroy the democratically elected government of a smaller 
neighbor.”1028 Bush II decided against military action to defend Georgia because it would 
inevitably lead to a confrontation with Russia and therefore limited U.S. interference to lending 
Georgia humanitarian aid.1029 Although the Cold War was no longer the operative context, 
Russia’s regional presence was sufficient to limit U.S. involvement in the South Ossetia-Georgia 
conflict. 
The case of Barack Obama’s approval of the Afghan troop surge is an example of the 
difference between initiating an intervention and modifying, indeed escalating, an ongoing 
operation. A premature withdrawal or perpetual stalemate would likely have contributed to 
further regional instability. Obama’s “go” decision for Libya in 2011 and “no-go” decision for 
Syria in 2013 derived from U.S. hegemonic leadership and continuing military presence in 
Western Asia (a.k.a. Middle East) since 2001. The positive outcome of the “lift and strike” and 
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“lead from behind” strategy in Libya proved cost-free in terms of U.S. casualties. The Libyan 
action became a model for the abortive “go” in Syria, September 9, 2013. This case emerged 
from the ongoing political instability in the Arab Middle East since the so-called “Arab Spring” 
of 2011. United States hegemonic leadership would compel action. Otherwise, U.S. credibility 
and President Obama’s competence would be called into question. Nevertheless, Obama initially 
resisted going into Syria for more than two years. Unspoken was the impediment of considerable 
Russian investment and property (including port facilities) in Syria. The humanitarian 
component came to the fore because of Bashir Assad’s regime reportedly using chemical 
weapons against unarmed civilians. The commander-in-chief then framed the need to respond in 
international terms: “I didn’t set a red line. The world set a red line.”1030 Hence, U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power explained that a limited strike (“no boots on the 
ground” became a mantra) “to degrade Assad’s capacity” to use chemical or biological weapons 
again. Failure to act would mean “our will to lead is compromised.” Ambassador Power invoked 
lessons of the past (i.e., Holocaust) and founding principles of the United Nations that dictated 
U.S. responsibility to stop such crimes against humanity. Power explained, since Russia would 
veto any UN Security Council action, the United States had to lead an ad-hoc coalition.1031 The 
Syrian case illustrated the tension between rivalry and cooperation with Russia. Hence, 
acknowledgment by the United States (Obama) that Russia (Putin) had a role to play, as well as 
allowing the Russians to protect their stake in Syria, gave the Obama administration “wiggle 
room.” (That is, if a “red line” could have wiggle room.) However, the bottom line was that 
Obama’s “go” decision in Syria ran aground on the rocks of unexpected domestic opposition and 
lack of international support, most crucially the British failure to back the plan. Regardless, an 
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intervention in Syria in 2013 could have been justified for reasons of hegemony, 
humanitarianism, and regional stability. As casualties mount and negotiations falter, the current 
presidential administration (or the next) might well be faced with a similar decision-making 
scenario in the near future. 
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have 
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage? 
 
“Since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, decisions on whether or not to intervene 
militarily have become, in many ways, more complex,” one scholar has observed. “Yet, 
paradoxically, it is easier for the U.S. to intervene.”1032 Thus, a consistent and truly predictive 
theory of presidential decision making in terms of military intervention eludes us.1033  Decision 
making is pushed or pulled to change direction by new perceptions and a convergence of 
contributing factors; i.e., no single factor is imperative. The protracted length of a crisis (such as 
Bosnia or Iraq) or recurrence in a troublesome region (Kosovo) seem to have been attractive for 
intervention. Military action appears more likely if it had occurred before and if troops were 
already in the region or nearby. Therefore, continuity and momentum are important keys.  
The Bush I administration’s intervention in the Persian Gulf War represented a reversal 
of the “tilt” toward Iraq, as illustrated by the Reagan administration’s Nimble Archer and 
Praying Mantis operations, 1987-1988. Nevertheless, a precedent of involvement had been 
established. Hence, Clinton followed continuity and momentum with four major retaliatory raids 
on Iraqi targets, 1993, 1996, and 1998, ultimately setting the stage for Bush II’s second Iraq War 
in 2003.  
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Somalia represented continuity, initiated as one of Bush I’s final acts and carried on by 
Clinton with generally agreed-upon unsatisfactory results. The operation went badly when the 
mission changed from humanitarian aid and rescue to an offensive operation (“Get Aideed!”). In 
the case of Somalia, beginning in August 1993, U.S. Army Rangers attempted to capture 
Mohammed Farah Aideed for attacking UN peacekeepers; Aideed eluded capture for months, set 
a trap for the U.S. peacekeepers, and ultimately killed eighteen troops in the well-known “Black 
Hawk Down” incident at Mogadishu (October 3-4, 1993).1034 
Rwanda was not on Bush I’s radar, but Clinton’s reluctance to intervene became a critical  
aspect of the story. The president himself believed his reputation had been damaged by the 
Mogadishu debacle and hence was resistant to the idea of going into Haiti or Rwanda. To avoid 
repeating one kind of mistake, Clinton made another, ineffectually standing by as thousands 
were slaughtered. Afterward, the Clinton administration reversed course and moved 
diplomatically and militarily in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  
Haiti was characterized by initial hesitation as a direct consequence of the failed 
operation in Somalia. Bush I had initially opted for a diplomatic track (circa 1993), whereas 
Clinton attempted a show of force (USS Harlan County), but pulled back in the face of 
orchestrated opposition. Clinton soon declared: “I’m never going to wimp out like I did in Haiti 
again.”1035 Hence, concerns for regional (hemispheric) stability, moral or humanitarian concern 
for refugees, and domestic political pressure combined to convince Clinton to intervene. 
Nevertheless, the macho factor persists in questions of the use of force. Bush I shed his “wimp” 
image with his actions in Panama and Kuwait.1036 Clinton was accused of employing a “Wag the 
Dog” strategy by a few conservative voices when he launched the tomahawk missile attacks in 
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Sudan and Afghanistan (August 1998) and air strikes against Iraqi targets (December 1998) 
allegedly in order to divert attention from his impeachment proceedings.1037 
Bosnia represented continuity from Bush I to Clinton, with both presidents preferring 
diplomacy and a European solution during what we refer to as Phase I (1992-1995), but changed 
course in the face of alliance pressure and humanitarian concerns. Initially, the Bush I 
administration did not consider the intra-state conflict in Bosnia to be a destabilizing 
international event, nor one that threatened U.S. alliance partners. Alliance pressure (through 
NATO and UN) and worldwide outcry over ethnic cleansing and atrocities approaching genocide 
prompted the Clinton White House’s reaction in Phase II. The U.S.-led NATO bombing raids 
and the negotiated Dayton peace accords exemplified Clinton’s successful diplomacy backed by 
force. 
Kosovo followed the perceived success of Bosnia, facilitated by continued presence in 
the former Yugoslavia, continuity of alliance and organizational obligations, and humanitarian 
concerns. In this case, momentum and continuity derived from success in Bosnia seem to have 
driven the Clinton White House, led by Madeline Albright, toward pro-active intervention in 
Kosovo. 
A more militant Clinton not only struck al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan (and 
Sudan), but also had the Pentagon draw up the Afghan war plan later implemented by Bush II. 
Two U.S. embassies were bombed in Kenya and Tanzania, August 7, 1998. Director of Central 
Intelligence George Tenet (who served as DCI from 1996 to 2004) informed the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, August 14, 1998. The decision made by Clinton was 
to hit targets in Afghanistan and Sudan with tomahawk missiles. The Congressional leadership 
(i.e., Newt Gingrich, Dick Gephardt, Trent Lott, and Tom Daschle) was briefed regarding the 
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strikes on al-Qaeda. One explanation for a higher level of consultation was because Clinton’s 
argument for retaliating against al-Qaeda was stronger than the reasons for the actions against 
Iraq in 1993 and 1996 due to the terroristic attack on property, loss of lives, and two “fatwahs” 
on the United States.1038 This action served as a precedent for Bush II’s 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan, establishing momentum from one administration to the next. 
Richard Haass, adviser for both the Bush I and Bush II administrations, contrasted the 
two wars against Iraq. Bush I’s Persian Gulf War was a “traditional war” to oppose aggression 
and restore equilibrium to the regional order. (See Chapter 2.) Bush II’s Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was a “radical” pre-emptive war designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government and 
invent a new democratic Iraq to serve as a model to transform the Arab Middle East. (See 
Chapter 6.) 
Continuity of policy constrained the Obama administration’s decision making in setting a 
terminal date for Iraqi operations (2009) and the Afghan troop surge (2010) and timetable for 
withdrawal (2014).1039 Conversely, momentum can operate in reverse as well, as witnessed by 
Obama’s “no-go” decisions for Iran and Syria, influenced by the specter of flawed if not quite 
failed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq under Bush II’s watch. (See Question #4 on lessons 
learned.) 
Bush II pursued a policy based on “two ticking clocks” in Iran: one counted down to an 
Iranian nuclear weapon; the other marked time for the strengthening of domestic opposition to 
the Iranian regime. Both clocks ticked away as Bush II’s attempts failed to engage Iran 
diplomatically while squeezing the regime with sanctions. The military option ruled itself out by 
the time Bush II passed the baton to Obama. On Iran, former CIA Director and Defense 
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Secretary Leon Panetta ominously prophesied: “They are not likely to give up nuclear 
enrichment … We will have to use military force.”1040 Therefore, the Obama administration had 
nothing to lose and everything to gain by opening up a dialogue with the Islamic Republic in 
2013. As Secretary of State John Kerry put it: “When you’re dealing with nuclear weapons, it’s 
not an issue of trust. Verification is the key.”1041 In the final analysis, the Iranian government 
perceives its nuclear development in the context of sovereign rights and security.1042 The United 
States and the United Nations can identify steps to be taken to resolve the nuclear issue, but the 
United States should not be solely responsible for resolving the crisis. As long as the Obama 
administration avoids the military option, the United States can continue a more constructive 
dialogue.  
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or 
management style) have a determinative effect? 
Are decisions determined by the leadership (or management) style of the commander-in-
chief, or mostly shaped by the self-motivated players participating in the decision-making 
process (i.e., what Condoleezza Rice called the “rarified staff”1043)? If the style and personality 
of the chief executive are the drivers, should we seek answers in personal ideology (e.g., 
“nontraditional” and “altruistic” goals;1044 “rhetoric of justice”;1045 and “legality” versus 
“morality”1046), generational experience (e.g., World War II and Vietnam War analogues in the 
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Persian Gulf War, as noted by Woodward1047), and reasoning by historical analogies,1048 or, as 
Greenstein1049 puts it, the President’s “vision of public policy” and “cognitive style”? To this we 
might add the environment and perception of threat as context for presidential decisions. Insider 
extraordinaire Condoleezza Rice has engaged the discussion: “Early in his administration, 
President Barack Obama would say that in the days after the attacks on New York and 
Washington, the Bush [II] administration ‘made decisions based on fear.’ Well, yes, we did, but 
not from irrational fear or paranoia.”1050 According to Greenstein, “the matter of who occupies 
the nation’s highest office can have profound repercussions.”1051 Greenstein further asserts: “the 
president’s latitude for independent action is even greater in the unstructured post-Cold War 
world than it was during the Cold War when the threat of mutual destruction concentrated minds 
and constrained actions.”1052 Therefore, the absence of “mutually assured destruction” as a 
constraint might explain the general trend toward increasingly frequent military intervention 
since the Cold War ended. However, each of the Oval Office’s occupants in the current era 
(Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama) have encountered the limitations of projected power. For 
example, Bush I cut off Desert Storm without continuing on to Baghdad; Clinton shied away 
from Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda in the aftermath of Somalia; Bush II lacked the wherewithal 
(though perhaps not the will) to intervene militarily against Iran; and Obama agonizingly labored 
over the decisions on Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.  
 Historical analogies invariably come into play, whether or not the lessons are applied 
rationally. Bill Clinton’s historical reference point in the Haitian crisis was Ronald Reagan’s 
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invasion of Grenada following his “cut and run” from Lebanon. Clinton wanted his people to 
give him a “win” after fumbling Somalia.1053 Clinton was “furious” and thought the NSC had put 
him in a “lose-lose” situation and decried the “lack of positive spin his White House was putting 
on events.” White House Chief of Staff George Stephanopoulis met with Lake and Sandy Berger 
after Clinton’s “tongue lashing.” Stephanopoulis was aghast: “Grenada? That’s how we should 
handle things? Like Reagan?”1054  
The management style unavoidably influences the quality of decision making. The 
collegial style of the Bush I decision makers supported a successful small-scale intervention in 
Panama and another successful intervention on a massive scale in the Persian Gulf War, whereby 
the institutional (Baker, Cheney), military (Powell, Schwarzkopf), and personal advisers 
(Scowcroft) all “owned” the decisions made by the President. The improvisational or ad-hoc 
approach of Clinton’s key players led to “messiness” and a chaotic process so that the decisions 
to act militarily or not were reversed in the cases of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. The “no-go” 
decision in Rwanda, to some extent, was the result of the fact that middle managers such as 
Prudence Bushnell and Susan Rice lacked direct access to the Secretary of State and President, 
and the Canadian field commander, Romeo Dallaire, stood outside the normal chain of command 
and communication. The “go” decision in Kosovo was affected by change of personnel, as 
cautious Warren Christopher was replaced by Madeline Albright, an outspoken advocate of the 
“indispensable nation.” The influence of prominent advisers permeated the Clinton ad-hocracy, 
where the Secretaries of State Christopher and Albright and National Security Advisers Lake and 
Berger strongly influenced the President’s thinking. 
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The Bush II administration was dominated by strong-willed politicos—Cheney, 
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and Perle—with a coherent agenda and a penchant for “office 
politics.” Important players, including Powell, Rice, O’Neill, and others carried out policies with 
which they had serious reservations and suffered in the midst of a conflict-ridden environment. 
Whereas, early on, the Vice President emerged as a dominant personality, Cheney was later 
superseded by Condi Rice. Yet, throughout the Bush II years, decisions were made privately, 
behind the scenes, and rubber-stamped at formal meetings. This practice led to narrow input and 
flawed decisions. 
Paradoxically, the very different profiles of the Clinton administration, dominated by the 
chief executive’s personality, and the Bush II administration, where the boss was often 
overshadowed by some of his own key players, yielded outcomes heavily influenced by the 
President’s team. 
In the case of Rwanda, more than one key player, including the Secretary of State and the 
ambassador in country, seem to have been blinded by their policy preference for a political 
settlement and a belief that the situation was no worse than normal for an African civil war, 
while those in a position to see how drastic the Rwanda case would become, such as Prudence 
Bushnell, operated in the shadows of the policy-making structure, without access to, or influence 
on, the POTUS. Just as an intervention in Haiti, like Rwanda, was initially feared as a potential 
reprise of the Mogadishu disaster (circa 1993), the later “go” decision on Haiti (circa 1994) was 
heavily influenced by remorse over not acting in Rwanda. 
Iraq redux was the result of a policy process that was a backformation, whereby the 
decision was predetermined in search of an acceptable rationale.  As has been well documented, 
key figures, including Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, among others, had Iraq in their crosshairs a 
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matter of days after 9/11 and sought justification for their preferred course in any intelligence 
that suited their predetermined narrative. They saw decapitating Saddam’s regime as a perfect fit 
for their “long war” on terrorism. 
On the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, initiated by Bush II and inherited by Obama, the 
crossover player was Robert Gates. The Defense Secretary considered Bush II “a mature leader 
who had walked a supremely difficult path,” and called Obama “the most deliberative president I 
worked for.” Gates was critical of Bush II’s adversarial attitude toward traditional allies that 
were skeptical of the Iraqi venture, such as Germany and France, and lamented that Obama had 
no “passion” for the Iraqi and Afghan wars.1055 The other transitional figure was David Petreaus, 
even though his tenure as CIA chief was aborted by personal scandal. Anomalously, Obama 
initially relied on a National Security Adviser with a military background, Jim Jones, a retired 
Marine Corps General. Jones was succeeded by a Beltway insider, Thomas E. Donillon, who had 
“no credibility with the military” and no rapport with NSC staff.1056 Therefore, not until Susan 
Rice became National Security Adviser in June 2013 would the job be filled by someone with a 
strong personal or political relationship with the POTUS, which should be a prerequisite for that 
most sensitive position.1057   
Momentum from the success of the “lead from behind” strategy in Libya was countered 
by Obama’s aversion to over-commitment in the manner of Bush II. Thus did Obama deploy 
naval and air forces against Khaddafi’s regime instead of ground combat troops. The views and 
influence of key players—Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, Bob 
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Gates, Leon Panetta, Admiral Mullin, and General Petreaus would be fruitful ground for further 
study. Hence, a similar approach was proposed in the case of Syria—military offshoring with 
limited objectives (i.e., punishment of Assad for use of chemical weapons and the eventual 
ouster of Assad, or “slow motion” regime change). 
On the question of Iran, if there had been a division between hawks and doves in Bush II, 
an array of factors reinforced the latter, most prominently the rise of Condoleezza Rice’s 
influence versus the decline of Cheney’s. Subsequently, an inclination toward personal 
diplomacy and summitry was evident in Barack Obama’s enlisting of Putin’s intercession in the 
case of Syria and reaching out telephonically to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in 2013 to 
open discussions. A great investment of moral suasion on the part of Obama or Kerry in conflict 
resolution on Syria, Iran, or, more recently, Ukraine, would inevitably exact a high cost in 
personal credibility and run the risk of floundering under the riptides of domestic politics.  
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or 
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an 
administration and from one presidency to the next?  
 
“The highly personalized nature of the modern presidency makes the strengths and 
weaknesses of the White House incumbent of the utmost importance,” as Greenstein puts it. 
More specifically, he posits, “presidents who steep themselves in the record of their predecessors 
will be better equipped for their responsibilities if they are able to do so. Members of the public 
are likely to make wiser electoral choices if they are able to place presidential contenders in a 
historical context.”1058  
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The cumulative effects of interventions are apparent in Panama serving as a test case for 
the Persian Gulf War for Bush I. Unlike Panama and the first Iraq War, Bush I saw no vital 
interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia, but agreed to join a multilateral humanitarian 
operation in Somalia. The dramatic events in Rwanda followed a parallel timeline as the political 
crises in Somalia and Haiti.1059 For Clinton, a bad outcome in Somalia poisoned the well in the 
cases of Haiti and Rwanda, leading to an aversion to involvement, until each of those crises 
continued and worsened.  Henceforth, Rwanda suffered from bad karma due to Haiti and 
Somalia.1060 The failure of the non-intervention in Rwanda prompted the Clinton White House to 
move on Haiti, with a more than credible threat of force in the form of a massive invasion flotilla 
that entered the country peacefully after a negotiated settlement.1061 Hence, the Clinton 
administration demonstrated its hesitance after Somalia and the emptiness of its resolve to 
intervene. Not without irony is the fact of the U.S. intervention in Haiti by way of a diplomatic 
initiative and bloodless invasion in September 1994, following the seeming “mistake” of non-
intervention in Rwanda. The “win” in Haiti made a change of course in Bosnia (Phase II) in 
1994-1995 seem less out of the question. The fruitful sanctions, military action, and negotiation 
in the Bosnian conflict cleared the pathway for a more resolute determination to make a 
commitment to Kosovo by 1999, even as that commitment ruled out “boots on the ground.”  
Bush II’s comparatively easy toppling of the Taliban regime and casting its al-Qaeda 
allies into disarray in Afghanistan, 2001, provided a promising precursor for the Iraq War, 
launched in 2003. The expected trajectory of Iraq redux was reasonably assumed to reprise the 
experience of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-1991. Notwithstanding the order of 
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magnitude greater difficulty of regime change and besieging Baghdad, the active combat of the 
second war was expected to take merely three weeks, just as the first war had.1062 Subsequently, 
the prolonged insurgency, difficult nation-building, and accumulating numbers of casualties 
overwhelmed the initial popularity of both the Bush II presidency and its wars, in the end 
scuttling hypothetical plans for military action against Iran, North Korea, Syria, or anywhere 
else. The cumulative effect of Bush II’s preceding interventions defined a clear set of limitations 
for the administration. In addition to intervention fatigue and tolerance for casualties, U.S. 
military resources were overstretched by 2006-2008. As Condoleezza Rice stated most 
succinctly: “It was well understood that we didn’t have the bandwidth for unilateral 
confrontation with Iran and North Korea, given the situation in Iraq.”1063 
  
I. International, systemic, or structural factors: 
 
The Persian Gulf War of 1991-1992, as a prototypical case, was precipitated by an action 
most readily defined as a destabilizing event in the international system, at least regionally, 
threatening the equilibrium of order and power. Additionally, Desert Storm was the most 
traditional and conventional war for control of territory of the post-Cold War era; other military 
operations in which the United States had engaged would be classified as wars of attrition, 
counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping.    
The origin of the war in Afghanistan, 2001, traced back to Osama bin Laden’s formation 
of al-Qaeda (translated as the base in Arabic) in 1990.1064 Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan 
in 1994, capitalizing on the mujahideen’s factional conflicts after defeating the Soviets and a 
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pro-communist Afghan regime.1065 The systemic objectives of the United States in Afghanistan 
were twofold: to root out a terrorist enemy and overthrow a rouge state’s regime. However, Bush 
II’s identification of a “new kind of enemy” in a “different kind of war” was contradicted by the 
deployment of conventional combat forces and what could be described as a minimalist 
approach. As historian Terry Anderson points out, “To catch bin Laden at Tora Bora, therefore, 
General [Tommy] Franks sent only about 40 Special Operations troops and a dozen Special 
Forces soldiers by early December, aided by about 110 CIA officers.,” followed by 4,000 
Marines for a total of “less than 5,000 ground troops.”1066 Given the Afghan population of 26 
million, Anderson notes, fewer troops were sent to Tora Bora than the number of police officers 
on the force in a major U.S. city.1067 
The Bush II administration’s second Iraq War, launched in 2003, was conceived as a 
repeat of the Persian Gulf War and a sequel to the Afghan campaign still underway. Operation 
Iraqi Freedom was advertised to the world community and U.S. public as vital to international 
stability—alluding to Saddam Hussein’s noncompliance with twelve years of UN directives and 
intransigence in the face of international sanctions plus the twin perils of WMDs and state 
complicity with Islamist terrorists. The assumption that pressure or support from allies should act 
as a crucial factor in military intervention decisions would be disproved by the case of Iraq 
redux, as the United States went ahead despite the unexpected and unfavorable reaction of 
alliance partners, such as Germany, France, and Canada, which had supported the Afghan 
campaign.    
Also noteworthy during Bush II’s tenure were the limited humanitarian mission in the 
South Ossetia-Georgia conflict and positive diplomatic pressure, including acknowledgement of 
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“genocide,” in the Darfur-Sudan scenario, leading to the independence of South Sudan. In these 
two cases, the Bush II team was either constrained from more overt military action, or simply 
avoided the perception of crisis that pervaded their decision making regarding Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Iran. Perhaps acting in scenarios that did not present a direct threat to U.S. interests could 
produce more favorable and less costly outcomes. 
II. National, domestic, or internal political: 
 
At the national or domestic political level, in each of our case studies, we tried to weigh 
the scope and quality of information available to decision makers,1068 the role of institutional 
players (for example, perceived pressure from Congress)1069 and bureaucratic politics,1070 as well 
as the impact of public opinion, interest groups, and other constituencies.1071 
How much did institutions factor into their decisions after 9/11? Unilateralism and 
interventionism may go hand in hand with executive decision making without recourse to 
Congress and the legal mechanism of the War Powers Resolution.1072 To illustrate, members of 
Congress may at one point in time be calling for intervention in a particular case, but later may 
join the chorus of opposition. Therefore, while the institution of Congress tries to exercise 
influence over the chief executive, the legislative branch probably acts mainly as a loose or 
intermittent brake rather than a significant or truly influential player. When the House and Senate 
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take a vote on a president’s military initiative, it might be close, but there has never been a vote 
to halt an ongoing operation. A no vote on Obama’s planned action in Syria would have been 
unprecedented, despite the opposition of a collection of liberal and conservative doves.1073  
Bureaucratic politics could also subvert effective policy if different governmental players 
act at cross purposes. In the case of Haiti, for example, President Clinton had negotiated a deal at 
Governors Island (July 3, 1993), but he would not act to enforce the agreement.1074 Meanwhile, 
the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency had organized and trained 
militias (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti, FRAPH) to attack Aristide supporters 
as well as engaging in drug trafficking and other illegal activities in support of the Armed Forces 
of Haiti (FADH).1075 This subverted Clinton’s policy toward Haiti, not only by enabling the 
junta’s foot soldiers, but also by subtly implying that the U.S. administration’s public opposition 
to the regime masked support behind the scenes.  
The so-called “CNN effect” played a crucial role in the way the Bosnian drama played 
out.1076 According to the CNN effect: the news media set the agenda; impede achieving policy 
goals; and accelerate decision making. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the worldwide media 
framed the issue as genocide, a moral imperative.1077 Although the idea that media had driven 
foreign policy in cases such as Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo had been exaggerated,1078 
worldwide news coverage might have a significant effect.1079 Hanson has determined that the 
global media largely respond to issues raised by other actors rather than setting the agenda for 
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the public.1080 Moreover, Strobel has contended that policy makers are unlikely to be dissuaded 
by alternative courses proposed in the media.1081   
The weight of public opinion varies between short-term and long-term effects. In the first 
Iraq war, Bush I kept his finger on the country’s pulse, making sure the people were with him. 
As the venture against Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was quickly victorious, the public’s support 
remained high. Conversely, in the second Iraq war, initial support waned and ultimately cast a 
shadow over the Bush II’s administration as the conflict wore on for eight years. The rally effect 
also revealed itself in more than one case. Clinton’s intervention in Kosovo should be instructive 
as public opinion opposed sending American troops into the former Yugoslavia by a slight 
margin when it was a hypothetical possibility, but, within a matter of days, when the decision to 
do so became a reality, the scales were tipped in support of intervening (see Chapter 5).1082  
Perhaps, the cumulative effects of intervention fatigue contributed to the Obama 
administration’s “no-go” in Syria following action in Libya two years earlier. A Pew survey 
found only 27% of the public believed the United States had a responsibility to do something 
about the fighting in Libya in March 2011 with 63% disagreeing. In the same survey, while 51% 
supported increasing sanctions against Libya, only 16% supported bombing raids and 13% 
supported sending troops.1083 A majority of those opposed to intervening in Libya stated the 
reason was that U.S. armed forces were already overcommitted.1084 This shift in opinion is 
clearly a long-term trend. A Quinnipiac survey showed disapproval of Obama’s foreign policy, 
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52% to 40%. Majorities of 61% percent said that involvement in Syria was not in U.S. national 
interest and 59% opposed aiding Syrian rebels.1085 A recent USA Today/Pew Institute poll 
showed a majority (52%) thought the United States failed to achieve its goals in Iraq. By 
contrast, 56% said the United States had largely succeeded when most troops were pulled out in 
November 2011. On Afghanistan, 52% of Americans believed the United States had mostly 
failed to achieve its goals. A majority considered the war in Afghanistan successful, according to 
a similar survey in 2011.1086 In general, public support for military intervention has shown a 
steep decline since 9/11, if not throughout the entire post-Cold War period, precisely because of 
the increased frequency of these wars.  
Tolerance for casualties is unquestionably a factor, but a difficult one to quantify. For 
example, the Persian Gulf War’s toll of 150 killed in action was considered minimal, whereas 18 
Army Rangers lost at Mogadishu was received as a large number. Over time, the impact of 
casualties could become decisive, as the Bush II administration well understood, barring media 
coverage of caskets bearing Afghanistan and Iraq war dead deplaning at Dover Air Force Base. 
Our case studies did not reveal decisive influence by domestic constituencies, such as the 
Israel lobby pushing intervention against Iraq and Iran, the Congressional Black Caucus calling 
for intervention in Haiti and Rwanda, or conservative PACs and think tanks promoting a 
militarized idealistic agenda in the Middle East. Each of those interest groups made their 
opinions known, but none of them carried sufficient weight to drive policies or decisions of a 
Democratic or Republican White House.     
III. Individual, personal, and ideological factors: 
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Greenstein has posited that presidential job performance derives from six qualities: (1) 
public communication; (2) organizational capacity; (3) political skill; (4) vision of public policy; 
(5) cognitive style; and (6) emotional intelligence.1087  While Clinton excelled in knowing how to 
use Teddy Roosevelt’s “bully pulpit,” Bush I and Bush II were decidedly weak communicators. 
Bush I and Clinton were open to vigorous debate within the decision-making circle, but their 
approaches were worlds apart. However, Bush I’s formal organization and Clinton’s chaotic ad-
hocracy both produced favorable outcomes in the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo, respectively. 
Clinton was the most skilled politico of the three presidential personalities studied in our selected 
cases. Whereas Bush I lacked “the vision thing,” mirroring the pragmatic realism of his top 
aides, Baker and Skowcroft, Bush II’s policy-making was infused with his neoconservative 
idealism, just as Clinton’s liberal idealism underscored his policies. Greenstein proposed that 
Clinton possessed considerable capacity to synthesize information, but lacked emotional 
intelligence.1088 Thus, according to Greenstein, Clinton took actions that were rationalizations 
rather than thoughtfully reasoned decisions. 
Foreign policy decision makers are susceptible to “reasoning by historical analogies.”1089 
Vietnam War and World War II analogies pervaded Persian Gulf War decision making.1090 The 
president, a former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, was “optimistic,” but uncertain about the 
prospects for decisiveness from the UN Security Council, where a Cold War “stalemate” 
persisted for years.1091 “We should not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of World War 
II,” stated former naval aviator Bush, which he understood to mean “appeasement of 
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aggression.”1092 Top decision makers in the Bush I administration used a “story model” mode of 
problem representation in “armed humanitarian intervention” in Bosnia, according to 
Peterson.1093 The conventional wisdom is that the former Yugoslavia splintered because of age-
old ethnic rivalries, after the long reign of Tito. Thus, they missed the impact of Slobodan 
Milosevic’s quest to consolidate his power by exploiting the force of Serbian nationalism. Brent 
Scowcroft, the President’s alter ego in foreign policy, practiced “conservative realism” in 
diplomacy, but his conservatism was less ideological than it was simply cautious.1094 Scowcroft 
quoted John Quincy Adams: “We are the well-wishers of all who seek freedom. We are the 
guarantors only of our own.”1095  
In the case of Rwanda, the Clinton administration was loathe to speak the word 
genocide.1096 Clinton’s inaction fit Janis and Mann’s concept of unconflicted inertia leading to 
defensive avoidance.1097 Romeo Dallaire claimed that “moral relativism” pervaded the Clinton 
administration’s thinking. “Risk-free warfare” was humanitarian aid and rescue, not 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement, and stressed avoidance of “mission creep” in Rwanda. In 
Kosovo, however, Clinton was not initially inclined to intervene directly with ground or combat 
forces. Advisers Lake and Berger were similarly dovish. Secretary of State Albright and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shalikashvili saw the issue through the lens of culture, formative 
experiences, and ideology owing to their family, personal, and ethno-cultural histories. In league 
with General Wesley Clark, they pushed Clinton in a more active direction, toward direct 
intervention. Their motivations were humanitarian and out of concern for political stability.  
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Mann has analyzed that the decision to invade Iraq derived from the ideology and 
worldview of the key Bush II foreign policy mavens, known as the Vulcans. The Bush II foreign 
policy makers envisioned something of a new world order well before 9/11 as a function of the 
new post-Cold War reality.1098 Unquestionably, the Bush II White House envisioned a “new” 
Arab-Muslim Middle East.1099 This vision resulted from “America’s historic missionary zeal to 
‘enlighten’ other societies,” in short, “exceptionalism.”1100 Unfortunately, Bush II’s crusade 
mentality invited acquiescence, if not instigation, of actions at variance with liberal democratic 
values.1101  
The chief executive, George W. Bush, set the tone for U.S. policy toward Iran in his 
“Axis of Evil” conceptualization. Bush II proceeded on the assumption that the Ayatollah and 
mullahs could be toppled in Tehran. His two objectives for Iran—halting nuclear weapons 
development and strengthening internal democratic forces—failed. A credible threat of force was 
ultimately not an option, as the cumulative effect of Bush II’s preceding interventions defined a 
clear set of limitations for the administration.  
IV.  Criteria for the use of force: 
 
Antizzo categorizes three types of direct military interventions—active, reactive, and 
restorative (peacekeeping/humanitrian).1102 However, Antizzo’s conceptualization distinguishes 
conditional circumstances in the first two types and a policy distinction in the third case. This 
distinction would appear to be a logical inconsistency, insofar as peacekeeping or humanitarian 
operations may be called either active (for example, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti) or reactive (for 
example, Somalia, Rwanda, or Syria). Therefore, our typology differentiates two broad 
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categories: humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities, 
including peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or 
other threats, which might also be called “wars of choice.” Either type of military intervention 
could be fought as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, war of attrition, air and naval strikes 
(offshoring or virtual war), or conventional territorial combat. Thus, the two Iraq wars, 
Afghanistan, and the non-intervention against Iran fall under these categories as well as the 
regional “teacup wars” in Panama and Haiti. Regardless of the tactics employed, pre-emptive 
interventions implicitly derive from U.S. hegemony.    
#1 – Have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or negotiation? 
United States intervention in the Persian Gulf War might be the sole case study where the 
criteria of the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine were fully engaged: diplomacy; clear-cut political 
objectives; sufficient resources, money, and personnel; doable strategy and tactics; and an 
activated exit plan.   
In the case of Haiti, the Carter-Powell-Nunn diplomatic mission was not only successful, 
but also “reassuring” to Latin American nations in contrast to overt “gunboat diplomacy.”1103 
Negotiations were drawn out in the case of Bosnia through phase I (Bush I’s non-intervention) 
and phase II (Clinton’s turnabout). In the end, Clinton brokered a settlement after NATO air 
strikes forced the Yugoslav-Serb regime to come to the table. This favorable outcome smoothed 
the path for a brokered peace in Kosovo, where the opinion of Ignatieff, Keegan, and Halberstam 
was that Russia’s de facto alliance with NATO, withdrawal of support for Milosevic’s regime, 
and collaboration with NATO peacekeepers comprised the “game changer.” (See Chapter 5.) 
Bush II’s interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq followed the barest minimum of diplomacy, if 
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ultimata could be called diplomacy—demanding that Taliban leader Mullah Omar surrender 
Osama bin Laden and convincing the UN to give Saddam Hussein “a final opportunity to comply 
with its disarmament obligations” and to renew weapons inspections.1104 Indeed, Bush II did not 
even wait for the inspections and cast doubt on the efficacy of the UN inspectors.  
#2 – Are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood?  
  Colin Powell reflected the military’s institutional memory of Vietnam—a limited war 
spelled disaster.1105 Powell further recalled the ill-defined objectives in the Lebanon 
peacekeeping mission that climaxed in more than two hundred “shattered bodies” of U.S. 
Marines in 1983 whenever he heard the “well meaning” urgings to intervene in such bloody 
scenarios.1106  
 In the cases of Somalia and Rwanda, the desired political outcomes were poorly 
understood, as was the situation in Bosnia for Bush I as well as for Clinton until the genocidal 
“ethnic cleansing” became compelling. Hence, in Bosnia and later Kosovo, stopping the fighting 
meant stopping the slaughter of innocents. In both instances, NATO intervention, led by 
Washington, ended the civil warfare.  
The most profound miscalculation of the Bush II administration in Iraq was not their 
failure to predict the insurgency—because the architects of the War on Terrorism conspicuously 
invited it. Bush II’s war hawks should have expected infiltration, based on intelligence about 
Iraqi links to Islamist militants, even if they exaggerated the threat to “hype” or “sell” the war. 
Rather, the Bush II team failed to anticipate that the media and public would see the infiltration 
of Fedayeen (Ba’ath guerrillas), foreign militants affiliated with al-Qaeda, and Iranian-backed 
Shi’ia and other Islamists as evidence of a “hopeless and unwinnable” quagmire like Vietnam. 
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Perhaps Bush II erred by prematurely shifting the focus of the War on Terrorism from 
Afghanistan before the Karzai government had sufficiently stabilized the country, not to mention 
the spillover of the Taliban’s guerrilla war into neighboring Pakistan. The 9/11 Commission 
stated, “the global conflict against Islamist terrorism became a different kind of struggle. The 
apparently successful model of Afghanistan, where the CIA employed intelligence, covert 
capabilities, and cash while the U.S. military supplied firepower and logistics against a 
counterinsurgency, was applied to Iraq” with deleterious effects.1107  
#3 – Is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively maintained?  
According to Van Evera, in the post-Cold War era, the most prominent condition that 
increases the risk of interstate war is false optimism with respect to the outcome.1108 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 would have satisfied none of 
the criteria of the Powell Doctrine. Von Hippel identified three critical issues pertinent to Bosnia 
in the early 1990s: first, military intervention and use of force; second, peace support operations; 
and third, nation-building.1109 If any one of these factors were to fail, the mission would fail. 
Additionally, Von Hippel suggests that inconsistent policy precedes intervention.1110 Under Bush 
I, the United States initially supported Yugoslavia remaining intact, but, when all but two of the 
constituent republics acted (or made noises) toward independence, some of the European allies 
backed them, prompting the United States to follow suit.  
Had the Clinton administration decided to intervene in Rwanda, how could the United 
States have effectively done so? An effective strategy would have emphasized nation-building 
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and economic development, not only “fire-power intensive strategies.”1111 An African task force 
investigating the Rwandan debacle found that the genocide could have been prevented, or, at 
least, significantly curtailed.1112 The United States rejected the UN field commander’s “peace 
enforcing” proposal as “unworkable.” The Clinton White House touted an alternative “outside-
in” plan to create “protected routes” for refugees on Rwanda’s borders without use of air cover. 
The problem with the plan, backed by Tony Lake and Dick Clarke, was that most refugees were 
not fleeing to the borders, but were trapped or hidden inside Rwanda. Clarke insisted the U.S. 
plan was “feasible, doable … in the short term,” but it was not, insofar as refugee camps 
remained vulnerable to attack, even after the Rwandan genocide and civil war were considered 
over.1113 
According to Martel, NATO’s credible threat of combat troops on the ground after the 
protracted bombing campaign led to victory in Kosovo.1114 Yet history does not repeat itself, as 
generals and civilian policy-makers continue to fight the last war! The NATO Commander in 
Libya (2011), Canadian General Charles Bouchard, observed that each scenario is unique: 
“Doctrine wasn’t written for Libya. It was written for Kosovo … You can’t try to adapt Libya to 
these other theatres. You have to adapt.”1115  
In the case of Iraq redux, “shock and awe,” the post-modern reincarnation of blitzkrieg, 
aims at demolishing the enemy’s morale as much as its infrastructure. The variant directed by 
Tommy Franks missed both targets. “I had decided to leave Iraq’s electric power grid 
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untouched,”1116 said Franks. In contrast to the top-to-bottom dismantling of the Iraqi 
government, military, and police under Saddam Hussein, this would seem equivalent to leaving 
the lights on to illuminate an empty house.  
In the hypothetical case of Iran, a one-dimensional strategy of precision air strikes against 
Iran’s nuclear development program held limited promise. Even if the air strikes destroyed Iran’s 
uranium-enrichment and weaponization capacity, they could be reconstituted elsewhere and 
would do little to change the regime’s behavior. As George W. Bush himself acknowledged, “a 
foreign military intervention would stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against 
us.”1117 All of the military interventions of the post-Cold War era, with the possible exception of 
the Persian Gulf War, targeted small, weak countries. Iran presented a considerably more 
formidable enemy. Therefore, Iran’s capacity to withstand an assault and counterattack must 
have been a factor in any hypothetical war planning. 
#4—Are there sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with  
“overwhelming” force? 
 
Bush I’s Panamanian intervention was one of the few “short but victorious” interventions 
since Vietnam. Operation Just Cause was based on a new concept for the U.S. military: a single 
commander using overwhelming force comprising conventional and special operations to full 
capabilities and in total secrecy (insofar as possible with a free press and media). At the outset, 
Colin Powell’s criteria would seem to have been met, but despite some complicating events (one 
U.S. Marine killed, another wounded), the first “completely integrated” military strategy for the 
U.S. turned out to be an “almost perfect operation.”1118  
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 In Bosnia, Clinton originally continued Bush I’s policy, which was based on the criterion 
that the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia was a European problem. In subsequent years, the 
Clinton administration, led by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and United Nations 
Ambassador Madeleine Albright, argued that the United States should lift the UN arms embargo 
and initiate air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff at the time, dismissed the “lift and strike” option, whereas Britain and France argued that 
their peacekeeping troops on the ground would be targets of Serb retaliation.1119 (“We do deserts, 
not mountains,” Powell allegedly said.1120) Thereafter, variants of “lift and strike” have been 
employed in Kosovo, Libya, and were proposed for Syria.    
 In Rwanda, Option 1 was immediately reinforcing the peacekeepers (UNAMIR), beefing 
up its manpower to 5,000 troops. Option 2 was downsizing the international force from 1,500 to 
170 and trying to broker a ceasefire. Option 3 was total withdrawal.1121 UNAMIR Commander 
Romeo Dallaire’s plan called for an added 5,000 combat troops to secure the capital, then “fan 
out” to protect tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons, and “create safe havens” for 
them. Only the United States had the capability to bring the air power and logistics called for by 
this plan. At the White House, Richard Clarke and Anthony Lake rejected Dallaire’s “inside-out” 
plan as unworkable.  
By contrast, General Wesley Clark points out that NATO deployed 60,000 troops in 
Bosnia for a population of four million and 40,000 troops in Kosovo with a population of two 
million.1122 After six years of Balkan crisis management, Clinton sent in air power against Serbia 
and was ready, despite his oft stated reluctance, to follow up with a ground invasion of Kosovo, 
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but he did not.1123 Serb-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic believed the threat of U.S. 
combat troops was real. This outcome demonstrated that a credible threat of force could be as 
effective as the real thing. 
Bush II conducted the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as two steps in a worldwide War on 
Terrorism by utilizing conventional military forces with the comprehensive objective of regime 
change, pacifying the country, and rebuilding it as a model for the future. Counterterrorism 
expert Kilcullen questioned the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theory to modern 
conflict, arguing that the strategy for the War on Terrorism should be best understood as a 
“global Islamic insurgency,” initiated by a diffuse group of Islamists with conflicting goals.1124 
The absence of such a culturally specific political track illustrated one of the major shortcomings 
of Bush II’s handling of Iraq redux: the wrong strategy in the wrong war at the wrong place. 
The war plan for Iran, TIRANNT, called for a land invasion by Marines, targeting the 
Iranian missile force, and a global strike plan against Iranian weapons of mass destruction. In 
June 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld alerted the Strategic Command to be prepared to 
implement CONPLAN 8022. The Pentagon task force considered global strikes against Iranian 
targets in Iran, “where the president’s only option might be a nuclear one.”1125 Wisely, Bush II 
chose not to do so.  
#5—Is there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel once 
the mission’s goals have been achieved? 
 
 In the Persian Gulf War, the last criterion was satisfied by Bush I, but has often been 
criticized for leaving Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq as what some critics saw as “unfinished 
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business.” Panama had been Bush I’s test run, apparently short and sweet. Somalia had ended in 
an embarrassing withdrawal. On the eve of the invasion of Haiti, presuming that the big-name 
peace mission would fail, Clinton met with key advisers to ask: What happens after U.S. troops 
enter and overthrow regime? Would there be “substantial resistance” by “small groups of people 
lightly armed”? How do we prepare for occupation? What would be the “rules of engagement” 
(ROE)—“military imperatives” versus “domestic police work”?1126 The “immaculate invasion” 
rendered these considerations moot. Unfortunately, such scrutiny was absent in 2003 in Iraq. 
United States troops participated in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia, starting in 1995. In 
response to pressure from members of Congress, President Bill Clinton announced U.S. forces 
would be there for only a year, but those troops were still in place during the 2000 presidential 
campaign, overlapping the Kosovo campaign.1127  
Because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had dragged on too long, U.S. intervention in 
Iran by ground troops was a nonstarter by 2007. Apart from limited Special Operations, the 
United States did not have the ground force numbers to invade and occupy Iran. As a result, the 
only feasible operation would be the limited use of air and naval forces.1128 In the eighth year of 
the War on Terrorism and Bush doctrine, the Bush II administration had no exit strategy in place 
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan when it turned over power to the Obama administration. No 
timetable for withdrawal was set in either case till after Bush II’s troop surge in Iraq (2007-2008) 
and Obama’s uptick in Afghanistan (2011). Never overlook the obvious: U.S. military 
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intervention has been hard-pressed to establish exit strategies and end-points. To paraphrase the 
theme of a play by Sartre, there is “no exit” from hell.1129  
CONCLUSION 
 
The Strategic Landpower Task Force white paper, titled Strategic Landpower: Winning 
the Clash of Wills, proposes that warfare begins and ends in the “human domain.” Thus, “armed 
conflict is a clash of interests between or among organized groups, each attempting to impose 
their will on the opposition. In essence it is a fundamentally human endeavor in which the 
conflict is determined by both parties.”1130  
We can categorize two types of interventions: (1) humanitarian aid and rescue, 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement; and (2) pre-emptive reaction, strategic, and hegemonic 
(regional or global). The predominance of alliance influences, continuity of policy, momentum, 
and lessons learned from prior interventions (categories I and III), weakly tempered by domestic 
factors (category II), influenced “go” and “no-go” decisions, while the criteria for the use of 
force were rarely applied, as plans of attack followed rather than led decision making. 
Presidential administrations tended to decide what they would do before figuring out how they 
would do it. No single factor dominated the decisions taken in our case studies. Moreover, as 
comparison of Bush II’s Iraq and Iran policies illustrated, even similar imperatives could lead to 
different outcomes. Decisions to intervene militarily, including what turned out to be “no-go” 
decisions, have been “perfect storm” scenarios, whereby a confluence of variables led to the 
outcome and no single factor was determinative. 
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All intervention decisions of the post-Cold War era involved a moral argument, at least in 
part, to sell the decision to the public.1131 Whereas ideological blinders and perceived policy 
imperatives accompanied the Iraq redux intervention, the gap between capabilities and desire 
imposed realistic limitations on action for not only Bush II on Iran, but for the Obama White 
House on Syria. Decision making is pushed or pulled to change direction by new perceptions and 
a convergence of contributing factors (i.e., no single factor is imperative). The protracted length 
of a crisis (such as Bosnia or Iraq) or recurrence in a troublesome region (Kosovo) seem to have 
been attractive for intervention. Military action appears more likely if it had occurred before and 
if troops were already in the region or nearby. Therefore, continuity and momentum are important 
keys. The decision-making for the “troop surges” in Iraq by Bush II and Afghanistan by Obama 
involved similar considerations as the original intervention decisions, although there is a 
fundamental difference between initiating an intervention and expanding or contracting the 
operation. In contrast to the initial decision, taking no action would not be an option. Syria could 
be seen as a test case on how to intervene and why or why not. All of the factors suggesting a 
“go” decision were in place: international crisis, threat to regional stability, coalition partners, 
momentum, continuity, humanitarian concern, and lessons learned from previous interventions 
as well as the dangers of doing nothing. Conversely, if ever the American public had been in a 
“no-go” mood, it was in 2014, whether the target country be Syria, Iran, North Korea, or 
Ukraine. Additionally, Russian interest and investment in Syria constituted a factor that was not 
present in the cases of Iraq (1990 and 2003), Afghanistan, or the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and 
Kosovo). The case of the recent Russian intervention in the Crimean region of Ukraine, 
following the overthrow of the pro-Russian regime of Viktor Yanukovych, could be telling. The 
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action of Putin in Crimea may have been a “brazen act of aggression,” in the words of John 
Kerry,1132 analogous to that of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait,1133 but there was no likelihood of the 
United States (under Barack Obama or any U.S. president) resorting to military force to expel the 
Russians from Ukrainian territory.1134 The potential reaction of a counterforce has thus emerged 
as a factor. On the one hand, Russian regional hegemony deterred U.S. action in the South 
Ossetia-Georgia conflict (2008). On the other hand, Russian cooperation with the United States 
and NATO brought resolution to the conflict in Kosovo. Therefore, the absence of a counter 
force is a prerequisite for U.S. military intervention. Hence, the presence of a counterforce is a 
deterrent. 
In the final analysis, the expectation of success, whether realistic or “false optimism,” is 
the constant in “go” decisions. The military interventions adjudged successful—Panama, Persian 
Gulf War, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Libya—were of limited duration and did not entail 
extended commitment and presence (i.e., post-invasion occupation). Regardless of whether the 
United States continues to be the sole global superpower or hegemon of the 21st century, 
American decision makers have never intervened expecting to fail.  
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